Mercurial > oi > oi-build
changeset 363:9c0cad004039
7039910 move OpenSSL from SFW to Userland gate
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/meta-packages/history/SUNWopenssl-fips-140.p5m Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# +# Legacy package information for renamed SUNWopenssl-fips-140 package +# + +set name=pkg.fmri value=pkg:/SUNWopenssl-fips-140@1.2,5.11-0.133 +set name=pkg.renamed value=true + +set name=org.opensolaris.consolidation value=$(CONSOLIDATION) + +depend fmri=library/security/openssl/openssl-fips-140@1.2-0.133 type=require
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/meta-packages/history/SUNWopenssl.p5m Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# +# Legacy package information for renamed SUNWopenssl package +# + +set name=pkg.fmri value=pkg:/SUNWopenssl@0.9.8.12,5.11-0.133 +set name=pkg.renamed value=true + +set name=org.opensolaris.consolidation value=$(CONSOLIDATION) + +depend fmri=library/security/openssl@0.9.8.12-0.133 type=require
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/README Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +Build Layout +--- + +OpenSSL build is run three times. Once for 1.0.0 non-fips, once for 0.9.8 +fips-140, and once for 0.9.8 FIPS-140 canister (in the openssl-fips component) +needed to build 0.9.8 FIPS-140 certified libraries. All builds are done for 32 +and 64 bits. So, in total, OpenSSL is built six times. + +See also comments in all three Makefiles for more information. + +The non-fips Build. +--- + +The non-fips build is the main build of OpenSSL and includes the regular +binaries, libraries, man pages, and header files. + +Patches +--- + +08-6193522.patch +Give CA.pl better defaults. See 6193522 for more information. + +11-6546806.patch +Make sure the HMAC_CTX_init(3) man page gets delivered. See 6546806 for +more information. + +14-manpage_openssl.patch +Force openssl to install man pages into man[1357]openssl instead of man[1357]. + +15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch +Patch which adds the pkcs11 engine. See also the pkcs11-engine/ +sub-directory. + +18-compiler_opts.patch +Adds four Solaris specific configurations (both 32bit and 64bit for both sparc +and x86) to Configure which are then explicitly used by the Makefiles. + +Care should be taken if modifying this patch as changes to compile-time options +can change the ABI. One example of this is the use of RC4_INT vs RC4_CHAR. + +20-remove_rpath.patch +Prevent build binaries having an unnecessary runpath (/lib). + +23-noexstack.patch +Build with non-executable stacks and non-executable data (x86). + +27-6978791.patch +Modifies Makefile.shared so that libssl is built with -znodelete. + +28-enginesdir.patch +Adds a new "enginesdir" option to the Configure script which allows a user to +specify the engines directory. + +29-devcrypto_engine.patch +Modifies engines/Makefile so that the devcrypto engine will be built in the +"engines" directory. + +opensslconf.patch +Modifies opensslconf.h so that it is suitable for both 32bit and 64bit installs. +OpenSSL either builds for 32bit or 64bit - it doesn't allow for combined 32bit +and 64bit builds. + +The fips Build +--- + +FIPS-140 certified libraries for Solaris private use. We wait for OpenSSL 1.0.0 +to be FIPS-140 certified in which time we can ship only 1.0.0 with S11 and make +it a public interface. + +Patches +--- + +All the patches from 1.0.0 are used in 0.9.8 as well aside from +14-manpage_openssl.patch which is not needed since we do not deliver 0.9.8 man +pages. Additional patches: + +01-7009105.patch +Fixing a bug introduces in 0.9.8q and fixed in 0.9.8r. + +sparc-01-ccwrap.patch +Workaround so that fingerprinting the canister during runtime and comparing it +with the saved fingerprint works correctly.
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/Makefile Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/shared-macros.mk + +COMPONENT_NAME = openssl +# Note that this is the OpenSSL version that is used to build FIPS-140 certified +# libraries. However, we use the FIPS canister version for the IPS package. +COMPONENT_VERSION = 0.9.8q +IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.2 +COMPONENT_SRC = $(COMPONENT_NAME)-$(COMPONENT_VERSION) +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE = $(COMPONENT_SRC).tar.gz +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_HASH= sha1:12b6859698ca299fa0cba594686c25d5c01e410d +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL = http://www.openssl.org/source/$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE) + +# Apply the patch on SPARC only. Must put this before including prep.mk as +# mentioned in there. +PATCH_sparc = patches/sparc-01-ccwrap.patch +EXTRA_PATCHES = $(PATCH_$(MACH)) +# Note that the SPARC patch above does not fit this pattern. That is intentional +# and a reason why we can add it to the EXTRA_PATCHES variable so that we use it +# only on SPARC. +PATCH_PATTERN = [0-9][0-9]*.patch + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/prep.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/configure.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/ips.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/lint-libraries.mk + +# OpenSSL does not use autoconf but its own configure system. +CONFIGURE_SCRIPT = $(SOURCE_DIR)/Configure + +# Used in the configure options below. +PKCS11_LIB32 = /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so.1 +PKCS11_LIB64 = /usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so.1 +ENGINESDIR_32 = /lib/openssl/engines +ENGINESDIR_64 = /lib/openssl/engines/64 + +# Built openssl/openssl-fips component is used when building FIPS-140 libraries. +# What we do here follows the OpenSSL FIPS-140 User Guide instructions. +FIPS_BUILD_DIR_32 = $(shell echo $(BUILD_DIR_32) | \ + sed -e 's/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-fips/g' ) +FIPS_BUILD_DIR_64 = $(shell echo $(BUILD_DIR_64) | \ + sed -e 's/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-fips/g' ) + +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS = -DSOLARIS_OPENSSL -DNO_WINDOWS_BRAINDEATH +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --openssldir=/etc/openssl +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --prefix=/usr +# We use OpenSSL install code for installing only manual pages and we do that +# for 32-bit version only. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --install_prefix=$(PROTO_DIR) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ec +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ecdh +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ecdsa +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-rc3 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-rc5 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-mdc2 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-idea +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_4758_cca +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_aep +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_atalla +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_chil +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_gmp +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_ncipher +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_nuron +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_padlock +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_sureware +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_ubsec +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_cswift +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += threads +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += shared +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += fips --with-fipslibdir="$(FIPS_BUILD_DIR_$(BITS))/fips" + +# We define our own compiler and linker option sets for Solaris. See Configure +# for more information. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS32_i386 = solaris-x86-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS32_sparc = solaris-sparcv8-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS64_i386 = solaris64-x86_64-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS64_sparc = solaris64-sparcv9-cc-sunw + +# Some additional options needed for our engines. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --pk11-libname=$(PKCS11_LIB$(BITS)) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --enginesdir=$(ENGINESDIR_$(BITS)) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += $(CONFIGURE_OPTIONS$(BITS)_$(MACH)) + +# OpenSSL has its own configure system which must be run from the fully +# populated source code directory. However, the Userland configuration phase is +# run from the build directory. The easiest way to workaround it is to copy all +# the source files there. +COMPONENT_PRE_CONFIGURE_ACTION = \ + ( $(CLONEY) $(SOURCE_DIR) $(BUILD_DIR)/$(MACH$(BITS)); ) + +# We deliver only one opensslconf.h file which must be suitable for both 32 and +# 64 bits. Depending on the configuration option, OpenSSL's Configure script +# creates opensslconf.h for either 32 or 64 bits. A patch makes the resulting +# header file usable on both architectures. The patch was generated against the +# opensslconf.h version from the 32 bit build. +COMPONENT_POST_CONFIGURE_ACTION = \ + ( [ $(BITS) -eq 32 ] && $(GPATCH) -p1 $(@D)/crypto/opensslconf.h \ + patches-post-config/opensslconf.patch; cd $(@D); $(MAKE) depend; ) + +# We must make sure that openssl-fips component is built before this 0.9.8 +# component since in order to build FIPS-140 certified libraries, the canister +# is needed. Note that we must unset BITS that would override the same variable +# used in openssl-fips' Makefile, and we would end up up with both canisters +# built in 64 (or 32) bits. +$(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips/build/$(MACH32)/.installed \ +$(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips/build/$(MACH64)/.installed: + ( unset BITS; \ + $(MAKE) -C $(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips install; ) + +# We do not ship our engines as patches since it would be more difficult to +# update the files which have been under continuous development. We rather copy +# the files to the right directories and let OpenSSL makefiles build it. +COMPONENT_PRE_BUILD_ACTION = \ + ( $(CP) -fp engines/pkcs11/* $(@D)/crypto/engine; ) + +# OpenSSL does not install into <dir>/$(MACH64) for 64-bit install so no such +# directory is created and Userland install code would fail when installing lint +# libraries. +COMPONENT_PRE_INSTALL_ACTION = ( $(MKDIR) $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/lib/$(MACH64); ) + +# For ccwrap on SPARC. This is to workaround a problem with the cc compiler on +# SPARC. We must modify PATH so that the wrapper can be found when run from +# fips/fipsld. +COMPONENT_BUILD_ENV += PATH=$(COMPONENT_DIR):$(PATH) +COMPONENT_INSTALL_ENV += PATH=$(COMPONENT_DIR):$(PATH) + +$(SOURCE_DIR)/.prep: $(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips/build/$(MACH32)/.installed \ + $(COMPONENT_DIR)/../openssl-fips/build/$(MACH64)/.installed + +# We need ccwrap for building the libraries. +$(BUILD_32_and_64): ccwrap +build: $(BUILD_32_and_64) + +# We follow what we do for install in openssl/openssl-1.0.0 component. Please +# see the comment in Makefile in there for more information. +install: $(INSTALL_32_and_64) + +# We need to modify the default lint flags to include patched opensslconf.h from +# the build directory. If we do not do that, lint will complain about md2.h +# which is not enabled by default but it is in our opensslconf.h. +LFLAGS_32 := -I$(BUILD_DIR_32)/include $(LINT_FLAGS) +LFLAGS_64 := -I$(BUILD_DIR_64)/include $(LINT_FLAGS) + +# Set modified lint flags for our lint library targets. +$(BUILD_DIR_32)/llib-lcrypto.ln: LINT_FLAGS=$(LFLAGS_32) +$(BUILD_DIR_32)/llib-lssl.ln: LINT_FLAGS=$(LFLAGS_32) +$(BUILD_DIR_64)/llib-lcrypto.ln: LINT_FLAGS=$(LFLAGS_64) +$(BUILD_DIR_64)/llib-lssl.ln: LINT_FLAGS=$(LFLAGS_64) + +test: $(NO_TESTS) + +BUILD_PKG_DEPENDENCIES = $(BUILD_TOOLS) + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/depend.mk
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/ccwrap.sh Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# Very simple cc wrapper whose only purpose is to ensure that cc behaves as +# desired when linking the fipscanister.o object. Currently that means removing +# "-g" and adding "-W2,-Rfully_unroll" from/to the compiler options. +# +# This wrapper is called from fipsld. See fips/fipsld and +# patches/sparc-01-ccwrap.patch for more information. + +CC_CMD="" +while [ $# -ne 0 ]; do + if [ "$1" != "-g" ]; then + CC_CMD="$CC_CMD '$1'" + fi + shift; +done + +eval $CC_CMD -W2,-Rfully_unroll
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,3837 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/aes.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <dlfcn.h> +#include <pthread.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ +#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" +/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ +#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more + * information. + */ +#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) +#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#endif + +/* + * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither + * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, + * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then + * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's + * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. + */ +#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine" +#include "hw_pk11_err.c" + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine + * initialization. + */ +int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* + * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), + * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the + * RSA keys by reference feature. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel + * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. + */ +int *hw_cnids; +int *hw_dnids; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ +static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; + +/* + * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when + * logging into the token. + */ +CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +/* + * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for + * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given + * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be + * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already + * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each + * PK11_SESSION object. + * + * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the + * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also + * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another + * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in + * invalid handle returned from the search operation. + * + * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. + * They are also used for active list protection. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one + * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session + * list) for given algorithm type + */ +PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available + * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed + * without losing the secret key objects. + */ +static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + +/* ENGINE level stuff */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int pk11_rand_status(void); + +/* These functions are also used in other files */ +PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ +extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); +extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif + +/* Local helper functions */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent); +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); + +/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ +static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ +static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); +static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); +static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc); +static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); +static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid); +static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len); +static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, + size_t count); +static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); +static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); +static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids); +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, + int *local_digest_nids); +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, + int id); +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id); + +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* Index for the supported ciphers */ +enum pk11_cipher_id { + PK11_DES_CBC, + PK11_DES3_CBC, + PK11_DES_ECB, + PK11_DES3_ECB, + PK11_RC4, + PK11_AES_128_CBC, + PK11_AES_192_CBC, + PK11_AES_256_CBC, + PK11_AES_128_ECB, + PK11_AES_192_ECB, + PK11_AES_256_ECB, + PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + PK11_AES_128_CTR, + PK11_AES_192_CTR, + PK11_AES_256_CTR, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + PK11_CIPHER_MAX +}; + +/* Index for the supported digests */ +enum pk11_digest_id { + PK11_MD5, + PK11_SHA1, + PK11_SHA224, + PK11_SHA256, + PK11_SHA384, + PK11_SHA512, + PK11_DIGEST_MAX +}; + +#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \ + { \ + if (uselock) \ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ + { \ + retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ + sp->persistent); \ + } \ + if (uselock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + } + +static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; +static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; +static int cipher_count = 0; +static int digest_count = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; + +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st + { + enum pk11_cipher_id id; + int nid; + int iv_len; + int min_key_len; + int max_key_len; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_CIPHER; + +static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = + { + { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, + { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, + { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, + CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, + { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, + CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ + { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + }; + +typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st + { + enum pk11_digest_id id; + int nid; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_DIGEST; + +static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = + { + {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, + {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, + {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, + {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, + {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, + {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, + {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, + }; + +/* + * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 + * session in multiple cipher_update calls + */ +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; + + +/* + * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets + * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. + * + * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. + */ + +/* DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = + { + NID_des_cbc, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* 3DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = + { + NID_des_ede3_cbc, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ecb, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ede3_ecb, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = + { + NID_aes_128_cbc, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = + { + NID_aes_192_cbc, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = + { + NID_aes_256_cbc, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = + { + NID_aes_128_ecb, + 16, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = + { + NID_aes_192_ecb, + 16, 24, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = + { + NID_aes_256_ecb, + 16, 32, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are + * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures + * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. + */ +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = + { + NID_bf_cbc, + 8, 16, 8, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = + { + NID_rc4, + 1, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = + { + NID_md5, + NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + MD5_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = + { + NID_sha1, + NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = + { + NID_sha224, + NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, + SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = + { + NID_sha256, + NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = + { + NID_sha384, + NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = + { + NID_sha512, + NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine + */ +#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = + { + { + PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, + "SO_PATH", + "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + + +static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = + { + pk11_rand_seed, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_cleanup, + pk11_rand_add, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_status + }; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; +static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support"; + +CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; +static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; + +/* + * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function + * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether + * this is 32 or 64 bit build. + */ +static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; +/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ +CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static int pk11_pid = 0; + +static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; + +/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + session_cache[type].lock = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL); + } + + return (1); + +malloc_err: + pk11_free_all_locks(); + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); + find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); + OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); + session_cache[type].lock = NULL; + } + } + } + +/* + * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. + */ +static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; + RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + if (!pk11_library_init(e)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || + !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || + !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) + return (0); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + if (pk11_have_random) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) + return (0); + +/* + * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup + * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp + * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. + * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; + pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_pk11_strings(); + + return (1); + } + +/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) + return (0); + + if (!bind_pk11(e)) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) + +#else +static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + + if (!ret) + return (NULL); + + if (!bind_pk11(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return (NULL); + } + + return (ret); + } + +void +ENGINE_load_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; + + /* + * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to + * security reasons. We will link it in statically. + */ + /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ + if (!pk11_dso) + pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + return; + } + + e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); + if (!e_pk11) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + return; + } + + /* + * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically + * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 + * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter + * needs cipher and digest algorithm information + */ + if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + return; + } + + ENGINE_add(e_pk11); + + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and + * the function symbol names to bind to. + */ +static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + return (PK11_LIBNAME); + + return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); + } + +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); + + PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + } + +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + + return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); + } + +/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ +static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + } + +/* release all engine specific mutexes */ +static void pk11_fork_parent(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* + * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them + * accessible to all threads. + */ +static void pk11_fork_child(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + return (pk11_library_init(e)); +} + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also + * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and + * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function + * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) + { + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + int any_slot_found; + int i; + + /* + * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called + * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one + * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more + * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen + * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a + * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be + * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes + * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID + * check so that we properly initialize the engine again. + */ + if (pk11_library_initialized) + { + if (pk11_pid == getpid()) + { + return (1); + } + else + { + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + /* + * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case + * the application calls fork() without finishing the + * engine first. + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + } + } + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all + * NIDs there. + */ + if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ + p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); + if (!p) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + rv = p(&pFuncList); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any + * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an + * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 + * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just + * because no slot was present. + */ + if (any_slot_found == 0) + return (1); + + if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, + PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since + * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function + */ + if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) + == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " + "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + digest_count = 0; + } + + pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE; + pk11_pid = getpid(); + /* + * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() + * will do the cleanup. + */ + if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + session_cache[i].head = NULL; + /* + * initialize active lists. We only use active lists + * for asymmetric ciphers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + active_list[i] = NULL; + + if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) + { + if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, + pk11_fork_child) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE; + } + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); + return (1); + } + +/* + * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 + * library. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + int i; + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); + + if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) + goto err; + + /* free all active lists */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + pk11_free_active_list(i); + + pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. + */ +#if 0 + pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + { + ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL; + if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + } +#endif + + if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + pk11_dso = NULL; + pFuncList = NULL; + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + pk11_pid = 0; + /* + * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than + * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason + * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out + * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes + * the engine before calling fork(). + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) + { + int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); + + switch (cmd) + { + case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + if (initialized) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + return (0); + } + + return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); + default: + break; + } + + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + return (0); + } + + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) + { + return; + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since + * the calling functions do not care anyway + */ + pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + + return; + } + +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) + { + pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); + } + +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (1); + } + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static int pk11_rand_status(void) + { + return (1); + } + +/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ +static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + +/* + * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have + * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here + * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. + * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. + */ +PK11_SESSION * +pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + static pid_t pid = 0; + pid_t new_pid; + CK_RV rv; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (NULL); + } + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + + /* + * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in + * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session + * here, with no PID information. + */ + if (pid == 0) + pid = getpid(); + + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp = freelist; + + /* + * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled + * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first + * structure from the freelist. + */ + if (sp == NULL) + { + if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); + + /* + * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the + * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so + * mark them as unused. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + freelist = sp->next; + + /* + * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all + * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. + */ + if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) + { + pid = new_pid; + + /* + * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited + * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which + * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the + * head of the list). + */ + while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) + { + freelist = sp1->next; + /* + * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() + * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 + * sessions and destroy all objects. + */ + pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp1); + } + + /* we have to free the active list as well. */ + pk11_free_active_list(optype); + + /* Initialize the process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this + * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one + * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. + * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more + * information. + */ +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) + goto err; + + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs + * re-initialization. + */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) + { + /* + * We will keep the session in the cache list and let + * the caller cope with the situation. + */ + freelist = sp; + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + + if (sp->pid == 0) + { + /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + } + } + + /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ + session_cache[optype].head = freelist; + +err: + if (sp != NULL) + sp->next = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + + return (sp); + } + + +void +pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + PK11_SESSION *freelist; + + /* + * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and + * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the + * next time we will ask for a new session. + */ + if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) + return; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return; + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp->next = freelist; + session_cache[optype].head = sp; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + } + + +/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions() + { + int ret = 1; + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); + + /* + * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will + * return 0 on exit. + */ + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many + * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we + * return an error on return. + */ +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + int ret = 1; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) + { + if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + ret = 0; + } + } + freelist = sp->next; + pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + return (ret); + } + + +static int +pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID myslot; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_RAND: + myslot = rand_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + myslot = SLOTID; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) + { + /* + * We are probably a child process so force the + * reinitialize of the session + */ + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) + return (0); + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + sp->pid = getpid(); + + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + case OP_CIPHER: + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent + * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. + */ + sp->persistent = CK_FALSE; + return (1); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code, + * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the + * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying + * a public or a private key, we always free what we can. + */ +static void +destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + } + +/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DH); + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DH key object wrapper. + * + * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure + * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } +err: + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +static int +pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects + * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so + * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. + */ + if (persistent == CK_TRUE) + return (1); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, + rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + + +/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ + +static int +cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) + if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) + return (ciphers[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) + { + if (cipher_count > 0) + *nids = cipher_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (cipher_count); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) + { + if (digest_count > 0) + *nids = digest_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (digest_count); + } + +/* + * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. + */ +static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, + PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) + { + CK_RV rv; +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + + /* + * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and + * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before + * pk11_init_symetric() is called. + */ + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); + pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); + /* + * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, + * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 + * needs. For more information on internal structure of the + * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can + * add code so that the counter length can be set via + * ENGINE_ctrl() function. + */ + ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + { + if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; + pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; + } + } + + /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) + { + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) + return (0); + + p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; + /* + * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the + * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our + * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From + * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a + * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key + * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this + * code serves as a sanity check. + * + * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be + * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs + * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES + * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. + */ + if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || + ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || + ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { + PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); + return (0); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ + mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ + (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); + + /* + * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then + * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the + * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && + sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) + { + state->sp = sp; + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + + /* + * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object + * needs to be created. + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( + ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); + } + + if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) + { + /* + * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to + * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. + */ + if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + } + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + /* now initialize the context with a new key */ + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +/* + * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a + * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session + * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so + * that it needs not be recreated. + * + * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this + * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return + * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good + * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix + * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient + * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long outl = inl; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; + + if (!inl) + return (1); + + /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ + if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) + return (0); + + if (ctx->encrypt) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + else + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always + * the same size of input. + * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with + * correctly aligned buffers. + */ + if (inl != outl) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() + * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's + * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but + * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't + * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with + * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, + * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used + * context is initialized without finalizing it first. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; + CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get + * rid of the context. + */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + state->sp = NULL; + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with + * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the + * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!cipher) + return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_des_ede3_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; + break; + case NID_des_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; + break; + case NID_bf_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; + break; + case NID_rc4: + *cipher = &pk11_rc4; + break; + default: +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs + * here are not constants. + */ + if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + *cipher = NULL; + break; + } + return (*cipher != NULL); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!digest) + return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_md5: + *digest = &pk11_md5; + break; + case NID_sha1: + *digest = &pk11_sha1; + break; + case NID_sha224: + *digest = &pk11_sha224; + break; + case NID_sha256: + *digest = &pk11_sha256; + break; + case NID_sha384: + *digest = &pk11_sha384; + break; + case NID_sha512: + *digest = &pk11_sha512; + break; + default: + *digest = NULL; + break; + } + return (*digest != NULL); + } + + +/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, + }; + + /* + * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions + * can use the key handles. Here is why: + * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. + * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. + * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with + * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES + * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and + * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session + * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key + * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to + * terminate the active operation. + */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; + a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Save the key information used in this session. + * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. + */ + sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? + PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len; + (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); +err: + + return (h_key); + } + +static int +md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) + if (digests[i].nid == nid) + return (digests[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_DIGEST *pdp; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) + return (0); + + pdp = &digests[index]; + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ + mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); + return (0); + } + + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ + if (count == 0) + return (1); + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, + count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) + { + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long len; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + len = ctx->digest->md_size; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) + return (0); + + /* + * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session + * to the pool + */ + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) + { + CK_RV rv; + int ret = 0; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; + CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + + /* The copy-from state */ + state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Initialize the copy-to state */ + if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) + goto err; + state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; + + /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + if (ul_state_len == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); + if (pstate == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, + ul_state_len, 0, 0); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, + PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; +err: + if (pstate != