Mercurial > illumos > illumos-gate
view usr/src/lib/krb5/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c @ 12955:b0be48f0b2d0
6936364 pkinit plugin mishandles the token label
| author | Will Fiveash <will.fiveash@oracle.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Wed, 28 Jul 2010 17:47:31 -0500 |
| parents | 2df46ea8f1b1 |
| children | 869896a08282 |
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/* * COPYRIGHT (C) 2006,2007 * THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED * * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works * and redistribute this software and such derivative works * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software * without specific, written prior authorization. If the * above copyright notice or any other identification of the * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must * also be included. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGES. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. */ #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <dlfcn.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <dirent.h> /* Solaris Kerberos */ #include <libintl.h> #include "k5-int.h" #include <ctype.h> /* * Q: What is this SILLYDECRYPT stuff about? * A: When using the ActivCard Linux pkcs11 library (v2.0.1), * the decrypt function fails. By inserting an extra * function call, which serves nothing but to change the * stack, we were able to work around the issue. If the * ActivCard library is fixed in the future, this * definition and related code can be removed. */ #define SILLYDECRYPT #include "pkinit_crypto_openssl.h" /* * Solaris Kerberos: * Changed to a switch statement so gettext() can be used * for internationization. * Use defined constants rather than raw numbers for error codes. */ static char * pkcs11_error_table(short code) { switch (code) { case CKR_OK: return (gettext("ok")); case CKR_CANCEL: return (gettext("cancel")); case CKR_HOST_MEMORY: return (gettext("host memory")); case CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID: return (gettext("slot id invalid")); case CKR_GENERAL_ERROR: return (gettext("general error")); case CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED: return (gettext("function failed")); case CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD: return (gettext("arguments bad")); case CKR_NO_EVENT: return (gettext("no event")); case CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS: return (gettext("need to create threads")); case CKR_CANT_LOCK: return (gettext("cant lock")); case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY: return (gettext("attribute read only")); case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE: return (gettext("attribute sensitive")); case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID: return (gettext("attribute type invalid")); case CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID: return (gettext("attribute value invalid")); case CKR_DATA_INVALID: return (gettext("data invalid")); case CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE: return (gettext("data len range")); case CKR_DEVICE_ERROR: return (gettext("device error")); case CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY: return (gettext("device memory")); case CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED: return (gettext("device removed")); case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: return (gettext("encrypted data invalid")); case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE: return (gettext("encrypted data len range")); case CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED: return (gettext("function canceled")); case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL: return (gettext("function not parallel")); case CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED: return (gettext("function not supported")); case CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return (gettext("key handle invalid")); case CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return (gettext("key size range")); case CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return (gettext("key type inconsistent")); case CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED: return (gettext("key not needed")); case CKR_KEY_CHANGED: return (gettext("key changed")); case CKR_KEY_NEEDED: return (gettext("key needed")); case CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE: return (gettext("key indigestible")); case CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED: return (gettext("key function not permitted")); case CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE: return (gettext("key not wrappable")); case CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE: return (gettext("key unextractable")); case CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID: return (gettext("mechanism invalid")); case CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID: return (gettext("mechanism param invalid")); case CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID: return (gettext("object handle invalid")); case CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE: return (gettext("operation active")); case CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED: return (gettext("operation not initialized")); case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT: return (gettext("pin incorrect")); case CKR_PIN_INVALID: return (gettext("pin invalid")); case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE: return (gettext("pin len range")); case CKR_PIN_EXPIRED: return (gettext("pin expired")); case CKR_PIN_LOCKED: return (gettext("pin locked")); case CKR_SESSION_CLOSED: return (gettext("session closed")); case CKR_SESSION_COUNT: return (gettext("session count")); case CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID: return (gettext("session handle invalid")); case CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED: return (gettext("session parallel not supported")); case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY: return (gettext("session read only")); case CKR_SESSION_EXISTS: return (gettext("session exists")); case CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS: return (gettext("session read only exists")); case CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS: return (gettext("session read write so exists")); case CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: return (gettext("signature invalid")); case CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE: return (gettext("signature len range")); case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE: return (gettext("template incomplete")); case CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT: return (gettext("template inconsistent")); case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT: return (gettext("token not present")); case CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED: return (gettext("token not recognized")); case CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED: return (gettext("token write protected")); case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return (gettext("unwrapping key handle invalid")); case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return (gettext("unwrapping key size range")); case CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return (gettext("unwrapping key type inconsistent")); case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: return (gettext("user already logged in")); case CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN: return (gettext("user not logged in")); case CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED: return (gettext("user pin not initialized")); case CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID: return (gettext("user type invalid")); case CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN: return (gettext("user another already logged in")); case CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES: return (gettext("user too many types")); case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID: return (gettext("wrapped key invalid")); case CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE: return (gettext("wrapped key len range")); case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID: return (gettext("wrapping key handle invalid")); case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE: return (gettext("wrapping key size range")); case CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT: return (gettext("wrapping key type inconsistent")); case CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED: return (gettext("random seed not supported")); case CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG: return (gettext("random no rng")); case CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID: return (gettext("domain params invalid")); case CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: return (gettext("buffer too small")); case CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID: return (gettext("saved state invalid")); case CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE: return (gettext("information sensitive")); case CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE: return (gettext("state unsaveable")); case CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED: return (gettext("cryptoki not initialized")); case CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED: return (gettext("cryptoki already initialized")); case CKR_MUTEX_BAD: return (gettext("mutex bad")); case CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED: return (gettext("mutex not locked")); case CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED: return (gettext("function rejected")); default: return (gettext("unknown error")); } } /* DH parameters */ unsigned char pkinit_1024_dhprime[128] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; unsigned char pkinit_2048_dhprime[2048/8] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; unsigned char pkinit_4096_dhprime[4096/8] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; /* Solaris Kerberos */ static k5_mutex_t oids_mutex = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER; static int pkinit_oids_refs = 0; krb5_error_code pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx = NULL; /* initialize openssl routines */ /* Solaris Kerberos */ retval = openssl_init(); if (retval != 0) goto out; ctx = (pkinit_plg_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; (void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); pkiDebug("%s: initializing openssl crypto context at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx); retval = pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(ctx); if (retval) goto out; retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(ctx); if (retval) goto out; *cryptoctx = ctx; out: if (retval && ctx != NULL) pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(ctx); return retval; } void pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx) { pkiDebug("%s: freeing context at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, cryptoctx); if (cryptoctx == NULL) return; pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(cryptoctx); pkinit_fini_dh_params(cryptoctx); free(cryptoctx); } krb5_error_code pkinit_init_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context *idctx) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx = NULL; ctx = (pkinit_identity_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; (void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); retval = pkinit_init_certs(ctx); if (retval) goto out; retval = pkinit_init_pkcs11(ctx); if (retval) goto out; pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx); *idctx = ctx; out: if (retval) { if (ctx) pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(ctx); } return retval; } void pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx) { if (idctx == NULL) return; pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, idctx); pkinit_fini_certs(idctx); pkinit_fini_pkcs11(idctx); free(idctx); } krb5_error_code pkinit_init_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context *cryptoctx) { pkinit_req_crypto_context ctx = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (cryptoctx == NULL) return EINVAL; ctx = (pkinit_req_crypto_context)malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return ENOMEM; (void) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->dh = NULL; ctx->received_cert = NULL; *cryptoctx = ctx; pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx); return 0; } void pkinit_fini_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx) { if (req_cryptoctx == NULL) return; pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, req_cryptoctx); if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL) DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh); if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert != NULL) X509_free(req_cryptoctx->received_cert); free(req_cryptoctx); } static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; int nid = 0; /* * If OpenSSL already knows about the OID, use the * existing definition. Otherwise, create an OID object. */ #define CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED(oid, vn, sn, ln) \ nid = OBJ_txt2nid(oid); \ if (nid == NID_undef) { \ nid = OBJ_create(oid, sn, ln); \ if (nid == NID_undef) { \ pkiDebug("Error creating oid object for '%s'\n", oid); \ goto out; \ } \ } \ ctx->vn = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); /* Solaris Kerberos */ retval = k5_mutex_lock(&oids_mutex); if (retval != 0) goto out; CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.2", id_pkinit_san, "id-pkinit-san", "KRB5PrincipalName"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1", id_pkinit_authData, "id-pkinit-authdata", "PKINIT signedAuthPack"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2", id_pkinit_DHKeyData, "id-pkinit-DHKeyData", "PKINIT dhSignedData"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.3", id_pkinit_rkeyData, "id-pkinit-rkeyData", "PKINIT encKeyPack"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4", id_pkinit_KPClientAuth, "id-pkinit-KPClientAuth", "PKINIT Client EKU"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5", id_pkinit_KPKdc, "id-pkinit-KPKdc", "KDC EKU"); #if 0 CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.2.840.113549.1.7.1", id_pkinit_authData9, "id-pkcs7-data", "PKCS7 data"); #else /* See note in pkinit_pkcs7type2oid() */ ctx->id_pkinit_authData9 = NULL; #endif CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2", id_ms_kp_sc_logon, "id-ms-kp-sc-logon EKU", "Microsoft SmartCard Login EKU"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3", id_ms_san_upn, "id-ms-san-upn", "Microsoft Universal Principal Name"); CREATE_OBJ_IF_NEEDED("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1", id_kp_serverAuth, "id-kp-serverAuth EKU", "Server Authentication EKU"); /* Success */ retval = 0; pkinit_oids_refs++; /* Solaris Kerberos */ k5_mutex_unlock(&oids_mutex); out: return retval; } static krb5_error_code get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert) { X509 *cert = NULL; BIO *tmp = NULL; int code; krb5_error_code retval; if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL) return EINVAL; *retcert = NULL; tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (tmp == NULL) return ENOMEM; code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename); if (code == 0) { retval = errno; goto cleanup; } cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (cert == NULL) { retval = EIO; pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename); goto cleanup; } *retcert = cert; retval = 0; cleanup: if (tmp != NULL) BIO_free(tmp); return retval; } static krb5_error_code get_key(char *filename, EVP_PKEY **retkey) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; BIO *tmp = NULL; int code; krb5_error_code retval; if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL) return EINVAL; tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (tmp == NULL) return ENOMEM; code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename); if (code == 0) { retval = errno; goto cleanup; } pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (pkey == NULL) { retval = EIO; pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename); goto cleanup; } *retkey = pkey; retval = 0; cleanup: if (tmp != NULL) BIO_free(tmp); return retval; } static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; /* Only call OBJ_cleanup once! */ /* Solaris Kerberos: locking */ k5_mutex_lock(&oids_mutex); if (--pkinit_oids_refs == 0) OBJ_cleanup(); k5_mutex_unlock(&oids_mutex); } static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; plgctx->dh_1024 = DH_new(); if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL) goto cleanup; plgctx->dh_1024->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_1024_dhprime, sizeof(pkinit_1024_dhprime), NULL); if ((plgctx->dh_1024->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (plgctx->dh_1024->q = BN_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_1024->g, DH_GENERATOR_2); BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_1024->q, plgctx->dh_1024->p); plgctx->dh_2048 = DH_new(); if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL) goto cleanup; plgctx->dh_2048->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime, sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL); if ((plgctx->dh_2048->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (plgctx->dh_2048->q = BN_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_2048->g, DH_GENERATOR_2); BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_2048->q, plgctx->dh_2048->p); plgctx->dh_4096 = DH_new(); if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL) goto cleanup; plgctx->dh_4096->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime, sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL); if ((plgctx->dh_4096->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (plgctx->dh_4096->q = BN_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; BN_set_word(plgctx->dh_4096->g, DH_GENERATOR_2); BN_rshift1(plgctx->dh_4096->q, plgctx->dh_4096->p); retval = 0; cleanup: if (retval) pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx); return retval; } static void pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx) { if (plgctx->dh_1024 != NULL) DH_free(plgctx->dh_1024); if (plgctx->dh_2048 != NULL) DH_free(plgctx->dh_2048); if (plgctx->dh_4096 != NULL) DH_free(plgctx->dh_4096); plgctx->dh_1024 = plgctx->dh_2048 = plgctx->dh_4096 = NULL; } static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ int i; for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) ctx->creds[i] = NULL; ctx->my_certs = NULL; ctx->cert_index = 0; ctx->my_key = NULL; ctx->trustedCAs = NULL; ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL; ctx->revoked = NULL; return 0; } static void pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; if (ctx->my_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->my_certs, X509_free); if (ctx->my_key != