view src/auth/checkpassword-reply.c @ 22614:cf66220d281e

doveadm proxy: Don't crash if remote doesn't support log proxying
author Timo Sirainen <timo.sirainen@dovecot.fi>
date Sat, 14 Oct 2017 12:54:18 +0300
parents 9e120590e0ef
children
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/* simple checkpassword wrapper to send userdb data back to dovecot-auth */

#include "lib.h"
#include "str.h"
#include "strescape.h"
#include "write-full.h"

#include <unistd.h>

int main(void)
{
	string_t *str;
	const char *user, *home, *authorized, *orig_uid_env;
	const char *extra_env, *key, *value, *const *tmp;
	bool uid_found = FALSE, gid_found = FALSE;
	uid_t orig_uid;

	lib_init();
	str = t_str_new(1024);

	orig_uid_env = getenv("ORIG_UID");
	if (orig_uid_env == NULL || str_to_uid(orig_uid_env, &orig_uid) < 0)
		orig_uid = (uid_t)-1;

	/* ORIG_UID should have the auth process's UID that forked us.
	   if the checkpassword changed the UID, this could be a security hole
	   because the UID's other processes can ptrace this process and write
	   any kind of a reply to fd 4. so we can run only if:

	   a) INSECURE_SETUID environment is set.
	   b) process isn't ptraceable (this binary is setuid/setgid)
	   c) checkpassword didn't actually change the UID (but used
	      userdb_uid instead)
	   */
	if (getenv("INSECURE_SETUID") == NULL &&
	    (orig_uid == (uid_t)-1 || orig_uid != getuid()) &&
	    getuid() == geteuid() && getgid() == getegid()) {
		if (orig_uid_env == NULL) {
			i_error("checkpassword: ORIG_UID environment was dropped by checkpassword. "
				"Can't verify if we're safe to run. See "
				"http://wiki2.dovecot.org/AuthDatabase/CheckPassword#Security");
		} else {
			i_error("checkpassword: The checkpassword couldn't be run securely. See "
				"http://wiki2.dovecot.org/AuthDatabase/CheckPassword#Security");
		}
		return 111;
	}

	user = getenv("USER");
	if (user != NULL) {
		if (strchr(user, '\t') != NULL) {
			i_error("checkpassword: USER contains TAB");
			return 1;
		}
		str_printfa(str, "user=");
		str_append_tabescaped(str, user);
		str_append_c(str, '\t');
	}

	home = getenv("HOME");
	if (home != NULL) {
		if (strchr(home, '\t') != NULL) {
			i_error("checkpassword: HOME contains TAB");
			return 1;
		}
		str_printfa(str, "userdb_home=");
		str_append_tabescaped(str, home);
		str_append_c(str, '\t');
	}

	extra_env = getenv("EXTRA");
	if (extra_env != NULL) {
		for (tmp = t_strsplit(extra_env, " "); *tmp != NULL; tmp++) {
			value = getenv(*tmp);
			if (value != NULL) {
				key = t_str_lcase(*tmp);
				if (strcmp(key, "userdb_uid") == 0)
					uid_found = TRUE;
				else if (strcmp(key, "userdb_gid") == 0)
					gid_found = TRUE;
				str_append_tabescaped(str, key);
				str_append_c(str, '=');
				str_append_tabescaped(str, value);
				str_append_c(str, '\t');
			}
		}
	}
	if (!uid_found)
		str_printfa(str, "userdb_uid=%s\t",  dec2str(getuid()));
	if (!gid_found)
		str_printfa(str, "userdb_gid=%s\t",  dec2str(getgid()));

	i_assert(str_len(str) > 0);

	if (write_full(4, str_data(str), str_len(str)) < 0) {
		i_error("checkpassword: write_full() failed: %m");
		exit(111);
	}
	authorized = getenv("AUTHORIZED");
	if (authorized == NULL) {
		/* authentication */
		return 0;
	} else if (strcmp(authorized, "2") == 0) {
		/* successful passdb/userdb lookup */
		return 2;
	} else {
		i_error("checkpassword: Script doesn't support passdb/userdb lookup");
		return 111;
	}
}