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pstate); + + return (ret); + } + +/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ +static int +pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; + unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not + * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory + * that might have been allocated in the token when + * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() + * will return the session to the cache. + */ + if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key + * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key + * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for + * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first + * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same + * prefix. + */ +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len) + { + if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || + memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) + { + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* + * The secret key object is created in the + * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). + */ + if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, + sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + + return (ret); + } + + +/* + * Public key mechanisms optionally supported + * + * CKM_RSA_X_509 + * CKM_RSA_PKCS + * CKM_DSA + * + * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a + * public key slot. + * + * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported + * + * CKM_DES3_CBC + * CKM_DES_CBC + * CKM_AES_CBC + * CKM_DES3_ECB + * CKM_DES_ECB + * CKM_AES_ECB + * CKM_AES_CTR + * CKM_RC4 + * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC + * + * Digests optionally supported + * + * CKM_MD5 + * CKM_SHA_1 + * CKM_SHA224 + * CKM_SHA256 + * CKM_SHA384 + * CKM_SHA512 + * + * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which + * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of + * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global + * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key + * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. + */ +static int +pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) + { + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar; + CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + int slot_n_cipher = 0; + int slot_n_digest = 0; + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; + int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + int current_slot_n_digest = 0; + + int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; + int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; + + /* let's initialize the output parameter */ + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 0; + + /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + return (0); + } + + /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + /* Check if slot has random support. */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, + * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_DSA. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, + &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and + * derivation. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) + { + slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (!found_candidate_slot && + (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; + pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; + found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if + * RSA keys by reference feature is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", + PK11_DBG); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + best_slot_sofar); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); + } +#else + } /* if */ +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } /* for */ + + if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + { + pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + } + + found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + best_slot_sofar = 0; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + current_slot_n_digest = 0; + (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); + + pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_cipher); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_digest); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", + PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than + * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, + * otherwise leave it where it is. + */ + if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > + (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", + PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; + cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; + digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; + (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, + sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, + sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); + OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 1; + return (1); + } + +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids, int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = + ciphers[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = + digests[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) + { + ASN1_OBJECT *o; + int nid; + + if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", + 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) + { + return (0); + } + + /* will return NID_undef on error */ + nid = OBJ_add_object(o); + ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); + + return (nid); + } + +/* + * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we + * have to help ourselves here. + */ +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) + { + /* are we already set? */ + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) + return (1); + + /* + * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just + * follow the format of those that exist. + */ + if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; + return (1); + +err: + PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, + ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, + local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); + } + } + +/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, + current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); + } + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library + * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation + * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code + * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the + * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some + * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a + * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, + * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the + * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte + * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products + * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression + * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the + * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. + * + * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for + * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same + * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 + * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without + * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use + * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since + * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said + * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with + * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code + * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for + * asymmetric operations. + * + * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what + * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can + * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be + * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, + * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. + * + * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find + * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric + * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table + * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays + * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the + * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token + * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more + * information. + * + * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined + * the code won't be used. + */ +#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#else +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#endif + +/* + * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, + * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware + * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. + */ +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + void *handle; + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; + int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif + /* + * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own + * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions + * from the top-level PKCS#11 library. + */ + if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + /* this means empty tables */ + hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; + hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also + * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the + * search. + */ + hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; + hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; + tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); + tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); + if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef + * is zero now. + */ + for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; + for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are + * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. + */ + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); + pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); + } + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by + * dlclose(3C). + */ +#if 0 + pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + (void) dlclose(handle); + hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; + hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + +err: + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); + if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); + + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., + * non-existent). + */ +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) + { + int i = 0; + + /* + * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new + * table. + */ + if (nid_table == NULL) + return (1); + + /* + * the table is never full, there is always at least one + * NID_undef. + */ + while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) + { + if (nid_table[i++] == nid) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + } + + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.h */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_H +#define HW_PK11_H + +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ +#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 + +/* + * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 + * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the + * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation + * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. + * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object + * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. + * + * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list + * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request + * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION + { + struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ + pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ + CK_BBOOL persistent; /* is that a keystore object? */ + union + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ + BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ + RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ + } u_RSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ + DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ + } u_DSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ + DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ + BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ + } u_DH; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ + unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; + int key_len; /* priv key len */ + int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ + } u_cipher; + } opdata_u; + } PK11_SESSION; + +#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key +#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key +#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub +#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv +#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num +#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num +#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num +#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key +#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key +#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub +#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num +#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv +#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num +#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key +#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh +#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num +#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key +#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key +#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len +#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt + +/* + * We have 3 different groups of operation types: + * 1) asymmetric operations + * 2) random operations + * 3) symmetric and digest operations + * + * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware + * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware + * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support + * only a single group of operations. + * + * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have + * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from + * different groups may be initialized in different slots. + * + * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are + * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. + */ +typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM + { + OP_RAND, + OP_RSA, + OP_DSA, + OP_DH, + OP_CIPHER, + OP_DIGEST, + OP_MAX + } PK11_OPTYPE; + +/* + * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches + * and locks associated with the lists. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE + { + PK11_SESSION *head; + pthread_mutex_t *lock; + } PK11_CACHE; + +/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ +typedef struct PK11_active_st + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; + unsigned int refcnt; + struct PK11_active_st *prev; + struct PK11_active_st *next; + } PK11_active; + +extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; +extern PK11_active *active_list[]; +/* + * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See + * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. + */ +extern char *passphrasedialog; +extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) +#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) + +extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +#endif /* HW_PK11_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= +{ +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, +{ 0, NULL} +}; + +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= +{ +{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, +{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, +{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, +{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, +{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, +{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, +{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, +{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, +{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, +{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, +{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, +{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork failed" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login failed on token" }, +{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen dialog command" }, +{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe failed" }, +{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, +{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf failed" }, +{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap failed" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, +{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock failed" }, +{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork failed" }, +{ 0, NULL} +}; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ + +static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; +static int pk11_error_init = 1; + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] = +{ +{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME}, +{0, NULL} +}; +#endif + +static void +ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + + if (pk11_error_init) + { + pk11_error_init = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME + pk11_engine_lib_name->error = + ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0); + ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); +#endif + } +} + +static void +ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_error_init == 0) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME + ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); +#endif + + pk11_error_init = 1; + } +} + +void +ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) +{ + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); +} + +void +PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) +{ + char tmp_buf[20]; + + PK11err(function, reason); + (void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); +}
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H +#define HW_PK11_ERR_H + +void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); +void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); +#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) + +/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ + +/* Function codes. */ + +#define PK11_F_INIT 100 +#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 +#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 +#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 +#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 +#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 +#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 +#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 +#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 +#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 +#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 +#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 +#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 +#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 +#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 +#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 +#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 +#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 +#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 +#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 +#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 +#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 +#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 +#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 +#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 +#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 +#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 +#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 +#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 +#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 +#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 +#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 +#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 +#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 +#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 +#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 + +/* Reason codes. */ +#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 +#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 +#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 +#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 +#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 +#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 +#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 +#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 +#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 +#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 +#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 +#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 +#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 +#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 +#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 +#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 +#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 +#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 +#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 +#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 +#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 +#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 +#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 +#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 +#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 +#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 +#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 +#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 +#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 +#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 +#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 +#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 +#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 +#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 +#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 +#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 +#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 +#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 +#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 +#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 +#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 +#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 +#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 +#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 +#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 +#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 + +#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,3236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <libgen.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; + +/* + * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the + * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent. + */ +char *passphrasedialog; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* RSA stuff */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); + +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +#endif + +/* DSA stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); +static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +#endif + +/* DH stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, + const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); +#endif + +static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); +static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, + CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); +static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); + +/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ +#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL +static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; +#else +static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; +#endif + +/* + * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11 + * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if + * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list + * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from + * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the + * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to + * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy(). + * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY. + */ +#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ + { \ + if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ + { \ + var = CK_TRUE; \ + if (unlock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the + * entry otherwise return NULL. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) + if (entry->h == h) + return (entry); + + return (NULL); + } + +/* + * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a + * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of + * failure. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + /* search for entry in the active list */ + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) + entry->refcnt++; + else + { + /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ + entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); + if (entry == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + entry->h = h; + entry->refcnt = 1; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ + if (active_list[type] == NULL) + active_list[type] = entry; + else /* make the entry first in the list */ + { + entry->next = active_list[type]; + active_list[type]->prev = entry; + active_list[type] = entry; + } + } + + return (entry->refcnt); + } + +/* + * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +void +pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *prev_entry; + + /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ + if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) + { + prev_entry->next = entry->next; + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = prev_entry; + } + else + { + active_list[type] = entry->next; + /* we were the first but not the only one */ + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = NULL; + } + + /* sanitization */ + entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(entry); + } + +/* Free all entries from the active list. */ +void +pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ + switch (type) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + } + +/* + * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, + * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. + * + * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, + * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); + entry->refcnt--; + if (entry->refcnt == 0) + { + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + return (1); + } + + return (0); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = + { + "PKCS#11 RSA method", + pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ + NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ + RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ + pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ + }; + +RSA_METHOD * +PK11_RSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_rsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = + { + "PKCS#11 DSA method", + pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ + NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ + pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ + NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL /* app_data */ + }; + +DSA_METHOD * +PK11_DSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_dsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* + * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for + * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but + * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by + * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be + * enough. + */ +#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 + +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = + { + "PKCS#11 DH method", + pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ + pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DH_init, /* init */ + pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + NULL /* generate_params */ + }; + +DH_METHOD * +PK11_DH(void) + { + return (&pk11_dh); + } +#endif + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ +#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 +#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to + * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not + * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. + * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + + +/* + * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors + * should be catched in the padding functions + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. + */ + for (j = 0; j < r; j++) + if (buf[j] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + j; + j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's here + */ + for (i = 0; i < r; i++) + if (buf[i] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + i; + i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* + * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and + * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_encrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and + * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, + rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + retval = ul_sig_len; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and + * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit + * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, + p_mech, h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, + * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. + */ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + return (1); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need + * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum + * structures. + */ + if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from + * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. + * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c + */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long ulsiglen; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + ulsiglen = j; + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); + *siglen = ulsiglen; + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto err; + } + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf, + (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +#define MAXATTR 1024 +/* + * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *privkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + const char *file; + int ret; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* We look for private keys only. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we + * never ask for private components. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in + * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in + * the 'privkey_id' parameter. + */ + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */ + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find + * is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + + /* + * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to + * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL + * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate + * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used + * many times. We do not check the return value because even in + * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports + * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->persistent = CK_TRUE; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now + * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + + /* + * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take + * care of handle management ourselves. + */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + + /* + * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + /* + * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as + * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key + * in the keystore. + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + } + else + if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(privkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, + rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *pubkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */ + int ret; + const char *file; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + /* + * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA + * structure. No cache hit is possible. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + + /* + * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Create a session object from it so that when calling + * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The + * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA + * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for + * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears + * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if + * we always have a session key. Note that this is different + * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that + * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore + * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. + */ + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(pubkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, + rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + else + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the + * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and + * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new + * session object is created and put also onto the active object list. + * + * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in + * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + int i; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue); + + a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); + a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e' + * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference + * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be + * NULL here. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, + &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, + &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, + &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, + &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, + &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL. + * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can + * use only public components for searching for the private key handle. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + ul_key_attr_count = 8; + /* + * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing + * session keys. + */ + a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + /* + * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we + * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was + * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key + * types we just create a new session key using the private + * components from the RSA structure. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private + * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we + * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented + * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it + * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no + * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read + * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage. + */ + if (rsa->d != NULL && (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + else + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + + /* + * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well + * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache + * 'n'/'e' components as well. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed upon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA + * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + * + * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public + * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we + * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public + * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for + * both data signing and verifying. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing private key + * object. We can just create a public object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA + * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should + * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component + * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are + * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub() + * about why we compare the handle as well. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing public key + * object. We can just create a private object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* The DSA function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + + +static DSA_SIG * +pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) + { + BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + int i; + DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; + + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + + /* + * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, + * each is 20 bytes long + */ + unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto ret; + } + + (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + + if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || + BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + dsa_sig->r = r; + dsa_sig->s = s; + +ret: + if (dsa_sig == NULL) + { + if (r != NULL) + BN_free(r); + if (s != NULL) + BN_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (dsa_sig); + } + +static int +pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, + DSA *dsa) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + int retval = 0; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + + unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto ret; + } + + /* + * The representation of each of the two big numbers could + * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need + * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. + */ + (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - + BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); + + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + retval = 1; +ret: + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. + * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, + &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure + * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed apon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* The DH function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* + * Generate DH key-pair. + * + * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key + * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key + * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard + * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem + * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. + */ +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) + { + CK_ULONG i; + CK_RV rv, rv1; + int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; + + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)} + }; + + CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) + { + /* + * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that + * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of + * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. + */ + pub_key_template[1].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) + { + pub_key_template[2].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + /* + * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting + * a session handle. The objects created in this function are + * destroyed before return and thus not cached. + */ + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, + &mechanism, + pub_key_template, + ul_pub_key_attr_count, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_pub_key, + &h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory + * should be sufficient for reuse. + */ + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + else + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) + { + rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || + ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) + { + if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); + pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, + DH *dh) + { + int i; + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + goto err; + + priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; + priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); + mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); + if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); + + (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); + + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = + pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, + &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, + &mechanism, + h_key, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + priv_key_result[0].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); + if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same + * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key + */ + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + /* + * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip + * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, + * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The + * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was + * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading + * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the + * pre-master secret. + */ + for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) + { + if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) + break; + } + + (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); + ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; + } + +err: + + if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); + priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; + } + + if (mechanism.pParameter) + { + OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); + mechanism.pParameter = NULL; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, + DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + }; + + key_template[0].pValue = &class; + key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); + + key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); + + key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); + key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dh_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dh; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); + key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + * + * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh + * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. + */ +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key + * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached + * in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + +/* + * Local function to simplify key template population + * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error + */ +static int +init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, + CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) + { + CK_ULONG len; + + /* + * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to + * check that here than individually in the callers. + */ + if (bn != NULL) + len = BN_num_bytes(bn); + + if (bn == NULL || len == 0) + return (1); + + *ul_value_len = len; + *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); + if (*p_value == NULL) + return (0); + + BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); + + return (1); + } + +static void +attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) + { + if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) + *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); + } + +/* + * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or + * if we find more objects based on the template we got. + * + * Returns: + * 1 OK + * 0 no object or more than 1 object found + */ +static int +find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG objcnt; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (objcnt > 1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + else + if (objcnt == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (1); +err: + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (0); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,870 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> +#include <libgen.