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->my_key); if (ctx->trustedCAs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->trustedCAs, X509_free); if (ctx->intermediateCAs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->intermediateCAs, X509_free); if (ctx->revoked != NULL) sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(ctx->revoked, X509_CRL_free); } static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 ctx->p11_module_name = strdup(PKCS11_MODNAME); if (ctx->p11_module_name == NULL) return ENOMEM; ctx->p11_module = NULL; ctx->slotid = PK_NOSLOT; ctx->token_label = NULL; ctx->cert_label = NULL; ctx->PIN = NULL; ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ctx->p11 = NULL; ctx->p11flags = 0; /* Solaris Kerberos */ #endif ctx->pkcs11_method = 0; return 0; } static void pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx) { #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 if (ctx == NULL) return; if (ctx->p11 != NULL) { if (ctx->session) { ctx->p11->C_CloseSession(ctx->session); ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; } /* * Solaris Kerberos: * Only call C_Finalize if the process was not already using pkcs11. */ if (ctx->finalize_pkcs11 == TRUE) ctx->p11->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR); ctx->p11 = NULL; } if (ctx->p11_module != NULL) { pkinit_C_UnloadModule(ctx->p11_module); ctx->p11_module = NULL; } if (ctx->p11_module_name != NULL) free(ctx->p11_module_name); if (ctx->token_label != NULL) free(ctx->token_label); if (ctx->cert_id != NULL) free(ctx->cert_id); if (ctx->cert_label != NULL) free(ctx->cert_label); if (ctx->PIN != NULL) { (void) memset(ctx->PIN, 0, strlen(ctx->PIN)); free(ctx->PIN); } #endif } krb5_error_code pkinit_identity_set_prompter(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data) { id_cryptoctx->prompter = prompter; id_cryptoctx->prompter_data = prompter_data; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int cms_msg_type, int include_certchain, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **signed_data, unsigned int *signed_data_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL; unsigned char *p; ASN1_TYPE *pkinit_data = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx2; const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL; unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk; unsigned char *sig = NULL; unsigned int sig_len = 0; X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL; unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0; unsigned char *y = NULL, *alg_buf = NULL, *digest_buf = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (signed_data == NULL) return EINVAL; if (signed_data_len == NULL) return EINVAL; /* start creating PKCS7 data */ if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; p7->d.sign = p7s; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3)) goto cleanup; /* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */ if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto cleanup; cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index); if (!include_certchain) { pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n"); sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert)); } else { /* create a cert chain */ X509_STORE *certstore = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX certctx; STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; int i = 0, size = 0; if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n"); X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(certstore, openssl_callback); X509_STORE_CTX_init(&certctx, certstore, cert, id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs); X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs); /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (X509_verify_cert(&certctx) <= 0) { pkiDebug("failed to create a certificate chain: %s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&certctx))); if (!sk_X509_num(id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs)) pkiDebug("No trusted CAs found. Check your X509_anchors\n"); goto cleanup; } certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&certctx); size = sk_X509_num(certstack); pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size); for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf); sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x)); } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&certctx); X509_STORE_free(certstore); sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free); } p7s->cert = cert_stack; /* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */ if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1)) goto cleanup; if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert))) goto cleanup; /* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do * things the ugly way. */ M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))) goto cleanup; /* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */ /* Set digest algs */ p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1); if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL) ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter); if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; /* Set sig algs */ if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL) ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter); p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption); if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) goto cleanup; p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; /* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */ oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type); if (oid == NULL) goto cleanup; if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) { /* don't include signed attributes for pa-type 15 request */ abuf = data; alen = data_len; } else { /* add signed attributes */ /* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, data_len); md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_data, &md_len); /* create a message digest attr */ digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len); PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *) digest_attr); /* create a content-type attr */ PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid); /* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */ /* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */ sk = p7si->auth_attr; alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *) sk, &abuf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN)); if (abuf == NULL) goto cleanup2; } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 /* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */ /* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash * function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo * DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE { * digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * digest OCTET STRING } */ if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 && id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) { pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n"); EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx2); /* if this is not draft9 request, include digest signed attribute */ if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, md_tmp, NULL); else EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, EVP_sha1(), NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx2, abuf, alen); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx2, md_data2, &md_len2); alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (alg == NULL) goto cleanup2; alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1); alg->parameter = NULL; alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL); alg_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(alg_len); if (alg_buf == NULL) goto cleanup2; digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (digest == NULL) goto cleanup2; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2); digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL); digest_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(digest_len); if (digest_buf == NULL) goto cleanup2; digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); y = digestInfo_buf = (unsigned char *)malloc(digestInfo_len); if (digestInfo_buf == NULL) goto cleanup2; ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y); i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y); #ifdef DEBUG_SIG pkiDebug("signing buffer\n"); print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len); print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign"); #endif retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len); } else #endif { pkiDebug("mech = %s\n", id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS"); retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen, &sig, &sig_len); } #ifdef DEBUG_SIG print_buffer(sig, sig_len); #endif if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) free(abuf); if (retval) goto cleanup2; /* Add signature */ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig, (int)sig_len)) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("failed to add a signed digest attribute\n"); goto cleanup2; } /* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */ if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si)) goto cleanup2; /* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */ if ((inner_p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup2; if ((pkinit_data = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup2; pkinit_data->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; if ((pkinit_data->value.octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup2; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pkinit_data->value.octet_string, data, (int)data_len)) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("failed to add pkcs7 data\n"); goto cleanup2; } if (!PKCS7_set0_type_other(inner_p7, OBJ_obj2nid(oid), pkinit_data)) goto cleanup2; if (p7s->contents != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7s->contents); p7s->contents = inner_p7; *signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL); if (!(*signed_data_len)) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n"); goto cleanup2; } if ((p = *signed_data = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*signed_data_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup2; /* DER encode PKCS7 data */ retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p); if (!retval) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n"); goto cleanup2; } retval = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) { print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len, "/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata"); } else { if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_SERVER) { print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len, "/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata"); } else { print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len, "/tmp/draft9_pkcs7_signeddata"); } } #endif cleanup2: if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 && id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx2); if (digest_buf != NULL) free(digest_buf); if (digestInfo_buf != NULL) free(digestInfo_buf); if (alg_buf != NULL) free(alg_buf); if (digest != NULL) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest); } #endif if (alg != NULL) X509_ALGOR_free(alg); cleanup: if (p7 != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7); if (sig != NULL) free(sig); return retval; } krb5_error_code cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx, int cms_msg_type, int require_crl_checking, unsigned char *signed_data, unsigned int signed_data_len, unsigned char **data, unsigned int *data_len, unsigned char **authz_data, unsigned int *authz_data_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; int flags = PKCS7_NOVERIFY, i = 0; unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0; const unsigned char *p = signed_data; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx; STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_verified_chain = NULL; krb5_data *authz = NULL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(signed_data, signed_data_len, "/tmp/client_received_pkcs7_signeddata"); #endif /* Do this early enough to create the shadow OID for pkcs7-data if needed */ oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, cms_msg_type); if (oid == NULL) goto cleanup; /* decode received PKCS7 message */ if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("%s: failed to decode message: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); goto cleanup; } /* verify that the received message is PKCS7 SignedData message */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_signed) { pkiDebug("Expected id-signedData PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n", OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type)); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n"); goto cleanup; } /* setup to verify X509 certificate used to sign PKCS7 message */ if (!(store = X509_STORE_new())) goto cleanup; /* check if we are inforcing CRL checking */ vflags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL; if (require_crl_checking) X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback); else X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls); X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags); /* get the signer's information from the PKCS7 message */ if ((si_sk = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((x = PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(p7, si)) == NULL) goto cleanup; /* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs * received in the PKCS7 message */ if (idctx->revoked == NULL) revoked = p7->d.sign->crl; else if (p7->d.sign->crl == NULL) revoked = idctx->revoked; else { size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked); revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i)); size = sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->crl); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(p7->d.sign->crl, i)); } /* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and * include the CA chain received in the PKCS7 message */ if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL) intermediateCAs = p7->d.sign->cert; else if (p7->d.sign->cert == NULL) intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs; else { size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs); intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null(); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i)); } size = sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, i)); } } /* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and * trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs */ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs)) goto cleanup; X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, revoked); /* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */ if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs); else { pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN if (intermediateCAs != NULL) { size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs); pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name( sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf); } } if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) { size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs); pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name( sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf); } } if (revoked != NULL) { size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked); pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf); } } #endif i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) { int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx); reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert_ctx.current_cert); switch(j) { case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE; break; default: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE; } X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name( reqctx->received_cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j, X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); #ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN size = sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert); pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size); for (j = 0; j < size; j++) { X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, j); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf); } #endif } else { /* retrieve verified certificate chain */ if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx); } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) goto cleanup; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) flags |= PKCS7_NOATTR; if (PKCS7_verify(p7, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags)) { int valid_oid = 0; if (!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, oid)) valid_oid = 1; else if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) { /* * Various implementations of the pa-type 15 request use * different OIDS. We check that the returned object * has any of the acceptable OIDs */ ASN1_OBJECT *client_oid = NULL, *server_oid = NULL, *rsa_oid = NULL; client_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT); server_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER); rsa_oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER); if (!OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, client_oid) || !OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, server_oid) || !OBJ_cmp(p7->d.sign->contents->type, rsa_oid)) valid_oid = 1; } if (valid_oid) pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification successful\n"); else { pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n"); print_buffer(p7->d.sign->contents->type->data, (unsigned int)p7->d.sign->contents->type->length); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n"); goto cleanup; } } else { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) { case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED; break; case PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: default: retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG; } pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification failure\n"); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); goto cleanup; } /* transfer the data from PKCS7 message into return buffer */ for (size = 0;;) { if ((*data = realloc(*data, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i = BIO_read(out, &((*data)[size]), 1024 * 10); if (i <= 0) break; else size += i; } *data_len = size; reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x); /* generate authorization data */ if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT || cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9) { if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL) goto out; *authz_data = NULL; retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain, &krb5_verified_chain); if (retval) { pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n"); goto cleanup; } retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_verified_chain, &authz); if (retval) { pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length, "/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas"); #endif *authz_data = (unsigned char *)malloc(authz->length); if (*authz_data == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } (void) memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length); *authz_data_len = authz->length; } out: retval = 0; cleanup: if (out != NULL) BIO_free(out); if (store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(store); if (p7 != NULL) { if (idctx->intermediateCAs != NULL && p7->d.sign->cert) sk_X509_free(intermediateCAs); if (idctx->revoked != NULL && p7->d.sign->crl) sk_X509_CRL_free(revoked); PKCS7_free(p7); } if (verified_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(verified_chain, X509_free); if (krb5_verified_chain != NULL) free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_verified_chain); if (authz != NULL) krb5_free_data(context, authz); return retval; } krb5_error_code cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx, krb5_preauthtype pa_type, int include_certchain, unsigned char *key_pack, unsigned int key_pack_len, unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL; int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY; STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; int cms_msg_type; /* create the PKCS7 SignedData portion of the PKCS7 EnvelopedData */ switch ((int)pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: cms_msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9; break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: cms_msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER; break; default: /* Solaris Kerberos */ retval = EINVAL; goto cleanup; } retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx, cms_msg_type, include_certchain, key_pack, key_pack_len, &signed_data, (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len); if (retval) { pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n"); goto cleanup; } /* check we have client's certificate */ if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) { retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; goto cleanup; } encerts = sk_X509_new_null(); sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert); cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); switch (pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data, &enc_data_len); retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len); if (retval != enc_data_len) { pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval); goto cleanup; } break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: retval = BIO_write(in, signed_data, signed_data_len); if (retval != signed_data_len) { pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval); /* Solaris Kerberos */ retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; goto cleanup; } break; default: retval = -1; goto cleanup; } p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags); if (p7 == NULL) { pkiDebug("failed to encrypt PKCS7 object\n"); retval = -1; goto cleanup; } switch (pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ: p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD: p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; } *out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL); if (!*out_len || (p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p); if (!retval) { pkiDebug("unable to write pkcs7 object\n"); goto cleanup; } retval = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data"); #endif cleanup: if (p7 != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (signed_data != NULL) free(signed_data); if (enc_data != NULL) free(enc_data); if (encerts != NULL) sk_X509_free(encerts); return retval; } krb5_error_code cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_preauthtype pa_type, int require_crl_checking, unsigned char *enveloped_data, unsigned int enveloped_data_len, unsigned char **data, unsigned int *data_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; int i = 0; unsigned int size = 0; const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data; unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0; unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL; int msg_type = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len, "/tmp/client_envelopeddata"); #endif /* decode received PKCS7 message */ if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); pkiDebug("failed to decode pkcs7\n"); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); goto cleanup; } /* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) { pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n", OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type)); krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n"); goto cleanup; } /* decrypt received PKCS7 message */ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) { pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n"); } else { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error(); if (err != 0) krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption failed\n"); goto cleanup; } /* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */ for (;;) { if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10); if (i <= 0) break; else size += i; } tmp_buf_len = size; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack"); #endif /* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */ switch (pa_type) { case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP: msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER; break; case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD: msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9; break; default: pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; goto cleanup; } /* * If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make * decoding easier in the verify routine. * For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it * is already wrapped. */ #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT /* * The Longhorn server returns the expected RFC-style data, but * it is missing the sequence tag and length, so it requires * special processing when wrapping. * This will hopefully be fixed before the final release and * this can all be removed. */ if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER || longhorn == 1) { retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len, longhorn); if (retval) { pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n"); goto cleanup; } vfy_buf = tmp_buf2; vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len; } else { vfy_buf = tmp_buf; vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len; } #else if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) { retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len); if (retval) { pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n"); goto cleanup; } vfy_buf = tmp_buf2; vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len; } else { vfy_buf = tmp_buf; vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len; } #endif #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2"); #endif retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, msg_type, require_crl_checking, vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, data, data_len, NULL, NULL); if (!retval) pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n"); else { pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n"); goto cleanup; } retval = 0; cleanup: if (p7 != NULL) PKCS7_free(p7); if (out != NULL) BIO_free(out); if (tmp_buf != NULL) free(tmp_buf); if (tmp_buf2 != NULL) free(tmp_buf2); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx, X509 *cert, krb5_principal **princs_ret, krb5_principal **upn_ret, unsigned char ***dns_ret) { krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; int p = 0, u = 0, d = 0; krb5_principal *princs = NULL; krb5_principal *upns = NULL; unsigned char **dnss = NULL; int i, num_found = 0; if (princs_ret == NULL && upn_ret == NULL && dns_ret == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: nowhere to return any values!\n", __FUNCTION__); return retval; } if (cert == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: no certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__); return retval; } X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("%s: looking for SANs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf); if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1)) >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *ialt = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; int ret = 0; unsigned int num_sans = 0; if (!(ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i)) || !(ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) { pkiDebug("%s: found no subject alt name extensions\n", __FUNCTION__); goto cleanup; } num_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt); pkiDebug("%s: found %d subject alt name extension(s)\n", __FUNCTION__, num_sans); /* OK, we're likely returning something. Allocate return values */ if (princs_ret != NULL) { princs = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal)); if (princs == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } } if (upn_ret != NULL) { upns = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal)); if (upns == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } } if (dns_ret != NULL) { dnss = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*dnss)); if (dnss == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } } for (i = 0; i < num_sans; i++) { krb5_data name = { 0, 0, NULL }; gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i); switch (gen->type) { case GEN_OTHERNAME: name.length = gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->length; name.data = (char *)gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->data; if (princs != NULL && OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_pkinit_san, gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) { #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)name.data, name.length, "/tmp/pkinit_san"); #endif ret = k5int_decode_krb5_principal_name(&name, &princs[p]); if (ret) { pkiDebug("%s: failed decoding pkinit san value\n", __FUNCTION__); } else { p++; num_found++; } } else if (upns != NULL && OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_ms_san_upn, gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) { ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name.data, &upns[u]); if (ret) { pkiDebug("%s: failed parsing ms-upn san value\n", __FUNCTION__); } else { u++; num_found++; } } else { pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized othername oid in SAN\n", __FUNCTION__); continue; } break; case GEN_DNS: if (dnss != NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: found dns name = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, gen->d.dNSName->data); dnss[d] = (unsigned char *) strdup((char *)gen->d.dNSName->data); if (dnss[d] == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: failed to duplicate dns name\n", __FUNCTION__); } else { d++; num_found++; } } break; default: pkiDebug("%s: SAN type = %d expecting %d\n", __FUNCTION__, gen->type, GEN_OTHERNAME); } } sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ialt, GENERAL_NAME_free); } retval = 0; if (princs) *princs_ret = princs; if (upns) *upn_ret = upns; if (dnss) *dns_ret = dnss; cleanup: if (retval) { if (princs != NULL) { for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++) krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]); free(princs); } if (upns != NULL) { for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++) krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]); free(upns); } if (dnss != NULL) { for (i = 0; dnss[i] != NULL; i++) free(dnss[i]); free(dnss); } } return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx, krb5_principal **princs_ret, krb5_principal **upn_ret, unsigned char ***dns_ret) { krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL; if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__); return retval; } return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx, reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret, upn_ret, dns_ret); } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_check_cert_eku(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx, int checking_kdc_cert, int allow_secondary_usage, int *valid_eku) { char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; int found_eku = 0; krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL; int i; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (valid_eku == NULL) return retval; *valid_eku = 0; if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) goto cleanup; X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("%s: looking for EKUs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf); if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(reqctx->received_cert, NID_ext_key_usage, -1)) >= 0) { EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL); if (extusage) { pkiDebug("%s: found eku info in the cert\n", __FUNCTION__); for (i = 0; found_eku == 0 && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *tmp_oid; tmp_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i); pkiDebug("%s: checking eku %d of %d, allow_secondary = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, i+1, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage), allow_secondary_usage); if (checking_kdc_cert) { if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc) == 0) || (allow_secondary_usage && OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_kp_serverAuth) == 0)) found_eku = 1; } else { if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth) == 0) || (allow_secondary_usage && OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon) == 0)) found_eku = 1; } } } EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(extusage); if (found_eku) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL; pkiDebug("%s: found acceptable EKU, checking for digitalSignature\n", __FUNCTION__); /* check that digitalSignature KeyUsage is present */ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { if (!ku_reject(reqctx->received_cert, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { pkiDebug("%s: found digitalSignature KU\n", __FUNCTION__); *valid_eku = 1; } else pkiDebug("%s: didn't find digitalSignature KU\n", __FUNCTION__); } ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); } } retval = 0; cleanup: pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_eku %d\n", __FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_eku); return retval; } krb5_error_code pkinit_octetstring2key(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *key, unsigned int dh_key_len, krb5_keyblock * key_block) { krb5_error_code retval; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char counter; size_t keybytes, keylength, offset; krb5_data random_data; if ((buf = (unsigned char *) malloc(dh_key_len)) == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } (void) memset(buf, 0, dh_key_len); counter = 0; offset = 0; do { SHA_CTX c; SHA1_Init(&c); SHA1_Update(&c, &counter, 1); SHA1_Update(&c, key, dh_key_len); SHA1_Final(md, &c); if (dh_key_len - offset < sizeof(md)) (void) memcpy(buf + offset, md, dh_key_len - offset); else (void) memcpy(buf + offset, md, sizeof(md)); offset += sizeof(md); counter++; } while (offset < dh_key_len); /* Solaris Kerberos */ key_block->magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK; key_block->enctype = etype; retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, etype, &keybytes, &keylength); if (retval) goto cleanup; key_block->length = keylength; key_block->contents = calloc(keylength, sizeof(unsigned char *)); if (key_block->contents == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } random_data.length = keybytes; random_data.data = (char *)buf; retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, etype, &random_data, key_block); cleanup: if (buf != NULL) free(buf); if (retval && key_block->contents != NULL && key_block->length != 0) { (void) memset(key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length); key_block->length = 0; } return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code client_create_dh(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int dh_size, unsigned char **dh_params, unsigned int *dh_params_len, unsigned char **dh_pubkey, unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; unsigned char *buf = NULL; int dh_err = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL; if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL) { if ((cryptoctx->dh = DH_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((cryptoctx->dh->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (cryptoctx->dh->q = BN_new()) == NULL) goto cleanup; switch(dh_size) { case 1024: pkiDebug("client uses 1024 DH keys\n"); cryptoctx->dh->p = get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL); break; case 2048: pkiDebug("client uses 2048 DH keys\n"); cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_2048_dhprime, sizeof(pkinit_2048_dhprime), NULL); break; case 4096: pkiDebug("client uses 4096 DH keys\n"); cryptoctx->dh->p = BN_bin2bn(pkinit_4096_dhprime, sizeof(pkinit_4096_dhprime), NULL); break; default: goto cleanup; } BN_set_word((cryptoctx->dh->g), DH_GENERATOR_2); BN_rshift1(cryptoctx->dh->q, cryptoctx->dh->p); } DH_generate_key(cryptoctx->dh); /* Solaris Kerberos */ #ifdef DEBUG DH_check(cryptoctx->dh, &dh_err); if (dh_err != 0) { pkiDebug("Warning: dh_check failed with %d\n", dh_err); if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) pkiDebug("p value is not prime\n"); if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) pkiDebug("p value is not a safe prime\n"); if (dh_err & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) pkiDebug("unable to check the generator value\n"); if (dh_err & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) pkiDebug("the g value is not a generator\n"); } #endif #ifdef DEBUG_DH print_dh(cryptoctx->dh, "client's DH params\n"); print_pubkey(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key="); #endif DH_check_pub_key(cryptoctx->dh, cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, &dh_err); if (dh_err != 0) { pkiDebug("dh_check_pub_key failed with %d\n", dh_err); goto cleanup; } /* pack DHparams */ /* aglo: usually we could just call i2d_DHparams to encode DH params * however, PKINIT requires RFC3279 encoding and openssl does pkcs#3. */ retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh->p, cryptoctx->dh->g, cryptoctx->dh->q, dh_params, dh_params_len); if (retval) goto cleanup; /* pack DH public key */ /* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this * encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the * subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo * data element */ if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; *dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL); if ((buf = *dh_pubkey = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &buf); if (pub_key != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); retval = 0; return retval; cleanup: if (cryptoctx->dh != NULL) DH_free(cryptoctx->dh); cryptoctx->dh = NULL; if (*dh_params != NULL) free(*dh_params); *dh_params = NULL; if (*dh_pubkey != NULL) free(*dh_pubkey); *dh_pubkey = NULL; if (pub_key != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code client_process_dh(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *subjectPublicKey_data, unsigned int subjectPublicKey_length, unsigned char **client_key, unsigned int *client_key_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED; BIGNUM *server_pub_key = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long data_len; /* decode subjectPublicKey (retrieve INTEGER from OCTET_STRING) */ if (der_decode_data(subjectPublicKey_data, (long)subjectPublicKey_length, &data, &data_len) != 0) { pkiDebug("failed to decode subjectPublicKey\n"); /* Solaris Kerberos */ retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED; goto cleanup; } *client_key_len = DH_size(cryptoctx->dh); if ((*client_key = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *client_key_len)) == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } p = data; if ((pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, data_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((server_pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; DH_compute_key(*client_key, server_pub_key, cryptoctx->dh); #ifdef DEBUG_DH print_pubkey(server_pub_key, "server's pub_key="); pkiDebug("client secret key (%d)= ", *client_key_len); print_buffer(*client_key, *client_key_len); #endif retval = 0; if (server_pub_key != NULL) BN_free(server_pub_key); if (pub_key != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); if (data != NULL) free (data); return retval; cleanup: if (*client_key != NULL) free(*client_key); *client_key = NULL; if (pub_key != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); if (data != NULL) free (data); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code server_check_dh(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_octet_data *dh_params, int minbits) { DH *dh = NULL; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int dh_prime_bits; krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED; tmp = dh_params->data; dh = DH_new(); dh = pkinit_decode_dh_params(&dh, &tmp, dh_params->length); if (dh == NULL) { pkiDebug("failed to decode dhparams\n"); goto cleanup; } /* KDC SHOULD check to see if the key parameters satisfy its policy */ dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p); if (minbits && dh_prime_bits < minbits) { pkiDebug("client sent dh params with %d bits, we require %d\n", dh_prime_bits, minbits); goto cleanup; } /* check dhparams is group 2 */ if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_1024->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { retval = 0; goto cleanup; } /* check dhparams is group 14 */ if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_2048->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { retval = 0; goto cleanup; } /* check dhparams is group 16 */ if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_4096->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { retval = 0; goto cleanup; } cleanup: if (retval == 0) req_cryptoctx->dh = dh; else DH_free(dh); return retval; } /* kdc's dh function */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code server_process_dh(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **dh_pubkey, unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len, unsigned char **server_key, unsigned int *server_key_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; DH *dh = NULL, *dh_server = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL; /* get client's received DH parameters that we saved in server_check_dh */ dh = cryptoctx->dh; dh_server = DH_new(); if (dh_server == NULL) goto cleanup; dh_server->p = BN_dup(dh->p); dh_server->g = BN_dup(dh->g); dh_server->q = BN_dup(dh->q); /* decode client's public key */ p = data; pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, (int)data_len); if (pub_key == NULL) goto cleanup; dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL); if (dh->pub_key == NULL) goto cleanup; ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); if (!DH_generate_key(dh_server)) goto cleanup; /* generate DH session key */ *server_key_len = DH_size(dh_server); if ((*server_key = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*server_key_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; DH_compute_key(*server_key, dh->pub_key, dh_server); #ifdef DEBUG_DH print_dh(dh_server, "client&server's DH params\n"); print_pubkey(dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key="); print_pubkey(dh_server->pub_key, "server's pub_key="); pkiDebug("server secret key="); print_buffer(*server_key, *server_key_len); #endif /* KDC reply */ /* pack DH public key */ /* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this * encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the * subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo * data element */ if ((pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh_server->pub_key, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; *dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL); if ((p = *dh_pubkey = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t)*dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &p); if (pub_key != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); retval = 0; if (dh_server != NULL) DH_free(dh_server); return retval; cleanup: if (dh_server != NULL) DH_free(dh_server); if (*dh_pubkey != NULL) free(*dh_pubkey); if (*server_key != NULL) free(*server_key); return retval; } /* * Solaris Kerberos: * Add locking around did_init to make it MT-safe. */ static krb5_error_code openssl_init() { krb5_error_code ret = 0; static int did_init = 0; static k5_mutex_t init_mutex = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER; ret = k5_mutex_lock(&init_mutex); if (ret == 0) { if (!did_init) { /* initialize openssl routines */ CRYPTO_malloc_init(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); did_init++; } k5_mutex_unlock(&init_mutex); } return (ret); } static krb5_error_code pkinit_encode_dh_params(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *q, unsigned char **buf, unsigned int *buf_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; int bufsize = 0, r = 0; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *ap = NULL, *ag = NULL, *aq = NULL; if ((ap = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(p, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((ag = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(g, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((aq = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(q, NULL)) == NULL) goto cleanup; bufsize = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, NULL); bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, NULL); bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, NULL); r = ASN1_object_size(1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); tmp = *buf = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) r); if (tmp == NULL) goto cleanup; ASN1_put_object(&tmp, 1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, &tmp); i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, &tmp); i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, &tmp); *buf_len = r; retval = 0; cleanup: if (ap != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ap); if (ag != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ag); if (aq != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(aq); return retval; } static DH * pkinit_decode_dh_params(DH ** a, unsigned char **pp, unsigned int len) { ASN1_INTEGER ai, *aip = NULL; long length = (long) len; M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a, DH *, DH_new); M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); aip = &ai; ai.data = NULL; ai.length = 0; M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); if (aip == NULL) return NULL; else { (*a)->p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL); if ((*a)->p == NULL) return NULL; if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data = NULL; ai.length = 0; } } M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); if (aip == NULL) return NULL; else { (*a)->g = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL); if ((*a)->g == NULL) return NULL; if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data = NULL; ai.length = 0; } } M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); if (aip == NULL) return NULL; else { (*a)->q = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL); if ((*a)->q == NULL) return NULL; if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data = NULL; ai.length = 0; } } M_ASN1_D2I_end_sequence(); M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, DH_free, 0); } static krb5_error_code pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers( krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int type, krb5_data **out_data) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers = NULL; krb5_data *td_certifiers = NULL, *data = NULL; krb5_typed_data **typed_data = NULL; switch(type) { case TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS: retval = create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers); if (retval) { pkiDebug("create_krb5_trustedCertifiers failed\n"); goto cleanup; } break; case TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES: retval = create_krb5_invalidCertificates(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers); if (retval) { pkiDebug("create_krb5_invalidCertificates failed\n"); goto cleanup; } break; default: retval = -1; goto cleanup; } retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((const krb5_external_principal_identifier **)krb5_trusted_certifiers, &td_certifiers); if (retval) { pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)td_certifiers->data, td_certifiers->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_certifiers"); #endif typed_data = malloc (2 * sizeof(krb5_typed_data *)); if (typed_data == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } typed_data[1] = NULL; init_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data[0]); if (typed_data[0] == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } typed_data[0]->type = type; typed_data[0]->length = td_certifiers->length; typed_data[0]->data = (unsigned char *)td_certifiers->data; retval = k5int_encode_krb5_typed_data((const krb5_typed_data **)typed_data, &data); if (retval) { pkiDebug("encode_krb5_typed_data failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)data->data, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_edata"); #endif *out_data = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_data)); (*out_data)->length = data->length; (*out_data)->data = (char *)malloc(data->length); (void) memcpy((*out_data)->data, data->data, data->length); retval = 0; cleanup: if (krb5_trusted_certifiers != NULL) free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_trusted_certifiers); if (data != NULL) { if (data->data != NULL) free(data->data); free(data); } if (td_certifiers != NULL) free(td_certifiers); if (typed_data != NULL) free_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data); return retval; } krb5_error_code pkinit_create_td_trusted_certifiers(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_data **out_data) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, out_data); return retval; } krb5_error_code pkinit_create_td_invalid_certificate( krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_data **out_data) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, out_data); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code pkinit_create_td_dh_parameters(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, pkinit_plg_opts *opts, krb5_data **out_data) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; unsigned int buf1_len = 0, buf2_len = 0, buf3_len = 0, i = 0; unsigned char *buf1 = NULL, *buf2 = NULL, *buf3 = NULL; krb5_typed_data **typed_data = NULL; krb5_data *data = NULL, *encoded_algId = NULL; krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (opts->dh_min_bits > 4096) { retval = EINVAL; goto cleanup; } if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) { retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->p, plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024->q, &buf1, &buf1_len); if (retval) goto cleanup; } if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) { retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->p, plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048->q, &buf2, &buf2_len); if (retval) goto cleanup; } retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->p, plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->g, plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096->q, &buf3, &buf3_len); if (retval) goto cleanup; if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) { algId = malloc(4 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *)); if (algId == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[3] = NULL; algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[0] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf2_len); if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len); algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len; algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid; algId[1] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[1] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[1]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len); if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len); algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len; algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid; algId[2] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[2] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[2]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf1_len); if (algId[2]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[2]->parameters.data, buf1, buf1_len); algId[2]->parameters.length = buf1_len; algId[2]->algorithm = dh_oid; } else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) { algId = malloc(3 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *)); if (algId == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[2] = NULL; algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[0] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf2_len); if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len); algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len; algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid; algId[1] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[1] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[1]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len); if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len); algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len; algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid; } else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 4096) { algId = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *)); if (algId == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[1] = NULL; algId[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (algId[0] == NULL) goto cleanup; algId[0]->parameters.data = (unsigned char *)malloc(buf3_len); if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL) goto cleanup; (void) memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len); algId[0]->parameters.length = buf3_len; algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid; } retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_dh_parameters((const krb5_algorithm_identifier **)algId, &encoded_algId); if (retval) goto cleanup; #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_algId->data, encoded_algId->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_dh_params"); #endif typed_data = malloc (2 * sizeof(krb5_typed_data *)); if (typed_data == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } typed_data[1] = NULL; init_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data[0]); if (typed_data == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } typed_data[0]->type = TD_DH_PARAMETERS; typed_data[0]->length = encoded_algId->length; typed_data[0]->data = (unsigned char *)encoded_algId->data; retval = k5int_encode_krb5_typed_data((const krb5_typed_data**)typed_data, &data); if (retval) { pkiDebug("encode_krb5_typed_data failed\n"); goto cleanup; } #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1 print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)data->data, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_edata"); #endif *out_data = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_data)); if (*out_data == NULL) goto cleanup; (*out_data)->length = data->length; (*out_data)->data = (char *)malloc(data->length); if ((*out_data)->data == NULL) { free(*out_data); *out_data = NULL; goto cleanup; } (void) memcpy((*out_data)->data, data->data, data->length); retval = 0; cleanup: if (buf1 != NULL) free(buf1); if (buf2 != NULL) free(buf2); if (buf3 != NULL) free(buf3); if (data != NULL) { if (data->data != NULL) free(data->data); free(data); } if (typed_data != NULL) free_krb5_typed_data(&typed_data); if (encoded_algId != NULL) free(encoded_algId); if (algId != NULL) { while(algId[i] != NULL) { if (algId[i]->parameters.data != NULL) free(algId[i]->parameters.data); free(algId[i]); i++; } free(algId); } return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *pdid_buf, unsigned int pkid_len, int *valid_kdcPkId) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL; const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf; int status = 1; X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index); *valid_kdcPkId = 0; pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n"); is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len); if (is == NULL) goto cleanup; status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer); if (!status) { status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial); if (!status) *valid_kdcPkId = 1; } retval = 0; cleanup: X509_NAME_free(is->issuer); ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); free(is); return retval; } static int pkinit_check_dh_params(BIGNUM * p1, BIGNUM * p2, BIGNUM * g1, BIGNUM * q1) { BIGNUM *g2 = NULL, *q2 = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ int retval = EINVAL; if (!BN_cmp(p1, p2)) { g2 = BN_new(); BN_set_word(g2, DH_GENERATOR_2); if (!BN_cmp(g1, g2)) { q2 = BN_new(); BN_rshift1(q2, p1); if (!BN_cmp(q1, q2)) { pkiDebug("good %d dhparams\n", BN_num_bits(p1)); retval = 0; } else pkiDebug("bad group 2 q dhparameter\n"); BN_free(q2); } else pkiDebug("bad g dhparameter\n"); BN_free(g2); } else