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +/* + * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one + * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI + * processing. + */ +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +/* + * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not + * cache the PIN by default. + */ +static char *token_pin; + +static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin); +static char *run_askpass(char *dialog); + +/* + * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to + * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using + * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated + * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take + * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted + * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN. + * + * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after + * the fork. + * + * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock" + * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function. + * + * Returns: + * 0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL) + * 1 if we got the PIN + */ +#define EXEC_SPEC "exec:" +#define BUILTIN_SPEC "builtin" +int +pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin) + { + /* Initialize as an error. */ + *pin = NULL; + + if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0) + { + /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */ + *pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: "); + if (*pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + else + { + char *pw; + + /* + * getpassphrase() uses an internal buffer to hold the + * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer + * with '\0'. + */ + if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + /* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */ + memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin)); + *pin = pw; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + } + else + { + /* + * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output + * of an external command. + */ + if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0) + { + dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC); + if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL) + goto err; + } + else + { + /* + * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog + * keyword. + */ + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC); + goto err; + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the + * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present + * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes + * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct' + * structure. + * + * Returns: + * 0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN + * 1 if all is OK + * 2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string + * pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points + * inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present. + */ +int +pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, + const char **file) + { + char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name; + + /* Check the "file://" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0) + { + *file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX); + return (2); + } + + /* This is the "pkcs11:" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0) + { + /* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */ + *file = (const char *)uristr; + return (2); + } + else + { + /* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */ + uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)); + if (uristr2 == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Initialize the structure. */ + memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct)); + + /* + * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We + * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first + * and the last character in the URI. + */ + if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' || + (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';')) + goto bad_uri; + + tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1); + for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1)) + { + /* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */ + name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2); + /* Check whether there is '=' at all. */ + if (l2 == NULL) + goto bad_uri; + + /* + * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit + * attributes. + */ + if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0) + if (uri_struct->token == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0) + if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->serial == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->model == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0) + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0) + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + { + uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2); + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0) + if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else + goto bad_uri; + } + + /* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */ + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL); + goto err; + } + + free(uristr2); + return (1); +bad_uri: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); +no_mem: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err: + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside. + */ +void +pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself) + { + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + free(uri_struct->token); + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + free(uri_struct->manuf); + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + free(uri_struct->serial); + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + free(uri_struct->model); + if (uri_struct->object != NULL) + free(uri_struct->object); + if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL) + free(uri_struct->objecttype); + if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + free(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE) + OPENSSL_free(uri_struct); + } + +/* + * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is + * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that + * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note + * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to + * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see + * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11 + * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct) + { + CK_RV rv; + static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO)); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label, + strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0) + { + goto urierr; + } + + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf, + (char *)token_info->manufacturerID, + strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model, + strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial, + (char *)token_info->serialNumber, + strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); + +urierr: + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH); + /* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */ +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the + * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will + * not have any affect on the policy. + * + * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked. + * + * Returns the caching policy number. + */ +int +pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void) + { + char *value = NULL; + static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED) + return (policy); + + value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY"); + + if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_NONE; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE); +done: + return (policy); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or + * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_cache_pin(char *pin) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + goto ok; + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY) + if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + else + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY) + { + if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0) + goto err; + } + +ok: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to + * the normal memory caching. + * + * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock" + * mutex. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +static int +mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin) + { + void *addr = NULL; + long pagesize = 0; + + /* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */ + if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */ + if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */ + if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1) + { + /* + * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common + * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues. + */ + if (errno == EPERM) + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING); + else + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED); + + /* + * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check + * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet + * anyway. + */ + (void) munmap(addr, pagesize); + goto err; + } + + /* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */ + token_pin = (char *)addr; + strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of + * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from + * multiple threads. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private) + { + CK_RV rv; + + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); + goto err; + } + + /* + * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even + * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to + * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may + * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the + * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set. + */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || + is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags & + CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into + * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we + * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in + * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded + * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to + * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a + * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before + * C_Login(). + */ + if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE) + { + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass, + &uri_struct->pin) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from + * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. + * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in + * the engine. + * + * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. + * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. + */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, + CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin, + strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which + * would need to relogin). + */ + if (passphrasedialog == NULL && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + passphrasedialog = + strdup(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (passphrasedialog == NULL) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + } + + /* + * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might + * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required - + * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory. + */ + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == + POLICY_WRONG_VALUE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID); + goto err_locked; + } + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE) + if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0) + goto err_locked; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + else + { + /* + * If token does not require login we take it as the + * login was done. + */ + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + } + + /* + * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that + * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the + * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the + * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with + * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it. + */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + + return (1); + +err_locked: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); +err: + /* Always get rid of the PIN. */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There + * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite + * different so we need a separate function for this. + * + * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is + * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again. + * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session + * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token + * then. + */ + if (passphrasedialog != NULL) + { + char *pin = NULL; + + /* If we cached the PIN then use it. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + pin = token_pin; + else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0) + goto err; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + + /* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */ + if (pin != token_pin) + { + memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); + OPENSSL_free(pin); + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we + * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able + * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we + * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed + * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose(). + * + * Returns: + * allocated buffer on success + * NULL on failure + */ +static char * +run_askpass(char *dialog) + { + pid_t pid; + int n, p[2]; + char *buf = NULL; + + if (pipe(p) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED); + return (NULL); + } + + switch (pid = fork()) + { + case -1: + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED); + return (NULL); + /* child */ + case 0: + /* + * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on + * file descriptor shortage. + */ + close(p[0]); + (void) dup2(p[1], 1); + close(p[1]); + /* + * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are + * in the child. However, parent will get read() error + * so do not worry. + */ + (void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL); + exit(1); + /* parent */ + default: + /* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */ + buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); + } + + close(p[1]); + n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN); + if (n == -1 || n == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return (NULL); + } + buf[n] = '\0'; + + (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + } + + return (buf); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_URI_H +#define HW_PK11_URI_H + +#include <security/pkcs11t.h> + +/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */ +#define PK11_URI_PREFIX "pkcs11:" +#define FILE_URI_PREFIX "file://" +#define PK11_TOKEN "token" +#define PK11_MANUF "manuf" +#define PK11_SERIAL "serial" +#define PK11_MODEL "model" +#define PK11_OBJECT "object" +#define PK11_OBJECTTYPE "objecttype" +#define PK11_ASKPASS "passphrasedialog" + +/* PIN caching policy. */ +#define POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define POLICY_NONE 1 +#define POLICY_MEMORY 2 +#define POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY 3 +#define POLICY_WRONG_VALUE 4 + +/* + * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports. + */ +#define PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN 256 + +/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */ +typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct { + char *object; /* object label, the only mandatory info */ + char *objecttype; /* (private|public|cert), currently unused */ + char *token; /* token label */ + char *manuf; /* manufacturer label */ + char *serial; /* serial number label */ + char *model; /* model label */ + char *askpass; /* full path to the command to get the PIN */ + /* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */ + char *pin; /* token PIN */ +} pkcs11_uri; + +/* For URI processing. */ +extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; + +int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin); +int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void); +int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, + const char **file); +int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct); +void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself); +int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin); +int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private); +int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +#endif /* HW_PK11_URI_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/llib-lcrypto Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* LINTLIBRARY */ +/* PROTOLIB1 */ + +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/blowfish.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/comp.h> +#include <openssl/conf.h> +#include <openssl/conf_api.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/des.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/ebcdic.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/pem2.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/safestack.h> +#include <openssl/sha.h> +#include <openssl/stack.h> +#include <openssl/symhacks.h> +#include <openssl/tmdiff.h> +#include <openssl/txt_db.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/llib-lssl Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* LINTLIBRARY */ +/* PROTOLIB1 */ + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/ssl2.h> +#include <openssl/ssl23.h> +#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140.license Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + + LICENSE ISSUES + ============== + + The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a dual license, i.e. both the conditions of + the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit. + See below for the actual license texts. Actually both licenses are BSD-style + Open Source licenses. In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL + please contact openssl-core@openssl.org. + + OpenSSL License + --------------- + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + + Original SSLeay License + ----------------------- + +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140.p5m Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +<transform file path=usr.*/man/.+ -> default mangler.man.stability uncommitted> +set name=pkg.fmri \ + value=pkg:/library/security/openssl/openssl-fips-140@$(IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION),$(BUILD_VERSION) +set name=pkg.summary value="FIPS 140-2 Capable OpenSSL libraries" +set name=info.classification \ + value="org.opensolaris.category.2008:System/Security" +set name=info.source_url value=$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL) +set name=info.upstream_url value=http://www.openssl.org +set name=opensolaris.arc_url \ + value=http://arc.opensolaris.org/caselog/PSARC/2009/507 +set name=org.opensolaris.consolidation value=$(CONSOLIDATION) +# Basic directories and a configuration file. +dir path=etc +dir path=etc/openssl group=sys +dir path=etc/openssl/fips-140 group=sys +file etc/openssl/openssl.cnf path=etc/openssl/fips-140/openssl.cnf group=sys mode=0644 preserve=true +dir path=lib +dir path=lib/openssl +dir path=lib/openssl/fips-140 +dir path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64) +dir path=usr +dir path=usr/include +dir path=usr/include/openssl +dir path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140 +dir path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl +link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/64 target=$(MACH64) +# 32 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines. +file $(MACH32)/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 +link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.0.9.8 +file $(MACH32)/libssl.so.0.9.8 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/libssl.so.0.9.8 +link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/libssl.so target=libssl.so.0.9.8 +file llib-lcrypto path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lcrypto +file $(MACH32)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lcrypto.ln +file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl +file $(MACH32)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/llib-lssl.ln +# 64 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines. +file $(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 +link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.0.9.8 +file $(MACH64)/libssl.so.0.9.8 path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libssl.so.0.9.8 +link path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/libssl.so target=libssl.so.0.9.8 +file llib-lcrypto path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto +file $(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln +file llib-lssl path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl +file $(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/openssl/fips-140/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln +# Header files. +# +# Take header files from the 32-bit build. This build has the patched +# opensslconf.h (64-bit build does not). We cannot take header files from the +# proto area since it could contain headers installed for the 64-bit build. +<transform file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/(.+\.h)$ -> \ + set action.hash $(MACH32)/include/openssl/%<1> > +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/aes.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/asn1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/asn1_mac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/asn1t.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/bio.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/blowfish.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/bn.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/buffer.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/cast.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/comp.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/conf.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/conf_api.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/crypto.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/des.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/des_old.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/dh.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/dsa.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/dso.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/dtls1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/e_os2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ebcdic.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/engine.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/err.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/evp.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/fips.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/fips_rand.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/hmac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/krb5_asn.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/kssl.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/lhash.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/md2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/md4.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/md5.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/obj_mac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/objects.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ocsp.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/opensslconf.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/opensslv.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ossl_typ.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pem.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pem2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pkcs12.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pkcs7.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pq_compat.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/pqueue.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/rand.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/rc2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/rc4.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ripemd.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/rsa.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/safestack.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/sha.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ssl.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ssl2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ssl23.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ssl3.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/stack.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/store.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/symhacks.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/tls1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/tmdiff.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/txt_db.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ui.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/ui_compat.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/x509.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/x509_vfy.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/fips-140/openssl/x509v3.h +license openssl-0.9.8-fips-140.license license="OpenSSL, SSLeay" +legacy desc="FIPS 140-2 Capable OpenSSL libraries (0.9.8) (Root)" name="FIPS 140-2 Capable OpenSSL libraries" pkg=SUNWopenssl-fips-140 +legacy desc="FIPS Capable OpenSSL C/C++ header files for development of OpenSSL applications (0.9.8)" name="FIPS 140-2 Capable OpenSSL Header Files" pkg=SUNWopenssl-fips-140-include
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches-post-config/opensslconf.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +--- /tmp/opensslconf.h Thu Mar 10 06:46:57 2011 ++++ /tmp/opensslconf.h.new Thu Mar 10 06:47:41 2011 +@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ + /* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */ + + /* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */ ++#if defined(__sparcv9) ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_ULTRASPARC ++# define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_ULTRASPARC ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND + + +@@ -205,10 +211,14 @@ + + #if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */ + #if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR) ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#define ENGINESDIR "/lib/openssl/engines/64" ++#else + #define ENGINESDIR "/lib/openssl/engines" +-#define OPENSSLDIR "/etc/openssl" + #endif ++#define OPENSSLDIR "/etc/openssl/fips-140" + #endif ++#endif + + #undef OPENSSL_UNISTD + #define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h> +@@ -252,13 +262,21 @@ + /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a + * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ + #ifndef DES_LONG ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#define DES_LONG unsigned int ++#else + #define DES_LONG unsigned long + #endif + #endif ++#endif + + #if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H) + #define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#undef BN_LLONG ++#else + #define BN_LLONG ++#endif + + /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ + +@@ -266,9 +284,14 @@ + /* The prime number generation stuff may not work when + * EIGHT_BIT but I don't care since I've only used this mode + * for debuging the bignum libraries */ ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG ++#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT ++#else + #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG +-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT + #define THIRTY_TWO_BIT ++#endif ++#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT + #undef SIXTEEN_BIT + #undef EIGHT_BIT + #endif
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/01-7009105.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8q-old/crypto/opensslv.h openssl-0.9.8q/crypto/opensslv.h +--- openssl-0.9.8q-old/crypto/opensslv.h 2010-12-02 19:53:52.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-0.9.8q/crypto/opensslv.h 2010-12-27 14:08:42.112072026 +0100 +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ + * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for + * major minor fix final patch/beta) + */ +-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090811f ++#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x0090811fL + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + #define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8q-fips 2 Dec 2010" + #else
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/08-6193522.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in +--- openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in 2005-07-04 23:44:22.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in 2009-04-21 16:08:45.354925289 +0200 +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ + $X509="$openssl x509"; + $PKCS12="$openssl pkcs12"; + +-$CATOP="./demoCA"; ++$CATOP="/etc/openssl"; + $CAKEY="cakey.pem"; + $CAREQ="careq.pem"; + $CACERT="cacert.pem"; +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf +--- openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf 2005-09-16 14:20:24.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf 2009-04-21 16:07:13.910980196 +0200 +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + #################################################################### + [ CA_default ] + +-dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept ++dir = /etc/openssl # Where everything is kept + certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept + crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept + database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ + + certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate + serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number +-crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number ++#crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number + # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL + crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL + private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key +@@ -122,17 +122,17 @@ + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) +-countryName_default = AU ++#countryName_default = US + countryName_min = 2 + countryName_max = 2 + + stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) +-stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State ++#stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State + + localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) + + 0.organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) +-0.organizationName_default = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd ++#0.organizationName_default = Unconfigured OpenSSL Installation + + # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-) + #1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (eg, company)
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/11-6546806.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod +--- openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod 2002-07-18 20:54:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod 2009-04-10 11:09:46.449071541 +0200 +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + + =head1 NAME + +-HMAC, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_cleanup - HMAC message ++HMAC, HMAC_CTX_init, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Init_ex, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_CTX_cleanup, HMAC_cleanup - HMAC message + authentication code + + =head1 SYNOPSIS
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Configure openssl-0.9.8o/Configure +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Configure 2010-05-20 10:36:23.000000000 -0700 ++++ openssl-0.9.8o/Configure 2010-09-22 18:32:18.922795700 -0700 +@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ + + # see INSTALL for instructions. + +-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; ++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; + + # Options: + # +@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ + # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories + # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory) + # ++# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. ++# (Default: none) ++# + # --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by + # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can + # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". +@@ -587,6 +590,9 @@ + my $idx_ranlib = $idx++; + my $idx_arflags = $idx++; + ++# PKCS#11 engine patch ++my $pk11_libname=""; ++ + my $prefix=""; + my $libdir=""; + my $openssldir=""; +@@ -825,6 +831,10 @@ + { + $flags.=$_." "; + } ++ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $pk11_libname=$1; ++ } + elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) + { + $prefix=$1; +@@ -960,6 +970,13 @@ + exit 0; + } + ++if (! $pk11_libname) ++ { ++ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; ++ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; ++ exit 1; ++ } ++ + if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { + $target = "Cygwin".$1; + } +@@ -1126,6 +1143,8 @@ + if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } + else { $no_user_cflags=1; } + ++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; ++ + # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through + # the script "config" or manually. + if (!$no_krb5) +@@ -1489,6 +1508,7 @@ + s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; + s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; + s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; ++ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; + s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org 2010-01-27 08:06:36.000000000 -0800 ++++ openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.org 2010-09-22 18:32:19.152576100 -0700 +@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ + INSTALL_PREFIX= + INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl + ++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. ++PK11_LIB_LOCATION= ++ + # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! + OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl + +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile 2009-09-27 07:04:32.000000000 -0700 ++++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/Makefile 2010-09-22 18:32:19.109972600 -0700 +@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ + eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ + tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ + tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \ +- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c ++ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \ ++ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11_uri.c + LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ + eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ + tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ + tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \ +- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o ++ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \ ++ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11_uri.o + + SRC= $(LIBSRC) + +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 2010-02-28 16:30:11.000000000 -0800 ++++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 2010-09-22 18:33:15.326949000 -0700 +@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ + ENGINE_load_padlock(); + #endif + ENGINE_load_dynamic(); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 ++ ENGINE_load_pk11(); ++#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h 2010-02-09 06:18:15.000000000 -0800 ++++ openssl-0.9.8o/crypto/engine/engine.h 2010-09-22 18:32:19.063758100 -0700 +@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ + void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void); + #endif + void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); ++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void); + void ENGINE_load_padlock(void); + void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); + #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/18-compiler_opts.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8k/Configure openssl-0.9.8k/Configure +--- openssl-0.9.8k/Configure 2009-02-16 09:44:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-0.9.8k/Configure 2009-06-25 16:19:22.897811727 +0200 +@@ -130,6 +130,11 @@ + my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o::aes-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o::"; + my $ia64_asm=":bn-ia64.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o:::sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o::"; + ++# ASM without "rx86-elf.o rc4_skey.o". The current RC4 asm assumes RC4_INT. Solaris/OpenSolaris uses RC4_CHAR. ++# Changing to RC4_INT would break ABI compatibility. ++my $x86_elf_asm_sunw="x86cpuid-elf.o:bn86-elf.o co86-elf.o MAYBE-MO86-elf.o:dx86-elf.o yx86-elf.o:ax86-elf.o:bx86-elf.o:mx86-elf.o:sx86-elf.o s512sse2-elf.o:cx86-elf.o::rm86-elf.o:r586-elf.o"; ++my $x86_64_asm_sunw="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o::aes-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::::"; ++ + my $no_asm="::::::::::"; + + # As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags, +@@ -235,6 +240,12 @@ + #"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::", + "sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::", + ++#### Solaris configs, used for OpenSSL as delivered by OpenSolaris ++"solaris-x86-cc-sunw","cc:-m32 -xO3 -xspace -g -Xa::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -lc -R /lib/openssl/fips-140:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_elf_asm_sunw}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m32 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"solaris64-x86_64-cc-sunw","cc:-xO3 -m64 -g -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -lc -R /lib/openssl/fips-140/64:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK BF_PTR DES_PTR DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm_sunw}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m64 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"solaris-sparcv8-cc-sunw","cc:-m32 -xregs=no%appl -xO5 -g -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -lc -R /lib/openssl/fips-140:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::sparcv8plus.o::::::::::dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m32 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"solaris64-sparcv9-cc-sunw","cc:-m64 -xregs=no%appl -xO5 -g -xstrconst -xdepend -xspace -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -R /lib/openssl/fips-140/64:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::::::::::dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m64 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):/usr/ccs/bin/ar rs", ++ + #### IRIX 5.x configs + # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate. + "irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/20-remove_rpath.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/Makefile.shared openssl-0.9.8a/Makefile.shared +--- openssl-0.9.8a/Makefile.shared 2005-06-23 22:47:54.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/Makefile.shared 2009-05-20 00:35:52.611961155 +0200 +@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ + @ if ${DETECT_GNU_LD}; then \ + $(DO_GNU_APP); \ + else \ +- LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -R $(LIBRPATH)"; \ ++ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_APP) +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/23-noexstack.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8k/Makefile.shared openssl-0.9.8k/Makefile.shared +--- openssl-0.9.8k/Makefile.shared 2008-09-17 17:56:40.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8k/Makefile.shared 2009-05-25 22:26:49.611468992 +0200 +@@ -347,12 +347,17 @@ + SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_SO_A) ++# Make sure the apps have non-executable stacks and data (x86/x64 only). + link_app.solaris: + @ if ${DETECT_GNU_LD}; then \ + $(DO_GNU_APP); \ + else \ + LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"; \ + fi; \ ++ if expr $(PLATFORM) : '.*x86.*' > /dev/null; then \ ++ LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS} -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata"; \ ++ fi; \ ++ LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS} -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexstk -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign"; \ + $(LINK_APP) + + # OpenServer 5 native compilers used
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/25-fips_rand.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN a/openssl-0.9.8k/fips/rand/fips_rand.h b/openssl-0.9.8k/fips/rand/fips_rand.h +--- openssl-0.9.8k/fips/rand/fips_rand.h 2008-09-16 12:12:18.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8k/fips/rand/fips_rand.h 2009-09-29 17:42:41.969816617 +0200 +@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ + #ifndef HEADER_FIPS_RAND_H + #define HEADER_FIPS_RAND_H + +-#include "des.h" ++#include <openssl/des.h> + + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/26-openssl_fips.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +--- openssl-0.9.8m/apps/openssl.c Thu Oct 15 19:28:02 2009 ++++ openssl-0.9.8m/apps/openssl.c Fri Feb 26 16:12:30 2010 +@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ + #include "s_apps.h" + #include <openssl/err.h> + ++/* Solaris OpenSSL */ ++#include <dlfcn.h> ++ + /* The LHASH callbacks ("hash" & "cmp") have been replaced by functions with the + * base prototypes (we cast each variable inside the function to the required + * type of "FUNCTION*"). This removes the necessity for macro-generated wrapper +@@ -151,9 +154,10 @@ + #endif + + ++static int *modes; ++ + static void lock_dbg_cb(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line) + { +- static int modes[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; /* = {0, 0, ... } */ + const char *errstr = NULL; + int rw; + +@@ -164,7 +168,7 @@ + goto err; + } + +- if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS) ++ if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_num_locks()) + { + errstr = "type out of bounds"; + goto err; +@@ -235,19 +239,29 @@ + + in_FIPS_mode = 0; + ++/* ++ * Solaris OpenSSL ++ * Add a further check for the FIPS_mode_set() symbol before calling to ++ * allow openssl(1openssl) to be run against both fips and non-fips libraries. ++ */ + if(getenv("OPENSSL_FIPS")) { +-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +- if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) { ++ ++ int (*FIPS_mode_set)(int); ++ FIPS_mode_set = (int (*)(int)) dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "FIPS_mode_set"); ++ ++ if (FIPS_mode_set != NULL) { ++ if (!(*FIPS_mode_set)(1)) { + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE)); + EXIT(1); + } + in_FIPS_mode = 1; +-#else +- fprintf(stderr, "FIPS mode not supported.\n"); ++ } else { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to enable FIPS mode. " ++ "For more information about running in FIPS mode see openssl(5).\n"); + EXIT(1); +-#endif + } ++ } + + if (bio_err == NULL) + if ((bio_err=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL) +@@ -272,6 +286,14 @@ + if (getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_LOCKING") != NULL) + #endif + { ++ modes = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof (int)); ++ if (modes == NULL) { ++ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ++ BIO_printf(bio_err,"Memory allocation failure\n"); ++ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ++ EXIT(1); ++ } ++ memset(modes, 0, CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof (int)); + CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(lock_dbg_cb); + } + +@@ -379,6 +401,8 @@ + BIO_free(bio_err); + bio_err=NULL; + } ++ ++ if (modes != NULL) OPENSSL_free(modes); + OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); + } +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/27-6978791.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff -ruN ../openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.shared ./Makefile.shared +--- ../openssl-0.9.8o/Makefile.shared 2010-08-23 12:35:50.222830608 +0200 ++++ ./Makefile.shared 2010-08-23 12:36:35.672746275 +0200 +@@ -345,6 +345,9 @@ + ALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSZ}allextract"; \ + NOALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSZ}defaultextract"; \ + SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ ++ if [ $(LIBNAME) = "ssl" ]; then \ ++ SHAREDFLAGS="$$SHAREDFLAGS $${MINUSZ}nodelete"; \ ++ fi; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_SO_A) + # Make sure the apps have non-executable stacks and data (x86/x64 only).