pkiDebug("p is not well-known group 2 dhparameter\n"); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code pkinit_process_td_dh_params(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId, int *new_dh_size) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED; int i = 0, use_sent_dh = 0, ok = 0; pkiDebug("dh parameters\n"); while (algId[i] != NULL) { DH *dh = NULL; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int dh_prime_bits = 0; if (algId[i]->algorithm.length != dh_oid.length || memcmp(algId[i]->algorithm.data, dh_oid.data, dh_oid.length)) goto cleanup; tmp = algId[i]->parameters.data; dh = DH_new(); dh = pkinit_decode_dh_params(&dh, &tmp, algId[i]->parameters.length); dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(dh->p); pkiDebug("client sent %d DH bits server prefers %d DH bits\n", *new_dh_size, dh_prime_bits); switch(dh_prime_bits) { case 1024: if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_1024->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { *new_dh_size = 1024; ok = 1; } break; case 2048: if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_2048->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { *new_dh_size = 2048; ok = 1; } break; case 4096: if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_4096->p, dh->p, dh->g, dh->q) == 0) { *new_dh_size = 4096; ok = 1; } break; default: break; } if (!ok) { DH_check(dh, &retval); if (retval != 0) { pkiDebug("DH parameters provided by server are unacceptable\n"); retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED; } else { use_sent_dh = 1; ok = 1; } } if (!use_sent_dh) DH_free(dh); if (ok) { if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL) { DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh); req_cryptoctx->dh = NULL; } if (use_sent_dh) req_cryptoctx->dh = dh; break; } i++; } if (ok) retval = 0; cleanup: return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int openssl_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx) { #ifdef DEBUG if (!ok) { char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("cert = %s\n", buf); pkiDebug("callback function: %d (%s)\n", ctx->error, X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error)); } #endif return ok; } static int openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx) { if (!ok) { switch (ctx->error) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: return 1; default: return 0; } } return ok; } static ASN1_OBJECT * pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type) { int nid; switch (pkcs7_type) { case CMS_SIGN_CLIENT: return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData; case CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9: /* * Delay creating this OID until we know we need it. * It shadows an existing OpenSSL oid. If it * is created too early, it breaks things like * the use of pkcs12 (which uses pkcs7 structures). * We need this shadow version because our code * depends on the "other" type to be unknown to the * OpenSSL code. */ if (cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9 == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: Creating shadow instance of pkcs7-data oid\n", __FUNCTION__); nid = OBJ_create("1.2.840.113549.1.7.1", "id-pkcs7-data", "PKCS7 data"); if (nid == NID_undef) return NULL; cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9 = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); } return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData9; case CMS_SIGN_SERVER: return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData; case CMS_ENVEL_SERVER: return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData; default: return NULL; } } #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT #if 0 /* * This is a version that worked with Longhorn Beta 3. */ static int wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len, int is_longhorn_server) { unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; pkiDebug("%s: This is the Longhorn version and is_longhorn_server = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, is_longhorn_server); /* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */ tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (is_longhorn_server == 0) { /* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */ oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL); tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); } p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len); if (p == NULL) return -1; if (is_longhorn_server == 0) { ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p); ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); } else { ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); } memcpy(p, data, data_len); *out_len = tot_len; return 0; } #else /* * This is a version that works with a patched Longhorn KDC. * (Which should match SP1 ??). */ static int wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len, int is_longhorn_server) { unsigned int oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0, wrap_len = 0, tag_len = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; pkiDebug("%s: This is the Longhorn version and is_longhorn_server = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, is_longhorn_server); /* New longhorn is missing another sequence */ if (is_longhorn_server == 1) wrap_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(data_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); else wrap_len = data_len; /* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */ tag_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)wrap_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); /* Always add oid */ oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL); oid_len += tag_len; tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len); if (p == NULL) return -1; ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p); ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)wrap_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); /* Wrap in extra seq tag */ if (is_longhorn_server == 1) { ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); } (void) memcpy(p, data, data_len); *out_len = tot_len; return 0; } #endif #else static int wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len) { unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; /* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */ tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); /* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */ oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL); tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc(tot_len); if (p == NULL) return -1; ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p); ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); (void) memcpy(p, data, data_len); *out_len = tot_len; return 0; } #endif static int prepare_enc_data(unsigned char *indata, int indata_len, unsigned char **outdata, int *outdata_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ ASN1_const_CTX c; long length = indata_len; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; c.pp = (const unsigned char **)&indata; c.q = *(const unsigned char **)&indata; c.error = ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR; c.p= *(const unsigned char **)&indata; c.max = (length == 0)?0:(c.p+length); asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length); ASN1_get_object(&c.p,&Tlen,&Ttag,&Tclass,c.slen); c.p += Tlen; ASN1_get_object(&c.p,&Tlen,&Ttag,&Tclass,c.slen); asn1_const_Finish(&c); *outdata = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t)Tlen); /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (outdata == NULL) return ENOMEM; (void) memcpy(*outdata, c.p, (size_t)Tlen); *outdata_len = Tlen; return 0; } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 static void * pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p) { void *handle; CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR); pkiDebug("loading module \"%s\"... ", modname); /* Solaris Kerberos */ handle = dlopen(modname, RTLD_NOW | RTLD_GROUP); if (handle == NULL) { pkiDebug("not found\n"); return NULL; } getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR)) dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList"); if (getflist == NULL || (*getflist)(p11p) != CKR_OK) { (void) dlclose(handle); pkiDebug("failed\n"); return NULL; } pkiDebug("ok\n"); return handle; } static CK_RV pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (dlclose(handle) != 0) return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; return CKR_OK; } /* * Solaris Kerberos: this function was changed to support a PIN being passed * in. If that is the case the user will not be prompted for their PIN. */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_login(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip) { krb5_data rdat; char *prompt; int prompt_len; krb5_prompt kprompt; krb5_prompt_type prompt_type; int r = 0; if (tip->flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) { rdat.data = NULL; rdat.length = 0; } else if (id_cryptoctx->PIN != NULL) { if ((rdat.data = strdup(id_cryptoctx->PIN)) == NULL) return (ENOMEM); /* * Don't include NULL string terminator in length calculation as this * PIN is passed to the C_Login function and only the text chars should * be considered to be the PIN. */ rdat.length = strlen(id_cryptoctx->PIN); } else { unsigned char *lastnonwspc, *iterp; /* Solaris Kerberos - trim token label */ int count; if (!id_cryptoctx->prompter) { pkiDebug("pkinit_login: id_cryptoctx->prompter is NULL\n"); /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, gettext("failed to log into token: prompter function is NULL")); return (KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); } /* Solaris Kerberos - Changes for gettext() */ prompt_len = sizeof (tip->label) + 256; if ((prompt = (char *) malloc(prompt_len)) == NULL) return ENOMEM; /* Solaris Kerberos - trim token label which can be padded with space */ for (count = 0, iterp = tip->label; count < sizeof (tip->label); count++, iterp++) { if ((char) *iterp != ' ') lastnonwspc = iterp; } (void) snprintf(prompt, prompt_len, gettext("%.*s PIN"), (int) (lastnonwspc - tip->label) + 1, tip->label); /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED) (void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN locked)"), prompt_len); else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY) (void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN final try)"), prompt_len); else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW) (void) strlcat(prompt, gettext(" (Warning: PIN count low)"), prompt_len); rdat.data = malloc(tip->ulMaxPinLen + 2); rdat.length = tip->ulMaxPinLen + 1; /* * Note that the prompter function will set rdat.length such that the * NULL terminator is not included */ kprompt.prompt = prompt; kprompt.hidden = 1; kprompt.reply = &rdat; prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH; /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */ k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type); r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data, NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt); k5int_set_prompt_types(context, NULL); free(prompt); } if (r == 0) { r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *) rdat.data, rdat.length); if (r != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_Login: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, gettext("failed to log into token: %s"), pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } else { /* Solaris Kerberos: only need to login once */ id_cryptoctx->p11flags |= C_LOGIN_DONE; } } if (rdat.data) { (void) memset(rdat.data, 0, rdat.length); free(rdat.data); } return r; } static krb5_error_code pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx) { int i, r; CK_ULONG count = 0; CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slotlist; CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo; if (cctx->p11_module != NULL) return 0; /* session already open */ /* Load module */ cctx->p11_module = pkinit_C_LoadModule(cctx->p11_module_name, &cctx->p11); if (cctx->p11_module == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; /* Init */ /* Solaris Kerberos: Don't fail if cryptoki is already initialized */ r = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL); if (r != CKR_OK && r != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED) { pkiDebug("C_Initialize: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* * Solaris Kerberos: * If C_Initialize was already called by the process before the pkinit * module was loaded then record that fact. * "finalize_pkcs11" is used by pkinit_fini_pkcs11 to determine whether * or not C_Finalize() should be called. */ cctx->finalize_pkcs11 = (r == CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED ? FALSE : TRUE); /* Get the list of available slots */ if (cctx->slotid != PK_NOSLOT) { /* A slot was specified, so that's the only one in the list */ count = 1; slotlist = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); slotlist[0] = cctx->slotid; } else { if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count) != CKR_OK) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; if (count == 0) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; slotlist = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(count * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count) != CKR_OK) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* Look for the given token label, or if none given take the first one */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { /* Open session */ if ((r = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &cctx->session)) != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_OpenSession: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* Get token info */ if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo)) != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_GetTokenInfo: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } if (cctx->token_label == NULL) { /* nothing to compare to assume this is the right token */ break; } else { /* + 1 so tokenlabelstr can be \0 terminated */ char tokenlabelstr[sizeof (tinfo.label) + 1]; int j; /* * Convert token label into C string with trailing white space trimmed. * Note, a token label is not a \0 terminated string. */ /* * \0 terminate tokenlabelstr in case the last char in the token * label is non-whitespace */ tokenlabelstr[sizeof (tokenlabelstr) - 1] = '\0'; (void) memcpy(tokenlabelstr, (char *) tinfo.label, sizeof (tinfo.label)); /* init j so it skips the \0 terminator */ for (j = sizeof (tinfo.label) - 1; j >= 0; j--) { if (isblank(tokenlabelstr[j])) tokenlabelstr[j] = '\0'; else break; } pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d token found: \"%s\", " "cctx->token_label: \"%s\"\n", slotlist[i], tokenlabelstr, (char *) cctx->token_label); if (!strcmp(cctx->token_label, tokenlabelstr)) { break; } } cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(cctx->session); } if (i >= count) { free(slotlist); pkiDebug("open_session: no matching token found\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } cctx->slotid = slotlist[i]; free(slotlist); pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d (%d of %d)\n", (int) cctx->slotid, i + 1, (int) count); /* Login if needed */ /* Solaris Kerberos: added cctx->p11flags check */ if (tinfo.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED && ! (cctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) r = pkinit_login(context, cctx, &tinfo); return r; } /* * Look for a key that's: * 1. private * 2. capable of the specified operation (usually signing or decrypting) * 3. RSA (this may be wrong but it's all we can do for now) * 4. matches the id of the cert we chose * * You must call pkinit_get_certs before calling pkinit_find_private_key * (that's because we need the ID of the private key) * * pkcs11 says the id of the key doesn't have to match that of the cert, but * I can't figure out any other way to decide which key to use. * * We should only find one key that fits all the requirements. * If there are more than one, we just take the first one. */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp) { CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls; CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4]; CK_ULONG count; CK_KEY_TYPE keytype; unsigned int nattrs = 0; int r; #ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE CK_BBOOL true_false; #endif cls = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_CLASS; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &cls; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof cls; nattrs++; #ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE /* * Some cards get confused if you try to specify a key usage, * so don't, and hope for the best. This will fail if you have * several keys with the same id and different usages but I have * not seen this on real cards. */ true_false = TRUE; attrs[nattrs].type = usage; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &true_false; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof true_false; nattrs++; #endif keytype = CKK_RSA; attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &keytype; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof keytype; nattrs++; attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID; attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len; nattrs++; r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs); if (r != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count); id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session); pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int) count, pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); /* * Solaris Kerberos: * The CKA_ID may not be correctly set for the private key. For e.g. when * storing a private key in softtoken pktool(1) doesn't generate or store * a CKA_ID for the private key. Another way to identify the private key is * to look for a private key with the same RSA modulus as the public key * in the certificate. */ if (r == CKR_OK && count != 1) { EVP_PKEY *priv; X509 *cert; unsigned int n_len; unsigned char *n_bytes; cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, 0); priv = X509_get_pubkey(cert); if (priv == NULL) { pkiDebug("Failed to extract pub key from cert\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } nattrs = 0; cls = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_CLASS; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &cls; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof cls; nattrs++; #ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE true_false = TRUE; attrs[nattrs].type = usage; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &true_false; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof true_false; nattrs++; #endif keytype = CKK_RSA; attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE; attrs[nattrs].pValue = &keytype; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof keytype; nattrs++; n_len = BN_num_bytes(priv->pkey.rsa->n); n_bytes = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) n_len); if (n_bytes == NULL) { return (ENOMEM); } if (BN_bn2bin(priv->pkey.rsa->n, n_bytes) == 0) { free (n_bytes); pkiDebug("zero-byte key modulus\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_MODULUS; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = n_len; attrs[nattrs].pValue = n_bytes; nattrs++; r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs); free (n_bytes); if (r != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count); id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session); pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int) count, pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); } if (r != CKR_OK || count < 1) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; return 0; } #endif /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_fs(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len) { if (decode_data(decoded_data, decoded_data_len, data, data_len, id_cryptoctx->my_key, sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index)) <= 0) { pkiDebug("failed to decode data\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } return 0; } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 #ifdef SILLYDECRYPT CK_RV pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen); if (rv == CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("pData %x *pulDataLen %d\n", (int) pData, (int) *pulDataLen); } return rv; } #endif static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len) { CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG len; CK_MECHANISM mech; unsigned char *cp; int r; if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) { pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* Solaris Kerberos: Login, if needed, to access private object */ if (!(id_cryptoctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) { CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo; r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid, &tinfo); if (r != 0) return r; r = pkinit_login(context, id_cryptoctx, &tinfo); if (r != 0) return r; } r = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_DECRYPT, &obj); if (r != 0) return r; mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; mech.pParameter = NULL; mech.ulParameterLen = 0; if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_DecryptInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_DecryptInit: 0x%x\n", (int) r); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } pkiDebug("data_len = %d\n", data_len); cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) data_len); if (cp == NULL) return ENOMEM; len = data_len; #ifdef SILLYDECRYPT pkiDebug("session %x edata %x edata_len %d data %x datalen @%x %d\n", (int) id_cryptoctx->session, (int) data, (int) data_len, (int) cp, (int) &len, (int) len); if ((r = pkinit_C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len)) != CKR_OK) { #else if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len)) != CKR_OK) { #endif pkiDebug("C_Decrypt: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) pkiDebug("decrypt %d needs %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } pkiDebug("decrypt %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len); *decoded_data_len = len; *decoded_data = cp; return 0; } #endif krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) retval = pkinit_decode_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len, decoded_data, decoded_data_len); #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 else retval = pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len, decoded_data, decoded_data_len); #endif return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_fs(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len) { if (create_signature(sig, sig_len, data, data_len, id_cryptoctx->my_key) != 0) { pkiDebug("failed to create the signature\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } return 0; } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len) { CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG len; CK_MECHANISM mech; unsigned char *cp; int r; if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) { pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* Solaris Kerberos: Login, if needed, to access private object */ if (!(id_cryptoctx->p11flags & C_LOGIN_DONE)) { CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo; r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid, &tinfo); if (r != 0) return r; r = pkinit_login(context, id_cryptoctx, &tinfo); if (r != 0) return r; } r = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj); if (r != 0 ) return r; mech.mechanism = id_cryptoctx->mech; mech.pParameter = NULL; mech.ulParameterLen = 0; if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_SignInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_SignInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } /* * Key len would give an upper bound on sig size, but there's no way to * get that. So guess, and if it's too small, re-malloc. */ len = PK_SIGLEN_GUESS; cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len); if (cp == NULL) return ENOMEM; r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len); if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || (r == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) { free(cp); pkiDebug("C_Sign realloc %d\n", (int) len); cp = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len); r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data, (CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len); } if (r != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_Sign: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } pkiDebug("sign %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len); *sig_len = len; *sig = cp; return 0; } #endif krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) retval = pkinit_sign_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len, sig, sig_len); #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 else retval = pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len, sig, sig_len); #endif return retval; } static krb5_error_code decode_data(unsigned char **out_data, unsigned int *out_data_len, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ int len; unsigned char *buf = NULL; int buf_len = 0; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (out_data == NULL || out_data_len == NULL) return EINVAL; if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) { pkiDebug("private key does not match certificate\n"); /* Solaris Kerberos */ return EINVAL; } buf_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); buf = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) buf_len + 10); if (buf == NULL) return ENOMEM; len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(buf, data, (int)data_len, pkey); if (len <= 0) { pkiDebug("unable to decrypt received data (len=%d)\n", data_len); /* Solaris Kerberos */ free(buf); return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; } *out_data = buf; *out_data_len = len; return 0; } static krb5_error_code create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len, unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; if (pkey == NULL) /* Solaris Kerberos */ return EINVAL; EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1()); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, data, data_len); *sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((*sig = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *sig_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey); retval = 0; cleanup: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return retval; } /* * Note: * This is not the routine the KDC uses to get its certificate. * This routine is intended to be called by the client * to obtain the KDC's certificate from some local storage * to be sent as a hint in its request to the KDC. */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code pkinit_get_kdc_cert(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (req_cryptoctx == NULL) return EINVAL; req_cryptoctx->received_cert = NULL; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; X509 *x = NULL; PKCS12 *p12 = NULL; int ret; FILE *fp; EVP_PKEY *y = NULL; if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to get certificate location")); pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__); goto cleanup; } if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to get private key location")); pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n", __FUNCTION__); goto cleanup; } fp = fopen(idopts->cert_filename, "rb"); if (fp == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to open PKCS12 file '%s': %s"), idopts->cert_filename, error_message(errno)); pkiDebug("Failed to open PKCS12 file '%s', error %d\n", idopts->cert_filename, errno); goto cleanup; } p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL); (void) fclose(fp); if (p12 == NULL) { krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to decode PKCS12 file '%s' contents"), idopts->cert_filename); pkiDebug("Failed to decode PKCS12 file '%s' contents\n", idopts->cert_filename); goto cleanup; } /* * Try parsing with no pass phrase first. If that fails, * prompt for the pass phrase and try again. */ ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, NULL, &y, &x, NULL); if (ret == 0) { krb5_data rdat; krb5_prompt kprompt; krb5_prompt_type prompt_type; int r = 0; char prompt_string[128]; char prompt_reply[128]; /* Solaris Kerberos */ char *prompt_prefix = gettext("Pass phrase for"); pkiDebug("Initial PKCS12_parse with no password failed\n"); if (id_cryptoctx->PIN != NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: use PIN if set */ rdat.data = id_cryptoctx->PIN; /* note rdat.length isn't needed in this case */ } else { (void) memset(prompt_reply, '\0', sizeof(prompt_reply)); rdat.data = prompt_reply; rdat.length = sizeof(prompt_reply); r = snprintf(prompt_string, sizeof(prompt_string), "%s %s", prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename); if (r >= sizeof(prompt_string)) { pkiDebug("Prompt string, '%s %s', is too long!\n", prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename); goto cleanup; } kprompt.prompt = prompt_string; kprompt.hidden = 1; kprompt.reply = &rdat; prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH; /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */ k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type); r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data, NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt); k5int_set_prompt_types(context, NULL); } ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, rdat.data, &y, &x, NULL); if (ret == 0) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to parse PKCS12 file '%s' with password"), idopts->cert_filename); pkiDebug("Seconde PKCS12_parse with password failed\n"); goto cleanup; } } id_cryptoctx->creds[0] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info)); if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) goto cleanup; id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = x; #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len = 0; #endif id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = y; id_cryptoctx->creds[1] = NULL; retval = 0; cleanup: if (p12) PKCS12_free(p12); if (retval) { if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (y != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(y); } return retval; } static krb5_error_code pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, char *certname, char *keyname, int cindex) { krb5_error_code retval; X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *y = NULL; /* load the certificate */ retval = get_cert(certname, &x); if (retval != 0 || x == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to load user's certificate from %s: %s"), certname, error_message(retval)); pkiDebug("failed to load user's certificate from '%s'\n", certname); goto cleanup; } retval = get_key(keyname, &y); if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to load user's private key from %s: %s"), keyname, error_message(retval)); pkiDebug("failed to load user's private key from '%s'\n", keyname); goto cleanup; } id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info)); if (id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert = x; #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id = NULL; id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id_len = 0; #endif id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->key = y; id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex+1] = NULL; retval = 0; cleanup: if (retval) { if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (y != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(y); } return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_get_certs_fs(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__); goto cleanup; } if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n", __FUNCTION__); goto cleanup; } retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx, idopts->cert_filename, idopts->key_filename, 0); cleanup: return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_get_certs_dir(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; DIR *d = NULL; struct dirent *dentry = NULL; char certname[1024]; char keyname[1024]; int i = 0, len; char *dirname, *suf; /* Solaris Kerberos */ if (idopts == NULL) return EINVAL; if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's certificate directory location\n", __FUNCTION__); return ENOENT; } dirname = idopts->cert_filename; d = opendir(dirname); if (d == NULL) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, errno, gettext("failed to open directory \"%s\": %s"), dirname, error_message(errno)); return errno; } /* * We'll assume that certs are named XXX.crt and the corresponding * key is named XXX.key */ while ((i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED) && (dentry = readdir(d)) != NULL) { /* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */ #ifdef DT_DIR if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR) continue; #endif if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.') continue; len = strlen(dentry->d_name); if (len < 5) continue; suf = dentry->d_name + (len - 4); if (strncmp(suf, ".crt", 4) != 0) continue; /* Checked length */ if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(certname)) { pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(certname, sizeof(certname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name); (void) snprintf(keyname, sizeof(keyname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name); len = strlen(keyname); keyname[len - 3] = 'k'; keyname[len - 2] = 'e'; keyname[len - 1] = 'y'; retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx, certname, keyname, i); if (retval == 0) { pkiDebug("%s: Successfully loaded cert (and key) for %s\n", __FUNCTION__, dentry->d_name); i++; } else continue; } if (i == 0) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT, gettext("No suitable cert/key pairs found in directory '%s'"), idopts->cert_filename); pkiDebug("%s: No cert/key pairs found in directory '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, idopts->cert_filename); retval = ENOENT; goto cleanup; } retval = 0; cleanup: if (d) (void) closedir(d); return retval; } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { #ifdef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR mechp; CK_MECHANISM_INFO info; #endif CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4]; CK_ULONG count; CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certtype; CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id; const unsigned char *cp; int i, r; unsigned int nattrs; X509 *x = NULL; /* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */ if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) { id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name = strdup(idopts->p11_module_name); if (id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name == NULL) return ENOMEM; } if (idopts->token_label != NULL) { id_cryptoctx->token_label = strdup(idopts->token_label); if (id_cryptoctx->token_label == NULL) return ENOMEM; } if (idopts->cert_label != NULL) { id_cryptoctx->cert_label = strdup(idopts->cert_label); if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label == NULL) return ENOMEM; } if (idopts->PIN != NULL) { id_cryptoctx->PIN = strdup(idopts->PIN); if (id_cryptoctx->PIN == NULL) return ENOMEM; } /* Convert the ascii cert_id string into a binary blob */ /* * Solaris Kerberos: * If the cert_id_string is empty then behave in a similar way to how * an empty certlabel is treated - i.e. don't fail now but rather continue * as though the certid wasn't specified. */ if (idopts->cert_id_string != NULL && strlen(idopts->cert_id_string) != 0) { BIGNUM *bn = NULL; BN_hex2bn(&bn, idopts->cert_id_string); if (bn == NULL) return ENOMEM; id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = BN_num_bytes(bn); id_cryptoctx->cert_id = malloc((size_t) id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len); if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id == NULL) { BN_free(bn); return ENOMEM; } BN_bn2bin(bn, id_cryptoctx->cert_id); BN_free(bn); } id_cryptoctx->slotid = idopts->slotid; id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method = 1; if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) { pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n"); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } #ifndef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST /* * We'd like to use CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but * many cards seems to be confused about whether they are capable of * this or not. The safe thing seems to be to ignore the mechanism list, * always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha1 digest ourselves. */ id_cryptoctx->mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS; #else if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid, NULL, &count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) { pkiDebug("C_GetMechanismList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } mechp = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR) malloc(count * sizeof (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); if (mechp == NULL) return ENOMEM; if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid, mechp, &count)) != CKR_OK) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid, mechp[i], &info)) != CKR_OK) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; #ifdef DEBUG_MECHINFO pkiDebug("mech %x flags %x\n", (int) mechp[i], (int) info.flags); if ((info.flags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT)) pkiDebug(" this mech is good for sign & decrypt\n"); #endif if (mechp[i] == CKM_RSA_PKCS) { /* This seems backwards... */ id_cryptoctx->mech = (info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS; } } free(mechp); pkiDebug("got %d mechs from card\n", (int) count); #endif cls = CKO_CERTIFICATE; attrs[0].type = CKA_CLASS; attrs[0].pValue = &cls; attrs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof cls; certtype = CKC_X_509; attrs[1].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; attrs[1].pValue = &certtype; attrs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof certtype; nattrs = 2; /* If a cert id and/or label were given, use them too */ if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len > 0) { attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID; attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len; nattrs++; } if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label != NULL) { attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_LABEL; attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_label; attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = strlen(id_cryptoctx->cert_label); nattrs++; } r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs); if (r != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } for (i = 0; ; i++) { if (i >= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; /* Look for x.509 cert */ /* Solaris Kerberos */ if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, &obj, 1, &count)) != CKR_OK || count == 0) { id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL; break; } /* Get cert and id len */ attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE; attrs[0].pValue = NULL; attrs[0].ulValueLen = 0; attrs[1].type = CKA_ID; attrs[1].pValue = NULL; attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0; if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session, obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK && r != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } cert = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[0].ulValueLen + 1); cert_id = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[1].ulValueLen + 1); if (cert == NULL || cert_id == NULL) return ENOMEM; /* Read the cert and id off the card */ attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE; attrs[0].pValue = cert; attrs[1].type = CKA_ID; attrs[1].pValue = cert_id; if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session, obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK) { pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } pkiDebug("cert %d size %d id %d idlen %d\n", i, (int) attrs[0].ulValueLen, (int) cert_id[0], (int) attrs[1].ulValueLen); cp = (unsigned char *) cert; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int) attrs[0].ulValueLen); if (x == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info)); if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert = x; id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->key = NULL; id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id = cert_id; id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id_len = attrs[1].ulValueLen; free(cert); } id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session); /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ if (cert == NULL) { if (r != CKR_OK) { krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, gettext("pkcs11 error while searching for certificates: %s"), pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r)); } else { BIGNUM *cid = BN_bin2bn(id_cryptoctx->cert_id, id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len, NULL); char *cidstr = BN_bn2hex(cid); char *printstr = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len ? cidstr : "<none>"; krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, gettext("failed to find any suitable certificates " "(certlabel: %s, certid: %s)"), id_cryptoctx->cert_label ? id_cryptoctx->cert_label : "<none>", cidstr ? printstr : "<unknown>"); if (cidstr != NULL) OPENSSL_free(cidstr); BN_free(cid); } return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; } return 0; } #endif /* ARGSUSED */ static void free_cred_info(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, struct _pkinit_cred_info *cred) { if (cred != NULL) { if (cred->cert != NULL) X509_free(cred->cert); if (cred->key != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(cred->key); #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 if (cred->cert_id != NULL) free(cred->cert_id); #endif free(cred); } } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_free_cert_info(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx) { int i; if (id_cryptoctx == NULL) return EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) { if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] != NULL) { free_cred_info(context, id_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx->creds[i]); id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL; } } return 0; } krb5_error_code crypto_load_certs(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_principal princ) { krb5_error_code retval; switch(idopts->idtype) { case IDTYPE_FILE: retval = pkinit_get_certs_fs(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, idopts, id_cryptoctx, princ); break; case IDTYPE_DIR: retval = pkinit_get_certs_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, idopts, id_cryptoctx, princ); break; #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 case IDTYPE_PKCS11: retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, idopts, id_cryptoctx, princ); break; #endif case IDTYPE_PKCS12: retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, idopts, id_cryptoctx, princ); break; default: retval = EINVAL; } /* Solaris Kerberos */ return retval; } /* * Get number of certificates available after crypto_load_certs() */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_get_count(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int *cert_count) { int count; if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) return EINVAL; for (count = 0; count <= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED && id_cryptoctx->creds[count] != NULL; count++); *cert_count = count; return 0; } /* * Begin iteration over the certs loaded in crypto_load_certs() */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_iteration_begin(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, pkinit_cert_iter_handle *ih_ret) { struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id; if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || ih_ret == NULL) return EINVAL; if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) /* No cred info available */ return ENOENT; id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id)); if (id == NULL) return ENOMEM; id->magic = ITER_MAGIC; id->plgctx = plg_cryptoctx, id->reqctx = req_cryptoctx, id->idctx = id_cryptoctx; id->index = 0; *ih_ret = (pkinit_cert_iter_handle) id; return 0; } /* * End iteration over the certs loaded in crypto_load_certs() */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_iteration_end(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih) { struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih; if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC) return EINVAL; free(ih); return 0; } /* * Get next certificate handle */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_iteration_next(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_iter_handle ih, pkinit_cert_handle *ch_ret) { struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id = (struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *)ih; struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd; pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx; if (id == NULL || id->magic != ITER_MAGIC) return EINVAL; if (ch_ret == NULL) return EINVAL; id_cryptoctx = id->idctx; if (id_cryptoctx == NULL) return EINVAL; if (id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index] == NULL) return PKINIT_ITER_NO_MORE; cd = calloc(1, sizeof(*cd)); if (cd == NULL) return ENOMEM; cd->magic = CERT_MAGIC; cd->plgctx = id->plgctx; cd->reqctx = id->reqctx; cd->idctx = id->idctx; cd->index = id->index; cd->cred = id_cryptoctx->creds[id->index++]; *ch_ret = (pkinit_cert_handle)cd; return 0; } /* * Release cert handle */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_release(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_handle ch) { struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch; if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC) return EINVAL; free(cd); return 0; } /* * Get certificate Key Usage and Extended Key Usage */ /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx, X509 *x, unsigned int *ret_ku_bits, unsigned int *ret_eku_bits) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ int i; unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0; ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL; if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL) return EINVAL; if (ret_eku_bits) *ret_eku_bits = 0; else { pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__); goto check_kus; } /* Start with Extended Key usage */ i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); if (i >= 0) { EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku; eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL); if (eku) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *certoid; certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i); if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0) eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT; else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0) eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN; else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0) eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH; else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0) eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION; } EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku); } } pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits); *ret_eku_bits = eku_bits; check_kus: /* Now the Key Usage bits */ if (ret_ku_bits) *ret_ku_bits = 0; else { pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__); goto out; } /* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */ usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL); if (usage) { if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE; if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); } pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits); *ret_ku_bits = ku_bits; out: return 0; } /* * Return a string format of an X509_NAME in buf where * size is an in/out parameter. On input it is the size * of the buffer, and on output it is the actual length * of the name. * If buf is NULL, returns the length req'd to hold name */ static char * X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_NAME * a, char *buf, unsigned int *size, unsigned long flag) { BIO *out = NULL; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem ()); if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, a, 0, flag) > 0) { if (buf != NULL && *size > (int) BIO_number_written(out)) { (void) memset(buf, 0, *size); BIO_read(out, buf, (int) BIO_number_written(out)); } else { *size = BIO_number_written(out); } } BIO_free(out); return (buf); } /* * Get certificate information */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_get_matching_data(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_handle ch, pkinit_cert_matching_data **ret_md) { krb5_error_code retval; pkinit_cert_matching_data *md; krb5_principal *pkinit_sans =NULL, *upn_sans = NULL; struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)ch; int i, j; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf); if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC) return EINVAL; if (ret_md == NULL) return EINVAL; md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md)); if (md == NULL) return ENOMEM; md->ch = ch; /* get the subject name (in rfc2253 format) */ X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cd->cred->cert), buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS); md->subject_dn = strdup(buf); if (md->subject_dn == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format) */ X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cd->cred->cert), buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS); md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf); if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* get the san data */ retval = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx, cd->cred->cert, &pkinit_sans, &upn_sans, NULL); if (retval) goto cleanup; j = 0; if (pkinit_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++) j++; } if (upn_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++) j++; } if (j != 0) { md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans)); if (md->sans == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } j = 0; if (pkinit_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++) md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i]; free(pkinit_sans); } if (upn_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++) md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i]; free(upn_sans); } md->sans[j] = NULL; } else md->sans = NULL; /* get the KU and EKU data */ retval = crypto_retieve_X509_key_usage(context, cd->plgctx, cd->reqctx, cd->cred->cert, &md->ku_bits, &md->eku_bits); if (retval) goto cleanup; *ret_md = md; retval = 0; cleanup: if (retval) { if (md) crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md); } return retval; } /* * Free certificate information */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_free_matching_data(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_matching_data *md) { krb5_principal p; int i; if (md == NULL) return EINVAL; if (md->subject_dn) free(md->subject_dn); if (md->issuer_dn) free(md->issuer_dn); if (md->sans) { for (i = 0, p = md->sans[i]; p != NULL; p = md->sans[++i]) krb5_free_principal(context, p); free(md->sans); } free(md); return 0; } /* * Make this matching certificate "the chosen one" */ /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_cert_matching_data *md) { struct _pkinit_cert_data *cd; if (md == NULL) return EINVAL; cd = (struct _pkinit_cert_data *)md->ch; if (cd == NULL || cd->magic != CERT_MAGIC) return EINVAL; /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */ if (cd->idctx->my_certs != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free(cd->idctx->my_certs, X509_free); } cd->idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null(); sk_X509_push(cd->idctx->my_certs, cd->cred->cert); cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ cd->idctx->cert_index = 0; if (cd->idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) { cd->idctx->my_key = cd->cred->key; cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 else { cd->idctx->cert_id = cd->cred->cert_id; cd->idctx->creds[cd->index]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ cd->idctx->cert_id_len = cd->cred->cert_id_len; } #endif return 0; } /* * Choose the default certificate as "the chosen one" */ krb5_error_code crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx) { krb5_error_code retval; int cert_count = 0; retval = crypto_cert_get_count(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &cert_count); if (retval) { pkiDebug("%s: crypto_cert_get_count error %d, %s\n", __FUNCTION__, retval, error_message(retval)); goto errout; } if (cert_count != 1) { /* Solaris Kerberos: Improved error messages */ retval = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, gettext("failed to select default certificate: " "found %d certs to choose from but there must be exactly one"), cert_count); pkiDebug("%s: ERROR: There are %d certs to choose from, " "but there must be exactly one.\n", __FUNCTION__, cert_count); goto errout; } /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */ if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free); } id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null(); sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert); id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0; if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) { id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key; id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ } #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11 else { id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id; id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */ id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len; } #endif retval = 0; errout: return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int catype, char *filename) { STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *ca_crls = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; int i = 0; /* If there isn't already a stack in the context, * create a temporary one now */ switch(catype) { case CATYPE_ANCHORS: if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs != NULL) ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs; else { ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (ca_certs == NULL) return ENOMEM; } break; case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES: if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs != NULL) ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs; else { ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (ca_certs == NULL) return ENOMEM; } break; case CATYPE_CRLS: if (id_cryptoctx->revoked != NULL) ca_crls = id_cryptoctx->revoked; else { ca_crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (ca_crls == NULL) return ENOMEM; } break; default: return ENOTSUP; } if (!