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/28-enginesdir.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +--- openssl-0.9.8n/Configure 2010-04-19 17:45:39.421625300 -0700 ++++ openssl-0.9.8n/Configure.new 2010-06-18 15:18:52.437417100 -0700 +@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ + # --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise) + # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories + # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory) ++# --enginesdir engines shared library location ++# (Default: $prefix/lib/engines) + # + # --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. + # (Default: none) +@@ -607,6 +609,7 @@ + my $prefix=""; + my $libdir=""; + my $openssldir=""; ++my $enginesdir=""; + my $exe_ext=""; + my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}"; + my $cross_compile_prefix=""; +@@ -858,6 +861,10 @@ + { + $openssldir=$1; + } ++ elsif (/^--enginesdir=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $enginesdir=$1; ++ } + elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/) + { + $install_prefix=$1; +@@ -1125,8 +1132,16 @@ + } + $prefix=$openssldir if $prefix eq ""; + ++if ($enginesdir eq "") ++ { ++ $enginesdir = "$prefix/lib/engines"; ++ } ++ + $libdir="lib" if $libdir eq ""; + ++ ++ ++ + $default_ranlib= &which("ranlib") or $default_ranlib="true"; + $perl=$ENV{'PERL'} or $perl=&which("perl5") or $perl=&which("perl") + or $perl="perl"; +@@ -1724,10 +1739,7 @@ + } + elsif (/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/) + { +- # $foo is to become "$prefix/lib$multilib/engines"; +- # as Makefile.org and engines/Makefile are adapted for +- # $multilib suffix. +- my $foo = "$prefix/lib/engines"; ++ my $foo = $enginesdir; + $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g; + print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n"; + }
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-0.9.8-fips-140/patches/sparc-01-ccwrap.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +diff -ruN ../a/openssl-0.9.8k/fips/fipsld openssl-0.9.8k/fips/fipsld +--- ../a/openssl-0.9.8k/fips/fipsld 2008-09-16 12:12:10.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8k/fips/fipsld 2009-10-06 16:45:34.379991933 +0200 +@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ + + #set -x + ++# Solaris OpenSSL: ++# Wrap the calls to cc to remove the "-g" option when compiling ++# (SPARC only). If "-g" is used on SPARC to build libcrypto.so ++# the fingerprint will be incorrectly generated as "-g" promotes ++# static symbols to globals which then interacts with the linker to ++# produce a changed text section. ++CCWRAP=ccwrap ++ + CC=${FIPSLD_CC:-${CC}} + [ -n "${CC}" ] || { echo '$CC is not defined'; exit 1; } + +@@ -112,7 +120,7 @@ + fi + + /bin/rm -f "${TARGET}" +- ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ ++ ${CCWRAP} ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ + "${PREMAIN_C}" \ + ${_WL_PREMAIN} "$@" + +@@ -124,7 +132,7 @@ + fi + + # recompile with signature... +- ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ ++ ${CCWRAP} ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ + -DHMAC_SHA1_SIG=\"${SIG}\" "${PREMAIN_C}" \ + ${_WL_PREMAIN} "$@" + ;; +@@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ + { echo "${PREMAIN_C} fingerprint mismatch"; exit 1; } + + /bin/rm -f "${TARGET}" +- ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ ++ ${CCWRAP} ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ + "${PREMAIN_C}" \ + ${_WL_PREMAIN} "$@" + +@@ -163,7 +171,7 @@ + fi + + # recompile with signature... +- ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ ++ ${CCWRAP} ${CC} ${CANISTER_O_CMD:+"${CANISTER_O_CMD}"} \ + -DHMAC_SHA1_SIG=\"${SIG}\" "${PREMAIN_C}" \ + ${_WL_PREMAIN} "$@" + ;;
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/Makefile Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/shared-macros.mk + +COMPONENT_NAME = openssl +# When new version of OpenSSL comes in, you must update both COMPONENT_VERSION +# and IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION. +COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.0d +# Version for IPS. It is easier to do it manually than convert the letter to a +# number while taking into account that there might be no letter at all. +IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.0.0.4 +COMPONENT_SRC = $(COMPONENT_NAME)-$(COMPONENT_VERSION) +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE = $(COMPONENT_SRC).tar.gz +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_HASH= sha1:32ca934f380a547061ddab7221b1a34e4e07e8d5 +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL = http://www.openssl.org/source/$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE) + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/prep.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/configure.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/ips.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/lint-libraries.mk + +# OpenSSL does not use autoconf but its own configure system. +CONFIGURE_SCRIPT = $(SOURCE_DIR)/Configure + +# Used in the configure options below. +PKCS11_LIB32 = /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so.1 +PKCS11_LIB64 = /usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so.1 +ENGINESDIR_32 = /lib/openssl/engines +ENGINESDIR_64 = /lib/openssl/engines/64 + +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS = -DSOLARIS_OPENSSL -DNO_WINDOWS_BRAINDEATH +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --openssldir=/etc/openssl +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --prefix=/usr +# We use OpenSSL install code for installing only manual pages and we do that +# for 32-bit version only. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --install_prefix=$(PROTO_DIR) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ec +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ecdh +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-ecdsa +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-rc3 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-rc5 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-mdc2 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-idea +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_4758_cca +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_aep +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_atalla +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_chil +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_gmp +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_ncipher +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_nuron +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_padlock +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_sureware +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_ubsec +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-hw_cswift +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += threads +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += shared +# MD2 is not enabled by default in OpensSSL but some software we have in +# Userland needs it. One example is nmap. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += enable-md2 +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-seed +# We use both no-whirlpool and no-whrlpool since there is an inconsistency in +# the OpenSSL code and one needs both to build OpenSSL successfully with +# Whirlpool implementation removed. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-whirlpool +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += no-whrlpool + +# We define our own compiler and linker option sets for Solaris. See Configure +# for more information. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS32_i386 = solaris-x86-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS32_sparc = solaris-sparcv9-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS64_i386 = solaris64-x86_64-cc-sunw +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS64_sparc = solaris64-sparcv9-cc-sunw + +# Some additional options needed for our engines. +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --pk11-libname=$(PKCS11_LIB$(BITS)) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += --enginesdir=$(ENGINESDIR_$(BITS)) +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS += $(CONFIGURE_OPTIONS$(BITS)_$(MACH)) + +# OpenSSL has its own configure system which must be run from the fully +# populated source code directory. However, the Userland configuration phase is +# run from the build directory. So, we must get the full source code into the +# build directory. +COMPONENT_PRE_CONFIGURE_ACTION = \ + ( $(CLONEY) $(SOURCE_DIR) $(BUILD_DIR)/$(MACH$(BITS)); ) + +# We deliver only one opensslconf.h file which must be suitable for both 32 and +# 64 bits. Depending on the configuration option, OpenSSL's Configure script +# creates opensslconf.h for either 32 or 64 bits. A patch makes the resulting +# header file usable on both architectures. The patch was generated against the +# opensslconf.h version from the 32 bit build. +COMPONENT_POST_CONFIGURE_ACTION = \ + ( [ $(BITS) -eq 32 ] && $(GPATCH) -p1 $(@D)/crypto/opensslconf.h \ + patches-post-config/opensslconf.patch; cd $(@D); $(MAKE) depend; ) + +# We do not ship our engines as patches since it would be more difficult to +# update the files which have been under continuous development. We rather copy +# the files to the right directories. +COMPONENT_PRE_BUILD_ACTION = \ + ( $(CP) -fp engines/devcrypto/* $(@D)/engines; \ + $(CP) -fp engines/pkcs11/* $(@D)/crypto/engine; ) + +build: $(BUILD_32_and_64) + +# OpenSSL uses sections man[1357] by default so we must create the man +# directories we use for OpenSSL man pages in Solaris. Note that we patch the +# OpenSSL man page install script to use the correct directories. +MANDIR_SECTIONS = $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/share/man/man1openssl +MANDIR_SECTIONS += $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/share/man/man3openssl +MANDIR_SECTIONS += $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/share/man/man5openssl +MANDIR_SECTIONS += $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/share/man/man7openssl + +# We must create man page directories manually since we patched OpenSSL install +# code to install into manXopenssl instead of manX. Also, OpenSSL does not +# install into <dir>/$(MACH64) for 64-bit install so no such directory is +# created and Userland install code would fail when installing lint libraries. +COMPONENT_PRE_INSTALL_ACTION = ( $(MKDIR) $(MANDIR_SECTIONS); \ + $(MKDIR) $(PROTO_DIR)/usr/lib/$(MACH64); ) + +# The install_docs target will install man pages into $(PROTO_DIR)/$(MANDIR). We +# also add /usr/perl5/bin to PATH so that OpenSSL install code can locate the +# system pod2man. If not set, OpenSSL make would use an internal implementation +# from the tarball which would corrupt some man pages. +COMPONENT_INSTALL_ENV += PATH=$(PATH):/usr/perl5/bin MANDIR=/usr/share/man + +# We could run OpenSSL install code for 32 bits only to process header files and +# manual pages. However, link libraries depend on install stamps so we run +# install for 64 bit as well. Note that we must take built binary files from +# build directories, not from the proto area which contains whatever was +# installed first. +install: $(INSTALL_32_and_64) + +# We need to modify the default lint flags to include patched opensslconf.h from +# the build directory. If we do not do that, lint will complain about md2.h +# which is not enabled by default but it is in our opensslconf.h. +LFLAGS_32 := -I$(BUILD_DIR_32)/include $(LINT_FLAGS) +LFLAGS_64 := -I$(BUILD_DIR_64)/include $(LINT_FLAGS) + +# Set modified lint flags for our lint library targets. +$(BUILD_DIR_32)/llib-lcrypto.ln: LINT_FLAGS="$(LFLAGS_32)" +$(BUILD_DIR_32)/llib-lssl.ln: LINT_FLAGS="$(LFLAGS_32)" +$(BUILD_DIR_64)/llib-lcrypto.ln: LINT_FLAGS="$(LFLAGS_64)" +$(BUILD_DIR_64)/llib-lssl.ln: LINT_FLAGS="$(LFLAGS_64)" + +test: $(NO_TESTS) + +BUILD_PKG_DEPENDENCIES = $(BUILD_TOOLS) + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/depend.mk
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,1276 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + * + * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <cryptoutil.h> +#include <sys/crypto/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/crypto/api.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/aes.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <security/cryptoki.h> + +#define DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME "devcrypto engine" +#include "e_devcrypto_err.c" + +/* DEVCRYPTO CONTEXT */ +typedef struct devcrypto_ctx { + uint_t session_id; +} devcrypto_ctx_t; + +/* Index for the supported ciphers */ +typedef enum { + DEV_DES_CBC, + DEV_DES3_CBC, + DEV_DES_ECB, + DEV_DES3_ECB, + DEV_RC4, + DEV_AES_128_CBC, + DEV_AES_192_CBC, + DEV_AES_256_CBC, + DEV_AES_128_ECB, + DEV_AES_192_ECB, + DEV_AES_256_ECB, + DEV_BLOWFISH_CBC, + DEV_AES_128_CTR, + DEV_AES_192_CTR, + DEV_AES_256_CTR, + DEV_CIPHER_MAX +} DEV_CIPHER_ID; + +typedef struct devcrypto_cipher { + DEV_CIPHER_ID id; + int nid; + int iv_len; + int min_key_len; + int max_key_len; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + crypto_mech_type_t pn_internal_number; +} devcrypto_cipher_t; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +static const char *ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID = "devcrypto"; +static const char *ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_NAME = "/dev/crypto engine support"; +static const char *CRYPTO_DEVICE = "/dev/crypto"; + +/* static variables */ +static int kernel_fd = -1; +static int kernel_fd_ref = 0; +static int slot_count = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID *kernel_provider_id = NULL; +static int cipher_count = 0; +static int *cipher_nids = NULL; +pthread_mutex_t *kernel_fd_lock; + +/* + * NIDs for AES counter mode. They will be defined during the engine + * initialization. + */ +static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; +static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; +static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; + +/* + * Cipher Table for all supported symmetric ciphers. + */ +static devcrypto_cipher_t cipher_table[] = { + { DEV_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, + CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, + CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + /* + * For the following 3 AES counter mode entries, we don't know the + * NIDs until the engine is initialized + */ + { DEV_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + { DEV_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID}, + }; + + +/* Formal declaration for functions in EVP_CIPHER structure */ +static int devcrypto_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, int); +static int devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, unsigned int); +static int devcrypto_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); + +/* OpenSSL's libcrypto EVP stuff. This is how this engine gets wired to EVP. */ +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_des_cbc = { + NID_des_cbc, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_3des_cbc = { + NID_des_ede3_cbc, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector, therefore set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_des_ecb = { + NID_des_ecb, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_3des_ecb = { + NID_des_ede3_ecb, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_rc4 = { + NID_rc4, + 1, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_cbc = { + NID_aes_128_cbc, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_cbc = { + NID_aes_192_cbc, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_cbc = { + NID_aes_256_cbc, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + + +/* + * ECB modes don't use IV, therefore set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_ecb = { + NID_aes_128_ecb, + 16, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_ecb = { + NID_aes_192_ecb, + 16, 24, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_ecb = { + NID_aes_256_ecb, + 16, 32, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +static const EVP_CIPHER dev_bf_cbc = { + NID_bf_cbc, + 8, 16, 8, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + + +/* + * NID_undef's will be changed for AES counter mode, as soon they are created. + */ +static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_128_ctr = { + NID_undef, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_192_ctr = { + NID_undef, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + +static EVP_CIPHER dev_aes_256_ctr = { + NID_undef, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + devcrypto_cipher_init, + devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher, + devcrypto_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (devcrypto_ctx_t), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL +}; + + + +/* + * This function creates a new NID. + */ +static int +devcrypto_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) +{ + ASN1_OBJECT *o; + int nid; + + if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", + 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) { + return (0); + } + + nid = OBJ_add_object(o); /* will return NID_undef on error */ + ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); + return (nid); +} + + +/* + * This function creates new NIDs for AES counter mode algorithms. + * Note that OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we have to help + * ourselves here. + */ +static int +devcrypto_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) +{ + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) /* already set */ + return (1); + + NID_aes_128_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr"); + if (NID_aes_128_ctr == NID_undef) + goto failed; + cipher_table[DEV_AES_128_CTR].nid = + dev_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; + + NID_aes_192_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr"); + if (NID_aes_192_ctr == NID_undef) + goto failed; + cipher_table[DEV_AES_192_CTR].nid = + dev_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; + + NID_aes_256_ctr = devcrypto_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr"); + if (NID_aes_256_ctr == NID_undef) + goto failed; + cipher_table[DEV_AES_256_CTR].nid = + dev_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; + + return (1); + +failed: + return (0); +} + + +static void +devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) +{ + ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL; + + if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + + if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } +} + +/* + * Open the /dev/crypto device + */ +static int +devcrypto_open() +{ + int fd = -1; + + if (kernel_fd != -1) { /* already open */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock); + kernel_fd_ref++; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + return (1); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock); + fd = open(CRYPTO_DEVICE, O_RDWR); + if (fd == -1) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "libdevcrypto: open /dev/crypto failed, errno=%x\n", + errno); +#endif + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + return (0); + } + + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: failed to fcntl\n"); +#endif + (void) close(fd); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + return (0); + } + + kernel_fd = fd; + kernel_fd_ref++; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + return (1); +} + + +/* + * This function gets the total number of hardware providers presented in + * the system first. If there is any hardware providers, then it will get + * the kernel provider id for each hardware slot also. + */ +static int +devcrypto_get_slot_info() +{ + crypto_get_provider_list_t *pl = NULL; + int ret = 1; + int r; + int i; + + /* Already have the information */ + if (kernel_provider_id != NULL) + return (1); + + /* Find out how many hardware slots are presented. */ + pl = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (crypto_get_provider_list_t)); + if (pl == NULL) + return (0); + + pl->pl_count = 0; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST, pl)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + if (r < 0 || pl->pl_return_value != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST:" + "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, pl->pl_return_value); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + slot_count = pl->pl_count; + if (slot_count == 0) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: no hw providers\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + /* Get the provider ID for each slot from kernel and save it */ + kernel_provider_id = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID) * slot_count); + if (kernel_provider_id == NULL) { + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + (void) OPENSSL_free(pl); + pl = OPENSSL_malloc(slot_count * sizeof (crypto_get_provider_list_t)); + if (pl == NULL) { + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + pl->pl_count = slot_count; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST, pl)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + if (r < 0 || (pl->pl_return_value != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_LIST:" + "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, pl->pl_return_value); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++) { + kernel_provider_id[i] = pl->pl_list[i].pe_provider_id; +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: i = %d, " + "kernel_provider_id = %d\n", i, kernel_provider_id[i]); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + } + +out: + if (pl != NULL) + (void) OPENSSL_free(pl); + + if (ret == 0 && kernel_provider_id != NULL) { + (void) OPENSSL_free(kernel_provider_id); + kernel_provider_id = NULL; + } + + return (ret); +} + + +/* + * This function checks if the "nid" is already in the nid list. + */ +static int +nid_in_list(int nid, int *nid_list, int count) +{ + int i = 0; + + if (nid_list == NULL || count <= 0) + return (0); + + while (i < count) { + if (nid == nid_list[i]) + break; + i++; + } + return (i < count ? 1 : 0); +} + +/* + * This function is to get all the ciphers supported by hardware providers. + * If this function is successfully completed, then the following 2 global + * variables will be set. + * cipher_count - the number of ciphers found in all hardware providers. + * cipher_nids - the nid list for all the ciphers. + */ +static int +devcrypto_get_hw_ciphers(void) +{ + crypto_get_provider_mechanism_info_t mechinfo; + int max_cipher_count; + int *tmp_nids = NULL; + const char *mech_string; + int r; + int i, j; + + if (slot_count <= 0) /* no hardware provider */ + return (0); + + max_cipher_count = slot_count * DEV_CIPHER_MAX + 1; + tmp_nids = OPENSSL_malloc(max_cipher_count * sizeof (int)); + if (tmp_nids == NULL) { + /* not enough memory */ + goto failed; + } + + for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++) { + mechinfo.mi_provider_id = kernel_provider_id[i]; + for (j = 0; j < DEV_CIPHER_MAX; j++) { + mech_string = + pkcs11_mech2str(cipher_table[j].mech_type); + if (mech_string == NULL) { + continue; /* shouldn't happen; skip it */ + } + + (void) strlcpy(mechinfo.mi_mechanism_name, + mech_string, CRYPTO_MAX_MECH_NAME); + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, + CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_MECHANISM_INFO, + &mechinfo)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + if (r < 0) { + goto failed; + } + + if (mechinfo.mi_return_value == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { + /* + * Found this mechanism in hardware providers. + * If it is not in the nid list yet, add it. + */ + if (!nid_in_list(cipher_table[j].nid, + tmp_nids, cipher_count)) { + tmp_nids[cipher_count] = + cipher_table[j].nid; + cipher_count++; + } + } + } + } + + if (cipher_count > 0) { + cipher_nids = tmp_nids; + } + + return (1); + +failed: + if (r < 0 || cipher_count == 0) { + if (tmp_nids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_nids); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with + * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the + * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with. + */ +static int +devcrypto_get_all_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid) +{ + if (!cipher) { + *nids = (cipher_count > 0) ? cipher_nids : NULL; + return (cipher_count); + } + + switch (nid) { + case NID_des_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_3des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ecb: + *cipher = &dev_des_ecb; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_ecb: + *cipher = &dev_3des_ecb; + break; + case NID_rc4: + *cipher = &dev_rc4; + break; + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_aes_128_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_aes_192_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_aes_256_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + *cipher = &dev_aes_128_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + *cipher = &dev_aes_192_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + *cipher = &dev_aes_256_ecb; + break; + case NID_bf_cbc: + *cipher = &dev_bf_cbc; + break; + default: + /* + * We cannot put the NIDs for AES counter mode in separated + * cases as above because they are not constants. + */ + if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) + *cipher = &dev_aes_128_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) + *cipher = &dev_aes_192_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + *cipher = &dev_aes_256_ctr; + else + *cipher = NULL; + break; + } + + return (*cipher != NULL); +} + + +static int +get_cipher_id_by_nid(int nid) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < DEV_CIPHER_MAX; i++) + if (cipher_table[i].nid == nid) + return (cipher_table[i].id); + return (-1); +} + + +static int +get_slotid_by_mechanism(const char *mech_string, CK_SLOT_ID *slot_id) +{ + crypto_get_provider_mechanism_info_t mechanism_info; + uint_t rv; + int r; + int i = 0; + + (void) strlcpy(mechanism_info.mi_mechanism_name, mech_string, + CRYPTO_MAX_MECH_NAME); + while (i < slot_count) { + mechanism_info.mi_provider_id = kernel_provider_id[i]; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, + CRYPTO_GET_PROVIDER_MECHANISM_INFO, + &mechanism_info)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + if (r < 0) { + return (0); /* ioctl function failed */ + } + rv = mechanism_info.mi_return_value; + if (rv == 0) { /* found it */ + *slot_id = kernel_provider_id[i]; + return (1); + } + i++; + } + + return (0); +} + + +static int +devcrypto_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) +{ + devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data; + crypto_encrypt_init_t encrypt_init; + crypto_decrypt_init_t decrypt_init; + crypto_open_session_t session; + crypto_get_mechanism_number_t get_number; + CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS aes_ctr_params; + devcrypto_cipher_t *the_cipher; + const char *mech_string; + CK_SLOT_ID slot_id; + int index; + int r; + uint_t rv = 0; + + + if (key == NULL) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY); + return (0); + } + + /* get the cipher entry index in cipher_table from nid */ + index = get_cipher_id_by_nid(ctx->cipher->nid); + if (index < 0 || index >= DEV_CIPHER_MAX) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID); + return (0); + } + the_cipher = &cipher_table[index]; + + /* check key size */ + if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < the_cipher->iv_len || + ctx->key_len < the_cipher->min_key_len || + ctx->key_len > the_cipher->max_key_len) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); + return (0); + } + + /* get the mechanism string */ + mech_string = pkcs11_mech2str(the_cipher->mech_type); + if (mech_string == NULL) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_MECH_STRING); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: mech_string=%s\n", mech_string); +#endif + + /* Find the slot that supports this mechanism */ + if (!get_slotid_by_mechanism(mech_string, &slot_id)) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH); +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "libdevcrypto: failed to find a slot with %s\n", + mech_string); +#endif + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto: found a slot with %s, " + "slot_id = %d\n", mech_string, slot_id); +#endif + + /* Open a session on this slot */ + session.os_provider_id = slot_id; + session.os_flags = CKF_RW_SESSION | CKF_SERIAL_SESSION; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_OPEN_SESSION, &session)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = session.os_return_value; + if (r || rv) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION); +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "libdevcrypto:cipher_init:failed to open a session\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + goto failed; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:cipher_init: open session = %d\n", + session.os_session); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + /* save the session_id */ + devc_ctx->session_id = session.os_session; + + /* + * Get the kernel mechanism number for this mechanism, if it has not + * been retrieved yet. + */ + if (the_cipher->pn_internal_number == CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID) { + get_number.pn_mechanism_string = (char *)mech_string; + get_number.pn_mechanism_len = strlen(mech_string) + 1; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER, + &get_number)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = get_number.pn_return_value; + if (r || rv) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, + DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER); +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:cipher_init: " + "failed to get the kernel mech number.\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + goto failed; + } + + the_cipher->pn_internal_number = get_number.pn_internal_number; + } + + /* Crypto Init */ + if (ctx->encrypt) { + encrypt_init.ei_session = session.os_session; + encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; + encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_obj_id = 0; + encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_data = (void *) key; + encrypt_init.ei_key.ck_length = ctx->key_len * 8; + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_type = the_cipher->pn_internal_number; + + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) { + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param = + (void *) (&aes_ctr_params); + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len = + sizeof (aes_ctr_params); + + aes_ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(aes_ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } else { + if (the_cipher->iv_len > 0) { + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param = + (char *)ctx->iv; + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len = + ctx->cipher->iv_len; + } else { + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param = NULL; + encrypt_init.ei_mech.cm_param_len = 0; + } + } + + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_INIT, + &encrypt_init)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = encrypt_init.ei_return_value; + + } else { + decrypt_init.di_session = session.os_session; + decrypt_init.di_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; + decrypt_init.di_key.ck_obj_id = 0; + decrypt_init.di_key.ck_data = (void *) key; + decrypt_init.di_key.ck_length = ctx->key_len * 8; + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_type = the_cipher->pn_internal_number; + + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) { + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param = + (void *)(&aes_ctr_params); + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len = + sizeof (aes_ctr_params); + aes_ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(aes_ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } else { + if (the_cipher->iv_len > 0) { + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param = + (char *)ctx->iv; + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len = + ctx->cipher->iv_len; + } else { + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param = NULL; + decrypt_init.di_mech.cm_param_len = 0; + } + } + + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_INIT, + &decrypt_init)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = decrypt_init.di_return_value; + } + +failed: + if (r || rv) { + if (ctx->encrypt) + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT); + else + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT, DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT); + + return (0); + } + + return (1); +} + + +/* + * ENCRYPT_UPDATE or DECRYPT_UPDATE + */ +static int +devcrypto_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) +{ + crypto_encrypt_update_t encrypt_update; + crypto_decrypt_update_t decrypt_update; + devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data; + int r = 0, rv = 0; + + if (ctx->encrypt) { + encrypt_update.eu_session = devc_ctx->session_id; + encrypt_update.eu_databuf = (char *)in; + encrypt_update.eu_datalen = inl; + encrypt_update.eu_encrbuf = (char *)out; + encrypt_update.eu_encrlen = inl; + + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_UPDATE, + &encrypt_update)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = encrypt_update.eu_return_value; + + } else { /* decrypt */ + decrypt_update.du_session = devc_ctx->session_id; + decrypt_update.du_encrbuf = (char *)in; + decrypt_update.du_encrlen = inl; + decrypt_update.du_databuf = (char *)out; + decrypt_update.du_datalen = inl; + + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_UPDATE, + &decrypt_update)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = decrypt_update.du_return_value; + } + + if (r || rv) { + if (ctx->encrypt) + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE); + else + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE); + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:crypto_do ret (r) = 0x%x," + "crypto ret (rv) = 0x%x,", r, rv); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return (0); + } + + return (1); +} + + +/* + * ENCRYPT_FINAL or DECRYPT_FINAL + */ +static int +devcrypto_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + crypto_encrypt_final_t encrypt_final; + crypto_decrypt_final_t decrypt_final; + crypto_close_session_t session; + devcrypto_ctx_t *devc_ctx = ctx->cipher_data; + char buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + int r; + uint_t rv = 0; + int ret = 1; + + if (ctx->encrypt) { + encrypt_final.ef_session = devc_ctx->session_id; + encrypt_final.ef_encrbuf = buf; + encrypt_final.ef_encrlen = sizeof (buf); + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL, + &encrypt_final)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = encrypt_final.ef_return_value; + + } else { + decrypt_final.df_session = devc_ctx->session_id; + decrypt_final.df_databuf = buf; + decrypt_final.df_datalen = sizeof (buf); + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL, + &decrypt_final)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + rv = decrypt_final.df_return_value; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + if (ctx->encrypt) + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL " + "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, rv); + else + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL " + "ret (r) = 0x%x, (rv) = 0x%x\n", r, rv); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + if (r || rv) { + if (ctx->encrypt) + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, + DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL); + else + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, + DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL); + ret = 0; + } + + /* close the session */ + session.cs_session = devc_ctx->session_id; + while ((r = ioctl(kernel_fd, CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION, &session)) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto:CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION, " + "session id = %d ret (r) = 0x%x, crypto ret (rv) = 0x%x\n", + devc_ctx->session_id, r, rv); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + if (r || rv) { + DEVCRYPTOerr(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION); + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); +} + +static void +devcrypto_cleanup() +{ + if (kernel_fd == -1) + return; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock); + kernel_fd_ref--; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + + if (kernel_fd_ref == 0) { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(kernel_fd_lock); + (void) close(kernel_fd); + kernel_fd = -1; + if (kernel_provider_id != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(kernel_provider_id); + kernel_provider_id = NULL; + } + if (cipher_nids != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(cipher_nids); + cipher_nids = NULL; + } + devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(kernel_fd_lock); + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(kernel_fd_lock); + OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock); + kernel_fd_lock = NULL; + } +} + +static int +devcrypto_destroy(ENGINE *e) +{ + ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings(); + return (1); +} + +static int +devcrypto_finish(ENGINE *e) +{ + devcrypto_cleanup(); + return (1); +} + +/* + * Set up the engine info and get the /dev/crypto engine ready. + */ +static int +devcrypto_bind(ENGINE *e) +{ +#ifdef DEBUG + int i; +#endif + + /* Get the NIDs for AES counter mode algorithms first. */ + if (devcrypto_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) { + return (0); + } + + /* Create a lock for the devcrypto device file descriptor */ + if (kernel_fd_lock == NULL) { + kernel_fd_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (kernel_fd_lock == NULL) { + devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(); + return (0); + } + + if (pthread_mutex_init(kernel_fd_lock, NULL) != 0) { + devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(); + OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock); + kernel_fd_lock = NULL; + return (0); + } + } + + /* Open the /dev/crypto device */ + if (devcrypto_open() == 0) { + devcrypto_free_aes_ctr_NIDs(); + pthread_mutex_destroy(kernel_fd_lock); + OPENSSL_free(kernel_fd_lock); + kernel_fd_lock = NULL; + return (0); + } + + /* Get all hardware providers' information */ + if (devcrypto_get_slot_info() == 0) { + goto failed; + } + + if (devcrypto_get_hw_ciphers() == 0) { + goto failed; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "cipher_count = %d\n", cipher_count); + for (i = 0; i < cipher_count; i++) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "cipher_nids[i] = %d\n", cipher_nids[i]); + } +#endif /* DEBUG */ + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_NAME) || + !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, devcrypto_get_all_ciphers) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, devcrypto_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, devcrypto_finish)) { + goto failed; + } + + /* Set up the devcrypto error handling */ + ERR_load_devcrypto_strings(); + return (1); + +failed: + devcrypto_cleanup(); + return (0); +} + + +static int +bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) +{ + if (id != NULL && (strcmp(id, ENGINE_DEVCRYPTO_ID) != 0)) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, "libdevcrypto - bad engine id\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return (0); + } + if (!devcrypto_bind(e)) { +#ifdef DEBUG + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "libdevcrypto - failed to bind engine\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG */ + return (0); + } + + return (1); +} + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + * + * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "e_devcrypto_err.h" + +/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + +#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(0, func, 0) +#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(0, 0, reason) + +static ERR_STRING_DATA devcrypto_str_functs[]= +{ +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_INIT), "DEVCRYPTO_INIT"}, +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_DESTROY), "DEVCRYPTO_DESTROY"}, +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_FINISH), "DEVCRYPTO_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT), "DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_INIT"}, +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER), "DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, +{ ERR_FUNC(DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP), "DEVCRYPTO_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, +{ 0, NULL} +}; + +static ERR_STRING_DATA devcrypto_str_reasons[]= +{ +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY), "invalid cipher key"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID), "invalid cipher nid"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM), "IV or key length incorrect"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_MECH_STRING), "convert cipher type to string failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH), + "no hardware providers support this cipher"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION), "CRYPTO_OPEN_SESSION failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER), + "CRYPTO_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT), "CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_INIT failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE), "CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_UPDATE failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL), "CRYPTO_ENCRYPT_FINAL failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT), "CRYPTO_DECRYPT_INIT failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE), "CRYPTO_DECRYPT_UPDATE failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL), "CRYPTO_DECRYPT_FINAL failed"}, +{ ERR_REASON(DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION), "CRYPTO_CLOSE_SESSION failed"}, +{ 0, NULL} +}; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ + + +#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME +static ERR_STRING_DATA DEVCRYPTO_lib_name[]= +{ +{0, DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME}, +{0, NULL} +}; +#endif + +static int devcrypto_error_code = 0; +static int devcrypto_error_init = 1; + +static void +ERR_load_devcrypto_strings(void) +{ + if (devcrypto_error_code == 0) + devcrypto_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + + if (devcrypto_error_init) { + devcrypto_error_init = 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_load_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME + DEVCRYPTO_lib_name->error = + ERR_PACK(devcrypto_error_code, 0, 0); + ERR_load_strings(0, DEVCRYPTO_lib_name); +#endif + } +} + +static void +ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings(void) +{ + if (devcrypto_error_init == 0) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_unload_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_functs); + ERR_unload_strings(devcrypto_error_code, devcrypto_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef DEVCRYPTO_LIB_NAME + ERR_unload_strings(0, DEVCRYPTO_lib_name); +#endif + devcrypto_error_init = 1; + } +} + +static void +ERR_devcrypto_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) +{ + if (devcrypto_error_code == 0) + devcrypto_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + ERR_PUT_error(devcrypto_error_code, function, reason, file, line); +}