(in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"))) { retval = errno; pkiDebug("%s: error opening file '%s': %s\n", __FUNCTION__, filename, error_message(errno)); goto cleanup; } /* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */ if ((sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { pkiDebug("%s: error reading file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, filename); retval = EIO; goto cleanup; } /* scan over the stack created from loading the file contents, * weed out duplicates, and push new ones onto the return stack */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(sk); i++) { X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(sk, i); if (xi != NULL && xi->x509 != NULL && catype != CATYPE_CRLS) { int j = 0, size = sk_X509_num(ca_certs), flag = 0; if (!size) { sk_X509_push(ca_certs, xi->x509); xi->x509 = NULL; continue; } for (j = 0; j < size; j++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, j); flag = X509_cmp(x, xi->x509); if (flag == 0) break; else continue; } if (flag != 0) { sk_X509_push(ca_certs, X509_dup(xi->x509)); } } else if (xi != NULL && xi->crl != NULL && catype == CATYPE_CRLS) { int j = 0, size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls), flag = 0; if (!size) { sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, xi->crl); xi->crl = NULL; continue; } for (j = 0; j < size; j++) { X509_CRL *x = sk_X509_CRL_value(ca_crls, j); flag = X509_CRL_cmp(x, xi->crl); if (flag == 0) break; else continue; } if (flag != 0) { sk_X509_push(ca_crls, X509_CRL_dup(xi->crl)); } } } /* If we added something and there wasn't a stack in the * context before, add the temporary stack to the context. */ switch(catype) { case CATYPE_ANCHORS: if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) { pkiDebug("no anchors in file, %s\n", filename); if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL) sk_X509_free(ca_certs); } else { if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL) id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs = ca_certs; } break; case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES: if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) { pkiDebug("no intermediates in file, %s\n", filename); if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL) sk_X509_free(ca_certs); } else { if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL) id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs = ca_certs; } break; case CATYPE_CRLS: if (sk_X509_num(ca_crls) == 0) { pkiDebug("no crls in file, %s\n", filename); if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL) sk_X509_CRL_free(ca_crls); } else { if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL) id_cryptoctx->revoked = ca_crls; } break; default: /* Should have been caught above! */ retval = EINVAL; goto cleanup; /* Solaris Kerberos: removed "break" as it's never reached */ } retval = 0; cleanup: if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(sk, X509_INFO_free); return retval; } static krb5_error_code load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int catype, char *dirname) { krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL; DIR *d = NULL; struct dirent *dentry = NULL; char filename[1024]; if (dirname == NULL) return EINVAL; d = opendir(dirname); if (d == NULL) return ENOENT; while ((dentry = readdir(d))) { if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(filename)) { pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name); goto cleanup; } /* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */ #ifdef DT_DIR if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR) continue; #endif if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.') continue; (void) snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name); retval = load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, catype, filename); if (retval) goto cleanup; } retval = 0; cleanup: if (d != NULL) (void) closedir(d); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int idtype, int catype, char *id) { pkiDebug("%s: called with idtype %s and catype %s\n", __FUNCTION__, idtype2string(idtype), catype2string(catype)); /* Solaris Kerberos: Removed "break"'s as they are never reached */ switch (idtype) { case IDTYPE_FILE: return load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, catype, id); case IDTYPE_DIR: return load_cas_and_crls_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, catype, id); default: return ENOTSUP; } } static krb5_error_code create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; int i = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk); krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_cas = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; int len = 0; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; *ids = NULL; krb5_cas = malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier *)); if (krb5_cas == NULL) return ENOMEM; krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) { krb5_cas[i] = (krb5_external_principal_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier)); x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf); /* fill-in subjectName */ krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.magic = 0; krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = 0; krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = NULL; xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL); if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p); krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = len; /* fill-in issuerAndSerialNumber */ krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = 0; krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.magic = 0; krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = NULL; #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */ #endif is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new(); X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x)); M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x)); len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL); if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p); krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = len; #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT } #endif /* fill-in subjectKeyIdentifier */ krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = 0; krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.magic = 0; krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = NULL; #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT if (longhorn == 0) { /* XXX Longhorn doesn't like this */ #endif if (X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1) >= 0) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL; if ((ikeyid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL))) { len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, NULL); if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, &p); krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = len; } if (ikeyid != NULL) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid); } #ifdef LONGHORN_BETA_COMPAT } #endif if (is != NULL) { if (is->issuer != NULL) X509_NAME_free(is->issuer); if (is->serial != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); free(is); } } *ids = krb5_cas; retval = 0; cleanup: if (retval) free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_cas); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ static krb5_error_code create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; *ids = NULL; if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (sk == NULL) goto cleanup; sk_X509_push(sk, req_cryptoctx->received_cert); retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids); sk_X509_free(sk); cleanup: return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_algorithm_identifier ***oids) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; krb5_algorithm_identifier **loids = NULL; krb5_octet_data des3oid = {0, 8, (unsigned char *)"\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x03\x07" }; *oids = NULL; loids = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *)); if (loids == NULL) goto cleanup; loids[1] = NULL; loids[0] = (krb5_algorithm_identifier *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier)); if (loids[0] == NULL) { free(loids); goto cleanup; } retval = pkinit_copy_krb5_octet_data(&loids[0]->algorithm, &des3oid); if (retval) { free(loids[0]); free(loids); goto cleanup; } loids[0]->parameters.length = 0; loids[0]->parameters.data = NULL; *oids = loids; retval = 0; cleanup: return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs; *ids = NULL; if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; return create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids); } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code create_krb5_trustedCas(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, int flag, krb5_trusted_ca *** ids) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs; int i = 0, len = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk); krb5_trusted_ca **krb5_cas = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; unsigned char *p = NULL; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL; *ids = NULL; if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL) return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; krb5_cas = malloc((sk_size + 1) * sizeof(krb5_trusted_ca *)); if (krb5_cas == NULL) return ENOMEM; krb5_cas[sk_size] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) { krb5_cas[i] = (krb5_trusted_ca *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_trusted_ca)); if (krb5_cas[i] == NULL) goto cleanup; x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf)); pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf); switch (flag) { case choice_trusted_cas_principalName: krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_principalName; break; case choice_trusted_cas_caName: krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_caName; krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.data = NULL; krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.length = 0; xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL); if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p); krb5_cas[i]->u.caName.length = len; break; case choice_trusted_cas_issuerAndSerial: krb5_cas[i]->choice = choice_trusted_cas_issuerAndSerial; krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.data = NULL; krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.length = 0; is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new(); X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x)); M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x)); len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL); if ((p = krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.data = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p); krb5_cas[i]->u.issuerAndSerial.length = len; if (is != NULL) { if (is->issuer != NULL) X509_NAME_free(is->issuer); if (is->serial != NULL) ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); free(is); } break; default: break; } } retval = 0; *ids = krb5_cas; cleanup: if (retval) free_krb5_trusted_ca(&krb5_cas); return retval; } /* ARGSUSED */ krb5_error_code create_issuerAndSerial(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len) { unsigned char *p = NULL; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL; int len = 0; krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; X509 *cert = req_cryptoctx->received_cert; *out = NULL; *out_len = 0; if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL) return 0; is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new(); X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)); M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); is->serial = M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert)); len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL); if ((p = *out = (unsigned char *)malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p); *out_len = len; retval = 0; cleanup: X509_NAME_free(is->issuer); ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial); free(is); return retval; } static int pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data) { BIO *tmpmem = NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ int i = 0; char buf[4096]; if(p7 == NULL) return 0; if(!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) { pkiDebug("wrong pkcs7 content type\n"); return 0; } if(!(tmpmem = pkcs7_dataDecode(context, id_cryptoctx, p7))) { pkiDebug("unable to decrypt pkcs7 object\n"); return 0; } /* Solaris Kerberos: Suppress sun studio compiler warning */ #pragma error_messages (off, E_END_OF_LOOP_CODE_NOT_REACHED) for(;;) { i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (i <= 0) break; BIO_write(data, buf, i); BIO_free_all(tmpmem); return 1; } #pragma error_messages (default, E_END_OF_LOOP_CODE_NOT_REACHED) return 0; } krb5_error_code pkinit_process_td_trusted_certifiers( krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers, int td_type) { krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk_xn = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; int i = 0; if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS) pkiDebug("received trusted certifiers\n"); else pkiDebug("received invalid certificate\n"); sk_xn = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); while(krb5_trusted_certifiers[i] != NULL) { if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data != NULL) { p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data; xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p, (int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.length); if (xn == NULL) goto cleanup; X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS) pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is trusted by kdc\n", i, buf); else pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is invalid\n", i, buf); sk_X509_NAME_push(sk_xn, xn); } if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data != NULL) { p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data; is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length); if (is == NULL) goto cleanup; X509_NAME_oneline(is->issuer, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS) pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is trusted bu kdc\n", i, buf, ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial)); else pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is invalid\n", i, buf, ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial)); PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free(is); } if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data != NULL) { p = krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data; id = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, (int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length); if (id == NULL) goto cleanup; /* XXX */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(id); } i++; } /* XXX Since we not doing anything with received trusted certifiers * return an error. this is the place where we can pick a different * client certificate based on the information in td_trusted_certifiers */ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; cleanup: if (sk_xn != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk_xn, X509_NAME_free); return retval; } static BIO * pkcs7_dataDecode(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7) { int i = 0; unsigned int jj = 0, tmp_len = 0; BIO *out=NULL,*etmp=NULL,*bio=NULL; unsigned char *tmp=NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body=NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher=NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx=NULL; X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos: Not used */ #if 0 X509_ALGOR *xalg=NULL; #endif PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL; X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index); p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE); goto cleanup; } /* Solaris Kerberos: Not used */ #if 0 xalg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; #endif if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto cleanup; } /* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key * with the private key */ /* Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate * (if any) */ if (cert) { for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { int tmp_ret = 0; ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i); tmp_ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer, cert->cert_info->issuer); if (!tmp_ret) { tmp_ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(cert->cert_info->serialNumber, ri->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!tmp_ret) break; } ri=NULL; } if (ri == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE); goto cleanup; } } /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */ if (cert == NULL) { for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i); jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key), (unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &tmp, &tmp_len); if (jj) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto cleanup; } if (!jj && tmp_len > 0) { jj = tmp_len; break; } ERR_clear_error(); ri = NULL; } if (ri == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY); goto cleanup; } } else { jj = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key), (unsigned int) M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &tmp, &tmp_len); /* Solaris Kerberos: tmp_len is unsigned. Cannot be < 0 */ if (jj || tmp_len == 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto cleanup; } jj = tmp_len; } evp_ctx=NULL; BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp,&evp_ctx); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0) goto cleanup; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0) goto cleanup; if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) { /* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key * and effective key length. The key length is * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key. */ if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, (int)jj)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto cleanup; } } if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0) goto cleanup; OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj); if (out == NULL) out=etmp; else BIO_push(out,etmp); etmp=NULL; if (data_body->length > 0) bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length); else { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0); } BIO_push(out,bio); bio=NULL; /* Solaris Kerberos */ goto out; cleanup: if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out); if (etmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(etmp); if (bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(bio); out=NULL; out: if (tmp != NULL) free(tmp); return(out); } static krb5_error_code der_decode_data(unsigned char *data, long data_len, unsigned char **out, long *out_len) { /* Solaris Kerberos */ krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s = NULL; const unsigned char *p = data; if ((s = d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(NULL, &p, data_len)) == NULL) goto cleanup; *out_len = s->length; if ((*out = (unsigned char *) malloc((size_t) *out_len + 1)) == NULL) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } (void) memcpy(*out, s->data, (size_t) s->length); (*out)[s->length] = '\0'; retval = 0; cleanup: if (s != NULL) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(s); return retval; } #ifdef DEBUG_DH static void print_dh(DH * dh, char *msg) { BIO *bio_err = NULL; bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); if (msg) BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg); if (dh) DHparams_print(bio_err, dh); BN_print(bio_err, dh->q); BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)"\n"); BIO_free(bio_err); } static void print_pubkey(BIGNUM * key, char *msg) { BIO *bio_err = NULL; bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); if (msg) BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg); if (key) BN_print(bio_err, key); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); BIO_free(bio_err); } #endif /* * Solaris Kerberos: * Error message generation has changed so gettext() can be used */ #if 0 static char * pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err) { int i; static char uc[64]; for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++) if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == err) break; if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL) return (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text); snprintf(uc, 64, gettext("unknown code 0x%x"), err); return (uc); } #endif static char * pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err) { return pkcs11_error_table(err); }