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/devcrypto/e_devcrypto_err.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + * + * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H +#define HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H + +static void ERR_load_devcrypto_strings(void); +static void ERR_unload_devcrypto_strings(void); +static void ERR_devcrypto_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); + +#define DEVCRYPTOerr(f, r) ERR_devcrypto_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) + + +/* Function codes */ +#define DEVC_F_INIT 100 +#define DEVC_F_DESTROY 101 +#define DEVC_F_FINISH 102 +#define DEVC_F_CIPHER_INIT 103 +#define DEVC_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 104 +#define DEVC_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 105 + + +/* Reason codes */ +#define DEVC_R_CIPHER_KEY 100 +#define DEVC_R_CIPHER_NID 101 +#define DEVC_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 102 +#define DEVC_R_MECH_STRING 103 +#define DEVC_R_FIND_SLOT_BY_MECH 104 +#define DEVC_R_OPEN_SESSION 105 +#define DEVC_R_GET_MECHANISM_NUMBER 106 +#define DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_INIT 107 +#define DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_UPDATE 108 +#define DEVC_R_ENCRYPT_FINAL 109 +#define DEVC_R_DECRYPT_INIT 110 +#define DEVC_R_DECRYPT_UPDATE 111 +#define DEVC_R_DECRYPT_FINAL 112 +#define DEVC_R_CLOSE_SESSION 113 + +#endif /* HEADER_DEVCRYPTO_ERR_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,3920 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/aes.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <dlfcn.h> +#include <pthread.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ +#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" +/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ +#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more + * information. + */ +#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) +#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#endif + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#include <sys/auxv.h> +#endif + +/* + * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither + * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, + * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then + * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's + * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. + */ +#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine" +#include "hw_pk11_err.c" + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine + * initialization. + */ +int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; +int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* + * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), + * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the + * RSA keys by reference feature. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel + * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. + */ +int *hw_cnids; +int *hw_dnids; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ +static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; + +/* + * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when + * logging into the token. + */ +CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +/* + * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for + * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given + * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be + * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already + * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each + * PK11_SESSION object. + * + * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the + * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also + * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another + * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in + * invalid handle returned from the search operation. + * + * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. + * They are also used for active list protection. + */ +pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one + * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session + * list) for given algorithm type + */ +PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available + * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed + * without losing the secret key objects. + */ +static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + +/* ENGINE level stuff */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int pk11_rand_status(void); + +/* These functions are also used in other files */ +PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ +extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); +extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif + +/* Local helper functions */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent); +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); + +/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ +static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ +static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); +static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); +static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc); +static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); +static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid); +static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len); +static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, + size_t count); +static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); +static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); +static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids); +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, + int *local_digest_nids); +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, + int id); +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id); + +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); +static int hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* Index for the supported ciphers */ +enum pk11_cipher_id { + PK11_DES_CBC, + PK11_DES3_CBC, + PK11_DES_ECB, + PK11_DES3_ECB, + PK11_RC4, + PK11_AES_128_CBC, + PK11_AES_192_CBC, + PK11_AES_256_CBC, + PK11_AES_128_ECB, + PK11_AES_192_ECB, + PK11_AES_256_ECB, + PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + PK11_AES_128_CTR, + PK11_AES_192_CTR, + PK11_AES_256_CTR, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + PK11_CIPHER_MAX +}; + +/* Index for the supported digests */ +enum pk11_digest_id { + PK11_MD5, + PK11_SHA1, + PK11_SHA224, + PK11_SHA256, + PK11_SHA384, + PK11_SHA512, + PK11_DIGEST_MAX +}; + +#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \ + { \ + if (uselock) \ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ + { \ + retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ + sp->persistent); \ + } \ + if (uselock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + } + +static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; +static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; +static int cipher_count = 0; +static int digest_count = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; + +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st + { + enum pk11_cipher_id id; + int nid; + int iv_len; + int min_key_len; + int max_key_len; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_CIPHER; + +static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = + { + { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, + { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, + { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, + CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, + { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, + CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ + { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + }; + +typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st + { + enum pk11_digest_id id; + int nid; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_DIGEST; + +static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = + { + {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, + {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, + {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, + {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, + {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, + {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, + {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, + }; + +/* + * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 + * session in multiple cipher_update calls + */ +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; + + +/* + * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets + * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. + * + * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. + */ + +/* DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = + { + NID_des_cbc, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* 3DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = + { + NID_des_ede3_cbc, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ecb, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ede3_ecb, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = + { + NID_aes_128_cbc, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = + { + NID_aes_192_cbc, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = + { + NID_aes_256_cbc, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = + { + NID_aes_128_ecb, + 16, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = + { + NID_aes_192_ecb, + 16, 24, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = + { + NID_aes_256_ecb, + 16, 32, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* + * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are + * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures + * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. + */ +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = + { + NID_undef, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = + { + NID_bf_cbc, + 8, 16, 8, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = + { + NID_rc4, + 1, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = + { + NID_md5, + NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + MD5_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = + { + NID_sha1, + NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = + { + NID_sha224, + NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, + SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = + { + NID_sha256, + NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = + { + NID_sha384, + NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = + { + NID_sha512, + NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine + */ +#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = + { + { + PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, + "SO_PATH", + "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + + +static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = + { + pk11_rand_seed, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_cleanup, + pk11_rand_add, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_status + }; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; +static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support"; + +CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; +static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; + +/* + * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function + * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether + * this is 32 or 64 bit build. + */ +static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; +/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ +CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE; +static int pk11_pid = 0; + +static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; + +/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + session_cache[type].lock = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL); + } + + return (1); + +malloc_err: + pk11_free_all_locks(); + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) + { + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); + find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); + OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); + session_cache[type].lock = NULL; + } + } + } + +/* + * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. + */ +static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; + RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + if (!pk11_library_init(e)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || + !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || + !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, pk11_engine_pkey_methods)) + return (0); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + if (pk11_have_random) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) + return (0); + +/* + * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup + * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp + * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. + * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; + pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_pk11_strings(); + + return (1); + } + +/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) + return (0); + + if (!bind_pk11(e)) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) + +#else +static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + + if (!ret) + return (NULL); + + if (!bind_pk11(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return (NULL); + } + + return (ret); + } + +void +ENGINE_load_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; + + /* + * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to + * security reasons. We will link it in statically. + */ + /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ + if (!pk11_dso) + pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + return; + } + + e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); + if (!e_pk11) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + return; + } + + /* + * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically + * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 + * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter + * needs cipher and digest algorithm information + */ + if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + return; + } + + ENGINE_add(e_pk11); + + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and + * the function symbol names to bind to. + */ +static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + return (PK11_LIBNAME); + + return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); + } + +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); + + PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + } + +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + + return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); + } + +/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ +static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + } + +/* release all engine specific mutexes */ +static void pk11_fork_parent(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* + * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them + * accessible to all threads. + */ +static void pk11_fork_child(void) + { + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + +/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + return (pk11_library_init(e)); +} + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also + * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and + * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function + * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) + { + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + int any_slot_found; + int i; + + /* + * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called + * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one + * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more + * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen + * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a + * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be + * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes + * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID + * check so that we properly initialize the engine again. + */ + if (pk11_library_initialized) + { + if (pk11_pid == getpid()) + { + return (1); + } + else + { + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + /* + * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case + * the application calls fork() without finishing the + * engine first. + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + } + } + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all + * NIDs there. + */ + if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ + p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); + if (!p) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + rv = p(&pFuncList); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any + * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an + * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 + * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just + * because no slot was present. + */ + if (any_slot_found == 0) + return (1); + + if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, + PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since + * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function + */ + if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) + == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " + "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + digest_count = 0; + } + + pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE; + pk11_pid = getpid(); + /* + * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() + * will do the cleanup. + */ + if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + session_cache[i].head = NULL; + /* + * initialize active lists. We only use active lists + * for asymmetric ciphers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + active_list[i] = NULL; + + if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) + { + if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, + pk11_fork_child) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE; + } + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); + return (1); + } + +/* + * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 + * library. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + int i; + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); + + if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) + goto err; + + /* free all active lists */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + pk11_free_active_list(i); + + pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. + */ +#if 0 + pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + { + ASN1_OBJECT *ob = NULL; + if (NID_aes_128_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_128_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_192_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_192_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) { + ob = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_aes_256_ctr); + if (ob != NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ob); + } + } +#endif + + if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + pk11_dso = NULL; + pFuncList = NULL; + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + pk11_pid = 0; + /* + * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than + * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason + * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out + * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes + * the engine before calling fork(). + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()) + { + int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); + + switch (cmd) + { + case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + if (initialized) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + return (0); + } + + return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); + default: + break; + } + + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + return (0); + } + + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) + { + return; + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since + * the calling functions do not care anyway + */ + pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + + return; + } + +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) + { + pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); + } + +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (1); + } + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static int pk11_rand_status(void) + { + return (1); + } + +/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ +static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + +/* + * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have + * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here + * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. + * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. + */ +PK11_SESSION * +pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + static pid_t pid = 0; + pid_t new_pid; + CK_RV rv; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (NULL); + } + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + + /* + * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in + * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session + * here, with no PID information. + */ + if (pid == 0) + pid = getpid(); + + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp = freelist; + + /* + * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled + * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first + * structure from the freelist. + */ + if (sp == NULL) + { + if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); + + /* + * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the + * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so + * mark them as unused. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + freelist = sp->next; + + /* + * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all + * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. + */ + if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) + { + pid = new_pid; + + /* + * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited + * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which + * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the + * head of the list). + */ + while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) + { + freelist = sp1->next; + /* + * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() + * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 + * sessions and destroy all objects. + */ + pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp1); + } + + /* we have to free the active list as well. */ + pk11_free_active_list(optype); + + /* Initialize the process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this + * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one + * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. + * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more + * information. + */ +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) + goto err; + + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs + * re-initialization. + */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) + { + /* + * We will keep the session in the cache list and let + * the caller cope with the situation. + */ + freelist = sp; + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + + if (sp->pid == 0) + { + /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + } + } + + /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ + session_cache[optype].head = freelist; + +err: + if (sp != NULL) + sp->next = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + + return (sp); + } + + +void +pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + PK11_SESSION *freelist; + + /* + * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and + * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the + * next time we will ask for a new session. + */ + if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) + return; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return; + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp->next = freelist; + session_cache[optype].head = sp; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + } + + +/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions() + { + int ret = 1; + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); + + /* + * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will + * return 0 on exit. + */ + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many + * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we + * return an error on return. + */ +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; + int ret = 1; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock); + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) + { + if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + ret = 0; + } + } + freelist = sp->next; + pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock); + return (ret); + } + + +static int +pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID myslot; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_RAND: + myslot = rand_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + myslot = SLOTID; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) + { + /* + * We are probably a child process so force the + * reinitialize of the session + */ + pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE; + if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) + return (0); + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + sp->pid = getpid(); + + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + case OP_CIPHER: + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent + * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. + */ + sp->persistent = CK_FALSE; + return (1); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code, + * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the + * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying + * a public or a private key, we always free what we can. + */ +static void +destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + } + +/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + destroy_all_rsa_params(sp); + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DH); + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DH key object wrapper. + * + * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure + * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; + uselock = CK_FALSE; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } +err: + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock); + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +static int +pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects + * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so + * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. + */ + if (persistent == CK_TRUE) + return (1); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, + rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + + +/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ + +static int +cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) + if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) + return (ciphers[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) + { + if (cipher_count > 0) + *nids = cipher_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (cipher_count); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) + { + if (digest_count > 0) + *nids = digest_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (digest_count); + } + +/* + * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. + */ +static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, + PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) + { + CK_RV rv; +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + + /* + * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and + * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before + * pk11_init_symetric() is called. + */ + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); + pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); + /* + * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, + * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 + * needs. For more information on internal structure of the + * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can + * add code so that the counter length can be set via + * ENGINE_ctrl() function. + */ + ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + { + if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; + pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; + } + } + + /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) + { + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) + return (0); + + p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; + /* + * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the + * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our + * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From + * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a + * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key + * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this + * code serves as a sanity check. + * + * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be + * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs + * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES + * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. + */ + if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || + ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || + ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { + PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); + return (0); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ + mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ + (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); + + /* + * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then + * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the + * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && + sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) + { + state->sp = sp; + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + + /* + * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object + * needs to be created. + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( + ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); + } + + if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) + { + /* + * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to + * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. + */ + if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + } + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + /* now initialize the context with a new key */ + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +/* + * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a + * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session + * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so + * that it needs not be recreated. + * + * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this + * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return + * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good + * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix + * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient + * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long outl = inl; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; + + if (!inl) + return (1); + + /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ + if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) + return (0); + + if (ctx->encrypt) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + else + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always + * the same size of input. + * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with + * correctly aligned buffers. + */ + if (inl != outl) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() + * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's + * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but + * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't + * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with + * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, + * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used + * context is initialized without finalizing it first. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; + CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get + * rid of the context. + */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + state->sp = NULL; + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with + * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the + * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!cipher) + return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_des_ede3_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; + break; + case NID_des_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; + break; + case NID_bf_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; + break; + case NID_rc4: + *cipher = &pk11_rc4; + break; + default: +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR + /* + * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs + * here are not constants. + */ + if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; + else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; + else +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + *cipher = NULL; + break; + } + return (*cipher != NULL); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!digest) + return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_md5: + *digest = &pk11_md5; + break; + /* + * A special case. For "openssl dgst -dss1 -engine pkcs11 ...", + * OpenSSL calls EVP_get_digestbyname() on "dss1" which ends up + * calling pk11_engine_digests() for NID_dsa. Internally, if an + * engine is not used, OpenSSL uses SHA1_Init() as expected for + * DSA. So, we must return pk11_sha1() for NID_dsa as well. Note + * that this must have changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 since we + * did not have the problem with the 0.9.8 version. + */ + case NID_sha1: + case NID_dsa: + *digest = &pk11_sha1; + break; + case NID_sha224: + *digest = &pk11_sha224; + break; + case NID_sha256: + *digest = &pk11_sha256; + break; + case NID_sha384: + *digest = &pk11_sha384; + break; + case NID_sha512: + *digest = &pk11_sha512; + break; + default: + *digest = NULL; + break; + } + return (*digest != NULL); + } + + +/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, + }; + + /* + * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions + * can use the key handles. Here is why: + * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. + * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. + * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with + * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES + * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and + * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session + * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key + * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to + * terminate the active operation. + */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; + a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Save the key information used in this session. + * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. + */ + sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? + PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len; + (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); +err: + + return (h_key); + } + +static int +md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) + if (digests[i].nid == nid) + return (digests[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_DIGEST *pdp; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) + return (0); + + pdp = &digests[index]; + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ + mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); + return (0); + } + + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ + if (count == 0) + return (1); + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, + count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) + { + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long len; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + len = ctx->digest->md_size; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) + return (0); + + /* + * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session + * to the pool + */ + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) + { + CK_RV rv; + int ret = 0; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; + CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + + /* The copy-from state */ + state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Initialize the copy-to state */ + if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) + goto err; + state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; + + /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + if (ul_state_len == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); + if (pstate == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, + ul_state_len, 0, 0); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, + PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; +err: + if (pstate != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pstate); + + return (ret); + } + +/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ +static int +pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; + unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not + * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory + * that might have been allocated in the token when + * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() + * will return the session to the cache. + */ + if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key + * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key + * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for + * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first + * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same + * prefix. + */ +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len) + { + if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || + memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) + { + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* + * The secret key object is created in the + * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). + */ + if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, + sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + + if (session == NULL) + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock); + + return (ret); + } + + +/* + * Public key mechanisms optionally supported + * + * CKM_RSA_X_509 + * CKM_RSA_PKCS + * CKM_DSA + * + * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a + * public key slot. + * + * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported + * + * CKM_DES3_CBC + * CKM_DES_CBC + * CKM_AES_CBC + * CKM_DES3_ECB + * CKM_DES_ECB + * CKM_AES_ECB + * CKM_AES_CTR + * CKM_RC4 + * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC + * + * Digests optionally supported + * + * CKM_MD5 + * CKM_SHA_1 + * CKM_SHA224 + * CKM_SHA256 + * CKM_SHA384 + * CKM_SHA512 + * + * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which + * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of + * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global + * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key + * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. + */ +static int +pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) + { + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar; + CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + int slot_n_cipher = 0; + int slot_n_digest = 0; + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; + int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + int current_slot_n_digest = 0; + + int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; + int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; + + /* let's initialize the output parameter */ + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 0; + + /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + return (0); + } + + /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + /* Check if slot has random support. */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, + * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_DSA. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, + &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and + * derivation. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) + { + slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (!found_candidate_slot && + (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; + pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; + found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if + * RSA keys by reference feature is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", + PK11_DBG); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + best_slot_sofar); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); + } +#else + } /* if */ +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } /* for */ + + if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + { + pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + } + + found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + best_slot_sofar = 0; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + current_slot_n_digest = 0; + (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); + + pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_cipher); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_digest); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", + PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than + * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, + * otherwise leave it where it is. + */ + if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > + (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", + PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; + cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; + digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; + (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, + sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, + sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); + OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 1; + return (1); + } + +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids, int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = + ciphers[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = + digests[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR +/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ +static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) + { + ASN1_OBJECT *o; + int nid; + + if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", + 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) + { + return (0); + } + + /* will return NID_undef on error */ + nid = OBJ_add_object(o); + ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); + + return (nid); + } + +/* + * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we + * have to help ourselves here. + */ +static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) + { + /* are we already set? */ + if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) + return (1); + + /* + * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just + * follow the format of those that exist. + */ + if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; + if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == + NID_undef) + goto err; + ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; + return (1); + +err: + PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ + +/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, + ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, + local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); + } + } + +/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, + current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); + } + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library + * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation + * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code + * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the + * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some + * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a + * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, + * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the + * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte + * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products + * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression + * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the + * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. + * + * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for + * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same + * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 + * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without + * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use + * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since + * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said + * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with + * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code + * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for + * asymmetric operations. + * + * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what + * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can + * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be + * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, + * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. + * + * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find + * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric + * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table + * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays + * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the + * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token + * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more + * information. + * + * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined + * the code won't be used. + */ +#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#else +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#endif + +/* + * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, + * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware + * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. + */ +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + void *handle; + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; + int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif + /* + * Use RTLD_GROUP to limit the pkcs11_kernel provider to its own + * symbols, which prevents it from mistakenly accessing C_* functions + * from the top-level PKCS#11 library. + */ + if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_GROUP)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pflist->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + /* this means empty tables */ + hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; + hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also + * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the + * search. + */ + hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; + hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; + tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); + tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); + if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef + * is zero now. + */ + for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; + for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are + * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. + */ + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); + pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); + } + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by + * dlclose(3C). + */ +#if 0 + pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + (void) dlclose(handle); + hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; + hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + +err: + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); + if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); + + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs unless the mechanism is + * supported directly in a CPU instruction set. The table may be NULL (i.e., + * non-existent). + */ +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) + { + int i = 0; + + /* + * Special case first. NULL means that we are initializing a new table. + */ + if (nid_table == NULL) + return (1); + + /* + * If we have an AES instruction set on SPARC we route everything + * through the Crypto Framework (ie., through pkcs11_softtoken in this + * case). This is for T4 which has HW instructions for AES, DES, MD5, + * SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, MONTMUL, and MPMUL. + * + * On Intel, if we have AES-NI instruction set we route AES to the + * Crypto Framework. Intel CPUs do not have other instruction sets for + * HW crypto acceleration so we check the HW NID table for any other + * mechanism. + */ +#if defined(__x86) + if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1) + { + switch (nid) + { + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + return (1); + } + /* + * These are variables, cannot be used as case expressions. + */ + if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + { + return (1); + } + } +#elif defined(__sparc) + if (hw_aes_instruction_set_present() == 1) + return (1); +#endif + + /* The table is never full, there is always at least one NID_undef. */ + while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) + { + if (nid_table[i++] == nid) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + } + + return (0); + } + +/* Do we have an AES instruction set? */ +static int +hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void) + { + static int present = -1; + + if (present == -1) + { + uint_t ui = 0; + + (void) getisax(&ui, 1); + /* + * Note that we do not have AES optimization using AES-NI + * instructions in pkcs11_softtoken on 32-bit systems. + */ +#if defined(__amd64) + present = (ui & AV_386_AES) > 0; +#elif defined(__sparc) + present = (ui & AV_SPARC_AES) > 0; +#else + /* x86 32-bit */ + present = 0; +#endif + } + + return (present); + } + +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.h */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_H +#define HW_PK11_H + +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ +#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 + +/* + * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 + * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the + * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation + * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. + * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object + * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. + * + * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list + * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request + * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION + { + struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ + pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ + CK_BBOOL persistent; /* is that a keystore object? */ + union + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ + BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ + RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ + } u_RSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ + DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ + } u_DSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ + DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ + BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ + } u_DH; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ + unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; + int key_len; /* priv key len */ + int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ + } u_cipher; + } opdata_u; + } PK11_SESSION; + +#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key +#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key +#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub +#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv +#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num +#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num +#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num +#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key +#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key +#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub +#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num +#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv +#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num +#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key +#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh +#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num +#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key +#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key +#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len +#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt + +/* + * We have 3 different groups of operation types: + * 1) asymmetric operations + * 2) random operations + * 3) symmetric and digest operations + * + * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware + * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware + * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support + * only a single group of operations. + * + * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have + * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from + * different groups may be initialized in different slots. + * + * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are + * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. + */ +typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM + { + OP_RAND, + OP_RSA, + OP_DSA, + OP_DH, + OP_CIPHER, + OP_DIGEST, + OP_MAX + } PK11_OPTYPE; + +/* + * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches + * and locks associated with the lists. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE + { + PK11_SESSION *head; + pthread_mutex_t *lock; + } PK11_CACHE; + +/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ +typedef struct PK11_active_st + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; + unsigned int refcnt; + struct PK11_active_st *prev; + struct PK11_active_st *next; + } PK11_active; + +extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; +extern PK11_active *active_list[]; +/* + * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See + * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. + */ +extern char *passphrasedialog; +extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) +#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) + +extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +extern int pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, + const int **nids, int nid); + +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +#endif /* HW_PK11_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= +{ +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, +{ 0, NULL} +}; + +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= +{ +{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, +{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, +{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, +{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, +{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, +{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, +{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, +{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, +{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, +{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, +{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, +{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork failed" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login failed on token" }, +{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen dialog command" }, +{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe failed" }, +{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, +{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf failed" }, +{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap failed" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, +{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock failed" }, +{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork failed" }, +{ 0, NULL} +}; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ + +static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; +static int pk11_error_init = 1; + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_engine_lib_name[] = +{ +{0, PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME}, +{0, NULL} +}; +#endif + +static void +ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + + if (pk11_error_init) + { + pk11_error_init = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME + pk11_engine_lib_name->error = + ERR_PACK(pk11_lib_error_code, 0, 0); + ERR_load_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); +#endif + } +} + +static void +ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_error_init == 0) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + +#ifdef PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME + ERR_unload_strings(0, pk11_engine_lib_name); +#endif + + pk11_error_init = 1; + } +} + +void +ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) +{ + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); +} + +void +PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) +{ + char tmp_buf[20]; + + PK11err(function, reason); + (void) snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); +}
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_err.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H +#define HW_PK11_ERR_H + +void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); +void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); +#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) + +/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ + +/* Function codes. */ + +#define PK11_F_INIT 100 +#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 +#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 +#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 +#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 +#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 +#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 +#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 +#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 +#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 +#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 +#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 +#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 +#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 +#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 +#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 +#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 +#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 +#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 +#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 +#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 +#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 +#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 +#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 +#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 +#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 +#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 +#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 +#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 +#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 +#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 +#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 +#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 +#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 +#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 +#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 + +/* Reason codes. */ +#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 +#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 +#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 +#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 +#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 +#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 +#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 +#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 +#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 +#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 +#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 +#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 +#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 +#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 +#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 +#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 +#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 +#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 +#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 +#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 +#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 +#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 +#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 +#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 +#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 +#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 +#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 +#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 +#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 +#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 +#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 +#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 +#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 +#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 +#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 +#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 +#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 +#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 +#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 +#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 +#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 +#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 +#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 +#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 +#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 +#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 + +#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_pub.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,3274 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> + +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <cryptlib.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <libgen.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; + +/* + * During the reinitialization after a detected fork we will try to login to the + * token using the passphrasedialog keyword that we inherit from the parent. + */ +char *passphrasedialog; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* RSA stuff */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp); + +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +#endif + +/* DSA stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); +static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +#endif + +/* DH stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, + const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); +#endif + +static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); +static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, + CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); +static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); + +static int pk11_pkey_meth_nids[] = {NID_dsa}; + +/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ +#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL +static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; +#else +static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; +#endif + +/* + * Increment existing or create a new reference for an asymmetric key PKCS#11 + * object handle in the active object list. If the operation fails, unlock (if + * locked), set error variable and jump to the specified label. We use this list + * so that we can track how many references to the PKCS#11 objects are used from + * all our sessions structures. If we are replacing an object reference in the + * session structure and the ref count for the reference being replaced gets to + * 0 we know that we can safely free the object itself via C_ObjectDestroy(). + * See also TRY_OBJ_DESTROY. + */ +#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ + { \ + if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ + { \ + var = CK_TRUE; \ + if (unlock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the + * entry otherwise return NULL. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) + if (entry->h == h) + return (entry); + + return (NULL); + } + +/* + * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a + * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of + * failure. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + /* search for entry in the active list */ + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) + entry->refcnt++; + else + { + /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ + entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); + if (entry == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + entry->h = h; + entry->refcnt = 1; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ + if (active_list[type] == NULL) + active_list[type] = entry; + else /* make the entry first in the list */ + { + entry->next = active_list[type]; + active_list[type]->prev = entry; + active_list[type] = entry; + } + } + + return (entry->refcnt); + } + +/* + * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +void +pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *prev_entry; + + /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ + if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) + { + prev_entry->next = entry->next; + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = prev_entry; + } + else + { + active_list[type] = entry->next; + /* we were the first but not the only one */ + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = NULL; + } + + /* sanitization */ + entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(entry); + } + +/* Free all entries from the active list. */ +void +pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ + switch (type) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + } + +/* + * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, + * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. + * + * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, + * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); + entry->refcnt--; + if (entry->refcnt == 0) + { + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + return (1); + } + + return (0); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = + { + "PKCS#11 RSA method", + pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ + NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ + RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ + pk11_RSA_verify, /* rsa_verify */ + /* Internal rsa_keygen will be used if this is NULL. */ + NULL /* rsa_keygen */ + }; + +RSA_METHOD * +PK11_RSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_rsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = + { + "PKCS#11 DSA method", + pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ + NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ + pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ + NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL /* app_data */ + }; + +DSA_METHOD * +PK11_DSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_dsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* + * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for + * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but + * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by + * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be + * enough. + */ +#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 + +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = + { + "PKCS#11 DH method", + pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ + pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DH_init, /* init */ + pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + NULL /* generate_params */ + }; + +DH_METHOD * +PK11_DH(void) + { + return (&pk11_dh); + } +#endif + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ +#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 +#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to + * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not + * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. + * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + + +/* + * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors + * should be catched in the padding functions + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. + */ + for (j = 0; j < r; j++) + if (buf[j] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + j; + j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's here + */ + for (i = 0; i < r; i++) + if (buf[i] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + i; + i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* + * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and + * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_encrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and + * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, + rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + retval = ul_sig_len; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and + * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit + * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, + p_mech, h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, + * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. + */ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + return (1); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need + * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum + * structures. + */ + if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from + * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. + * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c + */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long ulsiglen; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + ulsiglen = j; + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); + *siglen = ulsiglen; + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, sp); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto err; + } + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, sigbuf, + (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +#define MAXATTR 1024 +/* + * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *privkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + const char *file; + int ret; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[8][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* We look for private keys only. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we + * never ask for private components. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * The next function will decide whether we are going to access keys in + * the token or read them from plain files. It all depends on what is in + * the 'privkey_id' parameter. + */ + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(privkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + /* We will try to access a key from a PKCS#11 token. */ + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_TRUE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we cannot free it until the find + * is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + + /* + * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm according to + * the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer as NULL, and non-NULL + * RSA private pointer. However, it is easier just to recreate + * everything. We expect the keys to be loaded once and used + * many times. We do not check the return value because even in + * case of failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() reports + * the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->persistent = CK_TRUE; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not use it now + * for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for consistency reasons. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + + /* + * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we must take + * care of handle management ourselves. + */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + + /* + * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + /* + * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as + * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key + * in the keystore. + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + } + else + if ((privkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(privkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, + rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* Load RSA public key from a file or load it from the PKCS#11 token. */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *pubkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* everything else below needed for key by reference extension */ + int ret; + const char *file; + pkcs11_uri uri_struct; + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = CK_TRUE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof (is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + ret = pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(pubkey_id, &uri_struct, &file); + + if (ret == 0) + goto err; + + if (ret == 1) + { + if (pk11_check_token_attrs(&uri_struct) == 0) + goto err; + + search_templ[2].pValue = uri_struct.object; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + &uri_struct, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + /* + * Free the structure now. Note that we use uri_struct's field + * directly in the template so we can't free until find is done. + */ + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(&uri_struct, 0); + /* + * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA + * structure. No cache hit is possible. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; + + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + + /* + * These are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Create a session object from it so that when calling + * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The + * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA + * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for + * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears + * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if + * we always have a session key. Note that this is different + * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that + * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore + * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. + */ + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + if ((pubkey = fopen(file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(pubkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, + rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, sp); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + else + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Get a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. If the + * PKCS#11 session object already exists it is found, reused, and + * the counter in the active object list incremented. If not found, a new + * session object is created and put also onto the active object list. + * + * We use the session field from sp, and we cache rsa->(n|e) in + * opdata_rsa_(n|e|d)_num, respectively. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + int i; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue); + + a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); + a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Function similar to pk11_get_public_rsa_key(). In addition to 'n' and 'e' + * components, it also caches 'd' if present. Note that if RSA keys by reference + * are used, 'd' is never extracted from the token in which case it would be + * NULL here. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, + &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, + &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, + &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, + &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, + &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' component is NULL. + * That means this is key by reference RSA key. In that case, we can + * use only public components for searching for the private key handle. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + ul_key_attr_count = 8; + /* + * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing + * session keys. + */ + a_key_template[2].pValue = &pk11_true; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(sp->session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(sp->session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(sp->session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + /* + * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components only so we + * tried to find the private key in the keystore. If it was + * really a token key we have a problem. Note that for other key + * types we just create a new session key using the private + * components from the RSA structure. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(sp->session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never extract private + * components from the keystore. In that case 'd' was set to NULL and we + * expect the application to properly cope with that. It is documented + * in openssl(5). In general, if keys by reference are used we expect it + * to be used exclusively using the high level API and then there is no + * problem. If the application expects the private components to be read + * from the keystore then that is not a supported way of usage. + */ + if (rsa->d != NULL && (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + else + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + + /* + * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well + * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache + * 'n'/'e' components as well. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed upon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA + * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + * + * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public + * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we + * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public + * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for + * both data signing and verifying. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No public key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing private key + * object. We can just create a public object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss. Objects are cleaned only if we have a full cache miss, + * meaning that it's a different RSA key pair. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for + * cache miss. + */ +static int +pk11_check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent of RSA + * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should + * be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the public component + * since with the keys by reference mechanism, private components are + * not in the RSA structure. Also, see pk11_check_new_rsa_key_pub() + * about why we compare the handle as well. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv == rsa && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) == 0 && + BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) == 0) + { + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + return (1); + else + /* + * No private key object yet but we have the right RSA + * structure with potentially existing public key + * object. We can just create a private object and move + * on with this session structure. + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * A different RSA key pair was using this session structure previously + * or it's an empty structure. Destroy what we can. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* The DSA function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + + +static DSA_SIG * +pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) + { + BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + int i; + DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; + + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + + /* + * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, + * each is 20 bytes long + */ + unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto ret; + } + + (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + + if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || + BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + dsa_sig->r = r; + dsa_sig->s = s; + +ret: + if (dsa_sig == NULL) + { + if (r != NULL) + BN_free(r); + if (s != NULL) + BN_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (dsa_sig); + } + +static int +pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, + DSA *dsa) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + int retval = 0; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + + unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto ret; + } + + /* + * The representation of each of the two big numbers could + * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need + * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. + */ + (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - + BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); + + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + retval = 1; +ret: + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. + * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, + &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure + * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + + /* + * Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be CK_FALSE for session keys + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed apon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* The DH function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* + * Generate DH key-pair. + * + * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key + * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key + * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard + * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem + * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. + */ +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) + { + CK_ULONG i; + CK_RV rv, rv1; + int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; + + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)} + }; + + CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) + { + /* + * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that + * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of + * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. + */ + pub_key_template[1].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) + { + pub_key_template[2].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + /* + * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting + * a session handle. The objects created in this function are + * destroyed before return and thus not cached. + */ + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, + &mechanism, + pub_key_template, + ul_pub_key_attr_count, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_pub_key, + &h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory + * should be sufficient for reuse. + */ + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + else + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) + { + rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || + ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) + { + if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); + pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, + DH *dh) + { + int i; + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + goto err; + + priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; + priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); + mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); + if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); + + (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); + + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = + pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, + &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, + &mechanism, + h_key, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + priv_key_result[0].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); + if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same + * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key + */ + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + /* + * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip + * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, + * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The + * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was + * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading + * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the + * pre-master secret. + */ + for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) + { + if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) + break; + } + + (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); + ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; + } + +err: + + if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); + priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; + } + + if (mechanism.pParameter) + { + OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); + mechanism.pParameter = NULL; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, + DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_BBOOL rollback = CK_FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)}, + {CKA_PRIVATE, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + }; + + key_template[0].pValue = &class; + key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); + + key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); + + key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); + key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dh_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = CK_TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, CK_FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dh; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); + key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + * + * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh + * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. + */ +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key + * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached + * in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, CK_TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + +/* + * Local function to simplify key template population + * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error + */ +static int +init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, + CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) + { + CK_ULONG len; + + /* + * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is easier to + * check that here than individually in the callers. + */ + if (bn != NULL) + len = BN_num_bytes(bn); + + if (bn == NULL || len == 0) + return (1); + + *ul_value_len = len; + *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); + if (*p_value == NULL) + return (0); + + BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); + + return (1); + } + +static void +attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) + { + if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) + *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); + } + +/* + * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the object or + * if we find more objects based on the template we got. + * + * Returns: + * 1 OK + * 0 no object or more than 1 object found + */ +static int +find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG objcnt; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (objcnt > 1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + else + if (objcnt == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (1); +err: + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(op); + return (0); + } + +/* + * OpenSSL 1.0.0 introduced ENGINE API for the PKEY EVP functions. Sadly, + * "openssl dgst -dss1 ..." now uses a new function EVP_DigestSignInit() which + * internally needs a PKEY method for DSA even when in the engine. So, to avoid + * a regression when moving from 0.9.8 to 1.0.0, we use an internal OpenSSL + * structure for the DSA PKEY methods to make it work. It is a future project to + * make it work with HW acceleration. + * + * Note that at the time of 1.0.0d release there is no documentation as to how + * the PKEY EVP functions are to be implemented in an engine. There is only one + * engine shipped with 1.0.0d that uses the PKEY EVP methods, the GOST engine. + * It was used as an example when fixing the above mentioned regression problem. + */ +int +pk11_engine_pkey_methods(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids, + int nid) + { + if (pmeth == NULL) + { + *nids = pk11_pkey_meth_nids; + return (1); + } + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_dsa: + *pmeth = (EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)EVP_PKEY_meth_find(nid); + return (1); + } + + /* Error branch. */ + *pmeth = NULL; + return (0); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.c Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,869 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <strings.h> +#include <libgen.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 + +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#include <security/pkcs11.h> +#include "hw_pk11.h" +#include "hw_pk11_uri.h" + +/* + * The keystore used is always from the pubkey slot so we need to know which one + * was selected so that we can get the information needed for the URI + * processing. + */ +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +/* + * Cached PIN so that child can use it during the re-login. Note that we do not + * cache the PIN by default. + */ +static char *token_pin; + +static int mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin); +static char *run_askpass(char *dialog); + +/* + * Get the PIN. Either run the command and use its standard output as a PIN to + * fill in the PKCS11 URI structure, or read the PIN from the terminal. Using + * the external command is of higher precedence. The memory for PIN is allocated + * in this function and the PIN is always NULL terminated. The caller must take + * care of freeing the memory used for the PIN. The maximum PIN length accepted + * is PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN. + * + * The function is used also during the re-initialization of the engine after + * the fork. + * + * The function must not be called under the protection of the mutex "uri_lock" + * because the lock is acquired in the prefork function. + * + * Returns: + * 0 in case of troubles (and sets "*pin" to NULL) + * 1 if we got the PIN + */ +#define EXEC_SPEC "exec:" +#define BUILTIN_SPEC "builtin" +int +pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin) + { + /* Initialize as an error. */ + *pin = NULL; + + if (strcmp(dialog, BUILTIN_SPEC) == 0) + { + /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* Note that OpenSSL is not localized at all. */ + *pin = getpassphrase("Enter token PIN: "); + if (*pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + else + { + char *pw; + + /* + * getpassphrase() uses an internal buffer to hold the + * entered password. Note that it terminates the buffer + * with '\0'. + */ + if ((pw = strdup(*pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + /* Zero the internal buffer to get rid of the PIN. */ + memset(*pin, 0, strlen(*pin)); + *pin = pw; + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + } + else + { + /* + * This is the "exec:" case. We will get the PIN from the output + * of an external command. + */ + if (strncmp(dialog, EXEC_SPEC, strlen(EXEC_SPEC)) == 0) + { + dialog += strlen(EXEC_SPEC); + if ((*pin = run_askpass(dialog)) == NULL) + goto err; + } + else + { + /* + * Invalid specification in the passphrasedialog + * keyword. + */ + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC); + goto err; + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Process the PKCS#11 URI and get the PIN. It uses information from the + * passphrasedialog keyword to get the PIN. If passphrasedialog is not present + * it is not considered an error since it depends on the token attributes + * whether C_Login() is required. The function expects an allocated 'uri_struct' + * structure. + * + * Returns: + * 0 if URI is not valid at all, or if we could not get the PIN + * 1 if all is OK + * 2 if the URI is not the PKCS#11 URI. In that case, put the string + * pointer to the filename to "*file". Note that the pointer just points + * inside of the "uristr", possibly skipping the file:// prefix if present. + */ +int +pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, + const char **file) + { + char *uristr2, *l1, *l2, *tok, *name; + + /* Check the "file://" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, FILE_URI_PREFIX, strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX)) == 0) + { + *file = uristr + strlen(FILE_URI_PREFIX); + return (2); + } + + /* This is the "pkcs11:" case. */ + if (strncmp(uristr, PK11_URI_PREFIX, strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)) != 0) + { + /* Not PKCS#11 URI at all, could be a filename. */ + *file = (const char *)uristr; + return (2); + } + else + { + /* Dup the string and skip over the pkcs11: prefix then. */ + uristr2 = strdup(uristr + strlen(PK11_URI_PREFIX)); + if (uristr2 == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Initialize the structure. */ + memset(uri_struct, 0, sizeof (*uri_struct)); + + /* + * Using strtok_r() would silently skip over multiple semicolons. We + * must check that before moving on. We must also avoid ';' as the first + * and the last character in the URI. + */ + if (strstr(uristr2, ";;") != NULL || uristr2[0] == ';' || + (strlen(uristr2) > 0 && uristr2[strlen(uristr2) - 1] == ';')) + goto bad_uri; + + tok = strtok_r(uristr2, ";", &l1); + for (; tok != NULL; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ";", &l1)) + { + /* "tok" is not empty so there will be something in "name". */ + name = strtok_r(tok, "=", &l2); + /* Check whether there is '=' at all. */ + if (l2 == NULL) + goto bad_uri; + + /* + * Fill out the URI structure. We do not accept duplicit + * attributes. + */ + if (strcmp(name, PK11_TOKEN) == 0) + if (uri_struct->token == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->token = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MANUF) == 0) + if (uri_struct->manuf == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->manuf = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_SERIAL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->serial == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->serial = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_MODEL) == 0) + if (uri_struct->model == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->model = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECT) == 0) + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->object = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_OBJECTTYPE) == 0) + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + { + uri_struct->objecttype = strdup(l2); + if (uri_struct->objecttype == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else if (strcmp(name, PK11_ASKPASS) == 0) + if (uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + if ((uri_struct->askpass = strdup(l2)) == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + else + goto bad_uri; + else + goto bad_uri; + } + + /* The "object" token is mandatory in the PKCS#11 URI. */ + if (uri_struct->object == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL); + goto err; + } + + free(uristr2); + return (1); +bad_uri: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); +no_mem: + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err: + pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(uri_struct, CK_FALSE); + if (uristr2 != NULL) + free(uristr2); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Free the PKCS11 URI structure and anything that might be inside. + */ +void +pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself) + { + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + free(uri_struct->token); + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + free(uri_struct->manuf); + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + free(uri_struct->serial); + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + free(uri_struct->model); + if (uri_struct->object != NULL) + free(uri_struct->object); + if (uri_struct->objecttype != NULL) + free(uri_struct->objecttype); + if (uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + free(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (free_uri_itself == CK_TRUE) + OPENSSL_free(uri_struct); + } + +/* + * While our keystore is always the one used by the pubkey slot (which is + * usually the Metaslot) we must make sure that those URI attributes that + * specify the keystore match the real attributes of our slot keystore. Note + * that one can use the METASLOT_OBJECTSTORE_TOKEN environment variable to + * change the Metaslot's keystore from the softtoken to something else (see + * libpkcs11(3LIB)). The user might want to use such attributes in the PKCS#11 + * URI to make sure that the intended keystore is used. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct) + { + CK_RV rv; + static CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR token_info = NULL; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + token_info = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (CK_TOKEN_INFO)); + if (token_info == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(pubkey_SLOTID, token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, + PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (uri_struct->token != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->token, (char *)token_info->label, + strlen(uri_struct->token) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->token)) != 0) + { + goto urierr; + } + + if (uri_struct->manuf != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->manuf, + (char *)token_info->manufacturerID, + strlen(uri_struct->manuf) > 32 ? 32 : + strlen(uri_struct->manuf)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->model != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->model, (char *)token_info->model, + strlen(uri_struct->model) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->model)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + if (uri_struct->serial != NULL) + if (strncmp(uri_struct->serial, + (char *)token_info->serialNumber, + strlen(uri_struct->serial) > 16 ? 16 : + strlen(uri_struct->serial)) != 0) + goto urierr; + + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); + +urierr: + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH); + /* Correct error already set above for the "err" label. */ +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Return the process PIN caching policy. We initialize it just once so if the + * process change OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY during the operation it will + * not have any affect on the policy. + * + * We assume that the "uri_lock" mutex is already locked. + * + * Returns the caching policy number. + */ +int +pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void) + { + char *value = NULL; + static int policy = POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED; + + if (policy != POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED) + return (policy); + + value = getenv("OPENSSL_PKCS11_PIN_CACHING_POLICY"); + + if (value == NULL || strcmp(value, "none") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_NONE; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + if (strcmp(value, "mlocked-memory") == 0) + { + policy = POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY; + goto done; + } + + return (POLICY_WRONG_VALUE); +done: + return (policy); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in memory once. We already know that we have either "memory" or + * "mlocked-memory" keyword correctly set. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_cache_pin(char *pin) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + /* We set the PIN only once since all URIs must have it the same. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + goto ok; + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MEMORY) + if ((token_pin = strdup(pin)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + else + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY) + { + if (mlock_pin_in_memory(pin) == 0) + goto err; + } + +ok: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (1); +err: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Cache the PIN in mlock(3C)ed memory. If mlock(3C) fails we will not resort to + * the normal memory caching. + * + * Note that this function must be called under the protection of the "uri_lock" + * mutex. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +static int +mlock_pin_in_memory(char *pin) + { + void *addr = NULL; + long pagesize = 0; + + /* mlock(3C) locks pages so we need one whole page for the PIN. */ + if ((pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* This will ensure we have a page aligned pointer... */ + if ((addr = mmap(0, pagesize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + /* ...because "addr" must be page aligned here. */ + if (mlock(addr, pagesize) == -1) + { + /* + * Missing the PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege might be a common + * problem so distinguish this situation from other issues. + */ + if (errno == EPERM) + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING); + else + PK11err(PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, + PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED); + + /* + * We already have a problem here so there is no need to check + * that we could unmap the page. The PIN is not there yet + * anyway. + */ + (void) munmap(addr, pagesize); + goto err; + } + + /* Copy the PIN to the mlocked memory. */ + token_pin = (char *)addr; + strlcpy(token_pin, pin, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of + * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from + * multiple threads. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private) + { + CK_RV rv; + + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); + goto err; + } + + /* + * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been even + * initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we are supposed to + * always log in if we are going to access private keys. However, we may + * need to log in even for accessing public keys in case that the + * CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED flag is set. + */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || + is_private == CK_TRUE) && ~pubkey_token_flags & + CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread gets into + * pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We cannot avoid it since we + * cannot guard fork() in there with a lock because we could end up in + * a dead lock in the child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded + * environment so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to + * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call fork() held a + * lock, making future unlocking impossible. We lock right before + * C_Login(). + */ + if (pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED || is_private == CK_TRUE) + { + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + if (pk11_get_pin(uri_struct->askpass, + &uri_struct->pin) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from + * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. + * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in + * the engine. + * + * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. + * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. + */ + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, + CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)uri_struct->pin, + strlen(uri_struct->pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the passphrasedialog for possible child (which + * would need to relogin). + */ + if (passphrasedialog == NULL && + uri_struct->askpass != NULL) + { + passphrasedialog = + strdup(uri_struct->askpass); + + if (passphrasedialog == NULL) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + } + + /* + * Check the PIN caching policy. Note that user might + * have provided a PIN even when no PIN was required - + * in that case we always remove the PIN from memory. + */ + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() == + POLICY_WRONG_VALUE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID); + goto err_locked; + } + + if (pk11_get_pin_caching_policy() != POLICY_NONE) + if (pk11_cache_pin(uri_struct->pin) == 0) + goto err_locked; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + } + else + { + /* + * If token does not require login we take it as the + * login was done. + */ + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + } + + /* + * If we raced at pk11_get_pin() we must make sure that all threads that + * called pk11_get_pin() will erase the PIN from memory, not just the + * one that called C_Login(). Note that if we were supposed to cache the + * PIN it was already cached by now so filling "uri_struct.pin" with + * zero bytes is always OK since pk11_cache_pin() makes a copy of it. + */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + + return (1); + +err_locked: + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); +err: + /* Always get rid of the PIN. */ + if (uri_struct->pin != NULL) + memset(uri_struct->pin, 0, strlen(uri_struct->pin)); + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the parent. There + * are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() but still it is quite + * different so we need a separate function for this. + * + * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is + * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We are in the child so check if we should login to the token again. + * Note that it is enough to log in to the token through one session + * only, all already open and all future sessions can access the token + * then. + */ + if (passphrasedialog != NULL) + { + char *pin = NULL; + + /* If we cached the PIN then use it. */ + if (token_pin != NULL) + pin = token_pin; + else if (pk11_get_pin(passphrasedialog, &pin) == 0) + goto err; + + (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock); + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + goto err; + } + (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock); + + /* Forget the PIN now if we did not cache it before. */ + if (pin != token_pin) + { + memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); + OPENSSL_free(pin); + } + } + + return (1); +err: + return (0); + } + +/* + * This function forks and runs an external command. It would be nice if we + * could use popen(3C)/pclose(3C) for that but unfortunately we need to be able + * to get rid of the PIN from the memory. With p(open|close) function calls we + * cannot control the stdio's memory used for buffering and our tests showed + * that the PIN really stays there even after pclose(). + * + * Returns: + * allocated buffer on success + * NULL on failure + */ +static char * +run_askpass(char *dialog) + { + pid_t pid; + int n, p[2]; + char *buf = NULL; + + if (pipe(p) == -1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED); + return (NULL); + } + + switch (pid = fork()) + { + case -1: + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, PK11_R_FORK_FAILED); + return (NULL); + /* child */ + case 0: + /* + * This should make sure that dup2() will not fail on + * file descriptor shortage. + */ + close(p[0]); + (void) dup2(p[1], 1); + close(p[1]); + /* + * Note that we cannot use PK11err() here since we are + * in the child. However, parent will get read() error + * so do not worry. + */ + (void) execl(dialog, basename(dialog), NULL); + exit(1); + /* parent */ + default: + /* +1 is for the terminating '\0' */ + buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN + 1); + if (buf == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (NULL); + } + + close(p[1]); + n = read(p[0], buf, PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN); + if (n == -1 || n == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, + PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return (NULL); + } + buf[n] = '\0'; + + (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + } + + return (buf); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/engines/pkcs11/hw_pk11_uri.h Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_URI_H +#define HW_PK11_URI_H + +#include <security/pkcs11t.h> + +/* PKCS#11 URI related prefixes and attributes. */ +#define PK11_URI_PREFIX "pkcs11:" +#define FILE_URI_PREFIX "file://" +#define PK11_TOKEN "token" +#define PK11_MANUF "manuf" +#define PK11_SERIAL "serial" +#define PK11_MODEL "model" +#define PK11_OBJECT "object" +#define PK11_OBJECTTYPE "objecttype" +#define PK11_ASKPASS "passphrasedialog" + +/* PIN caching policy. */ +#define POLICY_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define POLICY_NONE 1 +#define POLICY_MEMORY 2 +#define POLICY_MLOCKED_MEMORY 3 +#define POLICY_WRONG_VALUE 4 + +/* + * That's what getpassphrase(3c) supports. + */ +#define PK11_MAX_PIN_LEN 256 + +/* Add new attributes of the PKCS#11 URI here. */ +typedef struct pkcs11_uri_struct { + char *object; /* object label, the only mandatory info */ + char *objecttype; /* (private|public|cert), currently unused */ + char *token; /* token label */ + char *manuf; /* manufacturer label */ + char *serial; /* serial number label */ + char *model; /* model label */ + char *askpass; /* full path to the command to get the PIN */ + /* Not part of the PKCS11 URI itself. */ + char *pin; /* token PIN */ +} pkcs11_uri; + +/* For URI processing. */ +extern pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock; + +int pk11_get_pin(char *dialog, char **pin); +int pk11_get_pin_caching_policy(void); +int pk11_process_pkcs11_uri(const char *uristr, pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, + const char **file); +int pk11_check_token_attrs(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct); +void pk11_free_pkcs11_uri(pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL free_uri_itself); +int pk11_cache_pin(char *pin); +int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + pkcs11_uri *uri_struct, CK_BBOOL is_private); +int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +#endif /* HW_PK11_URI_H */
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/llib-lcrypto Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* LINTLIBRARY */ +/* PROTOLIB1 */ + +#include <openssl/aes.h> +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h> +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/blowfish.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/camellia.h> +#include <openssl/cms.h> +#include <openssl/comp.h> +#include <openssl/conf.h> +#include <openssl/conf_api.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/des.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/e_os2.h> +#include <openssl/ebcdic.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> +#include <openssl/kssl.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/md2.h> +#include <openssl/md4.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/modes.h> +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/pem2.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h> +#include <openssl/pqueue.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/ripemd.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/safestack.h> +#include <openssl/sha.h> +#include <openssl/stack.h> +#include <openssl/symhacks.h> +#include <openssl/ts.h> +#include <openssl/txt_db.h> +#include <openssl/ui.h> +#include <openssl/ui_compat.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/llib-lssl Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + */ + +/* LINTLIBRARY */ +/* PROTOLIB1 */ + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <openssl/ssl2.h> +#include <openssl/ssl23.h> +#include <openssl/ssl3.h> +#include <openssl/tls1.h>
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/openssl-1.0.0.license Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + + LICENSE ISSUES + ============== + + The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a dual license, i.e. both the conditions of + the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit. + See below for the actual license texts. Actually both licenses are BSD-style + Open Source licenses. In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL + please contact openssl-core@openssl.org. + + OpenSSL License + --------------- + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + + Original SSLeay License + ----------------------- + +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/openssl-1.0.0.p5m Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,1406 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +<transform file path=usr.*/man/.+ -> default mangler.man.stability uncommitted> +set name=pkg.fmri \ + value=pkg:/library/security/openssl@$(IPS_COMPONENT_VERSION),$(BUILD_VERSION) +set name=pkg.description \ + value="OpenSSL is a full-featured toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library." +set name=pkg.summary value="OpenSSL - a Toolkit for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer (TLS v1) protocols and general purpose cryptographic library" +set name=info.classification \ + value="org.opensolaris.category.2008:System/Security" +set name=info.source_url value=$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL) +set name=info.upstream_url value=http://www.openssl.org +set name=opensolaris.arc_url \ + value=http://sac.sfbay.sun.com/PSARC/2011/025 +set name=org.opensolaris.consolidation value=$(CONSOLIDATION) +# Basic directories, links, and a configuration file. +dir path=etc +dir path=etc/openssl group=sys +file path=etc/openssl/openssl.cnf group=sys mode=0644 original_name=SUNWopenssl:etc/sfw/openssl/openssl.cnf preserve=true +dir path=etc/openssl/certs group=sys +dir path=etc/openssl/private group=sys mode=0700 +dir path=etc/sfw +link path=etc/sfw/openssl target=../openssl +dir path=lib +dir path=lib/$(MACH64) +dir path=lib/openssl +dir path=lib/openssl/engines +link path=lib/openssl/engines/64 target=$(MACH64) +dir path=lib/openssl/engines/$(MACH64) +dir path=usr/lib +dir path=usr/lib/$(MACH64) +# Commands. +dir path=usr +dir path=usr/bin +file $(MACH32)/apps/openssl path=usr/bin/openssl +file etc/openssl/misc/CA.pl path=usr/bin/CA.pl +dir path=usr/sfw +dir path=usr/sfw/bin +link path=usr/sfw/bin/openssl target=../../bin/openssl +dir path=usr/bin/$(MACH64) +dir path=usr/sfw/bin/$(MACH64) +file $(MACH64)/apps/openssl path=usr/bin/$(MACH64)/openssl +link path=usr/sfw/bin/$(MACH64)/openssl target=../../../bin/$(MACH64)/openssl +# 32 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines. +file $(MACH32)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 path=lib/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +link path=lib/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +file $(MACH32)/libssl.so.1.0.0 path=lib/libssl.so.1.0.0 +link path=lib/libssl.so target=libssl.so.1.0.0 +file llib-lcrypto path=lib/llib-lcrypto +file $(MACH32)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/llib-lcrypto.ln +file llib-lssl path=lib/llib-lssl +file $(MACH32)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/llib-lssl.ln +file $(MACH32)/engines/libdevcrypto.so path=lib/openssl/engines/libdevcrypto.so.1 +link path=lib/openssl/engines/libdevcrypto.so target=libdevcrypto.so.1 +link path=usr/lib/libcrypto.so target=../../lib/libcrypto.so +link path=usr/lib/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 target=../../lib/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +link path=usr/lib/libssl.so target=../../lib/libssl.so +link path=usr/lib/libssl.so.1.0.0 target=../../lib/libssl.so.1.0.0 +# 64 bit libraries, lint libraries, and engines. +file $(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 path=lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +link path=lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so target=libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +file $(MACH64)/libssl.so.1.0.0 path=lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so.1.0.0 +link path=lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so target=libssl.so.1.0.0 +file llib-lcrypto path=lib/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto +file $(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln path=lib/$(MACH64)/llib-lcrypto.ln +file llib-lssl path=lib/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl +file $(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln path=lib/$(MACH64)/llib-lssl.ln +file $(MACH64)/engines/libdevcrypto.so path=lib/openssl/engines/$(MACH64)/libdevcrypto.so.1 +link path=lib/openssl/engines/$(MACH64)/libdevcrypto.so target=libdevcrypto.so.1 +link path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so target=../../../lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so +link path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 target=../../../lib/$(MACH64)/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 +link path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so target=../../../lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so +link path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so.1.0.0 target=../../../lib/$(MACH64)/libssl.so.1.0.0 +# Header and pkg files. +dir path=usr/include +dir path=usr/include/openssl +dir path=usr/lib/pkgconfig +dir path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/pkgconfig +file $(MACH32)/openssl.pc path=usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc +file $(MACH64)/openssl.pc path=usr/lib/$(MACH64)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc +file path=usr/include/openssl/aes.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1_mac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/asn1t.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/bio.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/blowfish.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/bn.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/buffer.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/camellia.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/cast.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/cms.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/comp.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/conf.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/conf_api.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/crypto.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/des.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/des_old.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/dh.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/dsa.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/dso.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/dtls1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/e_os2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ebcdic.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/engine.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/err.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/evp.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/hmac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/krb5_asn.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/kssl.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/lhash.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/md2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/md4.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/md5.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/modes.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/obj_mac.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/objects.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ocsp.h +# A special case. This header file is patched but possibly overwritten in the +# proto are with the 64 bit install. We must use the one from the 32 bit build +# which is the one we have a patch for. +file $(MACH32)/include/openssl/opensslconf.h path=usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/pem.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/pem2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/pkcs12.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/pkcs7.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/pqueue.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/rand.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/rc2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/rc4.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ripemd.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/rsa.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/safestack.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/sha.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl2.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl23.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ssl3.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/stack.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/symhacks.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/tls1.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ts.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/txt_db.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ui.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/ui_compat.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/x509.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h +file path=usr/include/openssl/x509v3.h +# Manual pages. +dir path=usr/share +dir path=usr/share/man +dir path=usr/share/man/man1openssl +dir path=usr/share/man/man3openssl +dir path=usr/share/man/man5openssl +dir path=usr/share/man/man7openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/CA.pl.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/asn1parse.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ca.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ciphers.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/crl.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/crl2pkcs7.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/dgst.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/dhparam.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/dsa.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/dsaparam.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ec.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ecparam.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/enc.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/errstr.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/gendsa.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/genrsa.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/nseq.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ocsp.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/openssl.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/passwd.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/pkcs12.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/pkcs7.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/pkcs8.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/rand.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/req.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/rsa.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/rsautl.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/s_client.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/s_server.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/s_time.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/sess_id.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/smime.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/speed.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/spkac.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/verify.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/version.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/x509.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/genpkey.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/pkeyutl.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/pkey.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/tsget.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/cms.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man1openssl/ts.1openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ASN1_OBJECT_new.3openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ASN1_STRING_length.3openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ASN1_STRING_new.3openssl +file path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.3openssl +file 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target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_cfb64_encrypt.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_decrypt.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_ecb_encrypt.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_encrypt.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_ofb64_encrypt.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_options.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BF_set_key.3openssl target=blowfish.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_append_filename.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_callback_ctrl.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ctrl_get_read_request.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ctrl_pending.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ctrl_wpending.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_debug_callback.3openssl target=BIO_set_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_destroy_bio_pair.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_do_accept.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_do_connect.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_eof.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_flush.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_free.3openssl target=BIO_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_free_all.3openssl target=BIO_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_accept_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_bind_mode.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_callback.3openssl target=BIO_set_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_callback_arg.3openssl target=BIO_set_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_cipher_ctx.3openssl target=BIO_f_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_cipher_status.3openssl target=BIO_f_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_close.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_conn_hostname.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_conn_int_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_conn_ip.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_conn_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_fd.3openssl target=BIO_s_fd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_fp.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_info_callback.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_md.3openssl target=BIO_f_md.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_md_ctx.3openssl target=BIO_f_md.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_mem_data.3openssl target=BIO_s_mem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_mem_ptr.3openssl target=BIO_s_mem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_num_renegotiates.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_read_request.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_retry_BIO.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_retry_reason.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_ssl.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_write_buf_size.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_get_write_guarantee.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_gets.3openssl target=BIO_read.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_int_ctrl.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_make_bio_pair.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_bio_pair.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_fd.3openssl target=BIO_s_fd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_file.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_fp.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_mem_buf.3openssl target=BIO_s_mem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_socket.3openssl target=BIO_s_socket.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_ssl.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_new_ssl_connect.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_next.3openssl target=BIO_find_type.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_pending.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_pop.3openssl target=BIO_push.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ptr_ctrl.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_puts.3openssl target=BIO_read.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_read_filename.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_reset.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_retry_type.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_rw_filename.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_seek.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set.3openssl target=BIO_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_accept_bios.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_accept_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_bind_mode.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_callback_arg.3openssl target=BIO_set_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_cipher.3openssl target=BIO_f_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_close.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_conn_hostname.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_conn_int_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_conn_ip.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_conn_port.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_fd.3openssl target=BIO_s_fd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_fp.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_info_callback.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_md.3openssl target=BIO_f_md.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_mem_buf.3openssl target=BIO_s_mem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_mem_eof_return.3openssl target=BIO_s_mem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_nbio.3openssl target=BIO_s_connect.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_nbio_accept.3openssl target=BIO_s_accept.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_ssl.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_ssl_mode.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_set_write_buf_size.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_should_io_special.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_should_read.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_should_write.3openssl target=BIO_should_retry.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_shutdown_wr.3openssl target=BIO_s_bio.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ssl_copy_session_id.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_ssl_shutdown.3openssl target=BIO_f_ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_tell.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_vfree.3openssl target=BIO_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_wpending.3openssl target=BIO_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_write.3openssl target=BIO_read.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BIO_write_filename.3openssl target=BIO_s_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_convert.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_convert_ex.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_create_param.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_free.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_get_flags.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_invert.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_invert_ex.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_set_flags.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_BLINDING_update.3openssl target=BN_BLINDING_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_CTX_end.3openssl target=BN_CTX_start.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_CTX_free.3openssl target=BN_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_CTX_get.3openssl target=BN_CTX_start.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_CTX_init.3openssl target=BN_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_MONT_CTX_copy.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_MONT_CTX_free.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_MONT_CTX_init.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_MONT_CTX_new.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_MONT_CTX_set.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_RECP_CTX_free.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_RECP_CTX_init.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_RECP_CTX_new.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_RECP_CTX_set.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_bin2bn.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_bn2dec.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_bn2hex.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_bn2mpi.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_clear.3openssl target=BN_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_clear_bit.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_clear_free.3openssl target=BN_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_dec2bn.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_div.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_div_recp.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_div_word.3openssl target=BN_add_word.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_dup.3openssl target=BN_copy.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_exp.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_free.3openssl target=BN_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_from_montgomery.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_gcd.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_get_word.3openssl target=BN_zero.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_hex2bn.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_init.3openssl target=BN_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_bit_set.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_odd.3openssl target=BN_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_one.3openssl target=BN_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_prime.3openssl target=BN_generate_prime.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_prime_fasttest.3openssl target=BN_generate_prime.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_word.3openssl target=BN_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_is_zero.3openssl target=BN_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_lshift.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_lshift1.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mask_bits.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_add.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_exp.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_mul.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_sqr.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_sub.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mod_word.3openssl target=BN_add_word.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mpi2bn.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mul.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_mul_word.3openssl target=BN_add_word.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_nnmod.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_num_bits.3openssl target=BN_num_bytes.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_num_bits_word.3openssl target=BN_num_bytes.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_one.3openssl target=BN_zero.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_print.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_print_fp.3openssl target=BN_bn2bin.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_pseudo_rand.3openssl target=BN_rand.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_rshift.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_rshift1.3openssl target=BN_set_bit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_set_word.3openssl target=BN_zero.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_sqr.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_sub.3openssl target=BN_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_sub_word.3openssl target=BN_add_word.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_to_montgomery.3openssl target=BN_mod_mul_montgomery.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_ucmp.3openssl target=BN_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BN_value_one.3openssl target=BN_zero.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BUF_MEM_free.3openssl target=buffer.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BUF_MEM_grow.3openssl target=buffer.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BUF_MEM_new.3openssl target=buffer.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/BUF_strdup.3openssl target=buffer.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CONF_modules_finish.3openssl target=CONF_modules_free.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CONF_modules_load.3openssl target=CONF_modules_load_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CONF_modules_unload.3openssl target=CONF_modules_free.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_get_ex_data.3openssl target=CRYPTO_set_ex_data.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_lock.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_num_locks.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_set_locking_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_cbc_cksum.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_cfb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_cfb_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_crypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ecb2_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ecb3_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ecb_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_enc_read.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_enc_write.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_fcrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_is_weak_key.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_key_sched.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ncbc_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ofb64_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_ofb_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_pcbc_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_quad_cksum.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_random_key.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_set_key.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_set_key_checked.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_set_key_unchecked.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_set_odd_parity.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_string_to_2keys.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_string_to_key.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DES_xcbc_encrypt.3openssl target=des.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_OpenSSL.3openssl target=DH_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_check.3openssl target=DH_generate_parameters.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_compute_key.3openssl target=DH_generate_key.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_free.3openssl target=DH_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_get_default_method.3openssl target=DH_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_get_ex_data.3openssl target=DH_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_new_method.3openssl target=DH_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_set_default_method.3openssl target=DH_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DH_set_ex_data.3openssl target=DH_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DHparams_print.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DHparams_print_fp.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_OpenSSL.3openssl target=DSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_SIG_free.3openssl target=DSA_SIG_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_do_verify.3openssl target=DSA_do_sign.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_free.3openssl target=DSA_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_get_default_method.3openssl target=DSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_get_ex_data.3openssl target=DSA_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_new_method.3openssl target=DSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_print.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_print_fp.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_set_default_method.3openssl target=DSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_set_ex_data.3openssl target=DSA_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_sign_setup.3openssl target=DSA_sign.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSA_verify.3openssl target=DSA_sign.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSAparams_print.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/DSAparams_print_fp.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_GET_FUNC.3openssl target=ERR_GET_LIB.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_GET_REASON.3openssl target=ERR_GET_LIB.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_PACK.3openssl target=ERR_load_strings.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_add_error_data.3openssl target=ERR_put_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_error_string_n.3openssl target=ERR_error_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_free_strings.3openssl target=ERR_load_crypto_strings.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_func_error_string.3openssl target=ERR_error_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_get_error_line.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_get_error_line_data.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_get_next_error_library.3openssl target=ERR_load_strings.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_lib_error_string.3openssl target=ERR_error_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_load_UI_strings.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_error.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_error_line.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_error_line_data.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_last_error.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_last_error_line.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.3openssl target=ERR_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_pop_to_mark.3openssl target=ERR_set_mark.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_print_errors_fp.3openssl target=ERR_print_errors.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/ERR_reason_error_string.3openssl target=ERR_error_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_block_size.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_flags.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_iv_length.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_key_length.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_mode.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_nid.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CIPHER_type.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CipherFinal.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CipherFinal_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CipherInit.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CipherInit_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_CipherUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DecryptFinal.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DecryptFinal_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DecryptInit.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DecryptInit_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DecryptUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestFinal_ex.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestInit_ex.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_EncryptFinal.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_EncryptFinal_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_EncryptInit_ex.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_EncryptUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_block_size.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_copy.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_create.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_destroy.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_init.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_md.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_size.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_CTX_type.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_block_size.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_pkey_type.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_size.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_MD_type.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_OpenFinal.3openssl target=EVP_OpenInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_OpenUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_OpenInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_assign_DH.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_free.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_get1_DH.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_set1_DH.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_type.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_SealFinal.3openssl target=EVP_SealInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_SealUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_SealInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_SignFinal.3openssl target=EVP_SignInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_SignUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_SignInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_VerifyFinal.3openssl target=EVP_VerifyInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_VerifyUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_VerifyInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_dss.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_dss1.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_cipherbyname.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_cipherbynid.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_cipherbyobj.3openssl target=EVP_EncryptInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_digestbyname.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_digestbynid.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_get_digestbyobj.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_md2.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_md5.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_md_null.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_mdc2.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_ripemd160.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_sha.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_sha1.3openssl target=EVP_DigestInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_CTX_cleanup.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_CTX_init.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_Final.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_Init.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_Init_ex.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_Update.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/HMAC_cleanup.3openssl target=hmac.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD2.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD2_Final.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD2_Init.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD2_Update.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD4.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD4_Final.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD4_Init.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD4_Update.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD5.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD5_Final.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD5_Init.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MD5_Update.3openssl target=md5.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MDC2.3openssl target=mdc2.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MDC2_Final.3openssl target=mdc2.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MDC2_Init.3openssl target=mdc2.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/MDC2_Update.3openssl target=mdc2.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_cleanup.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_cmp.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_create.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_dup.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_ln2nid.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_nid2ln.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_nid2sn.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_obj2nid.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_obj2txt.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_sn2nid.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_txt2nid.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OBJ_txt2obj.3openssl target=OBJ_nid2obj.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OPENSSL_no_config.3openssl target=OPENSSL_config.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers.3openssl target=OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OpenSSL_add_all_digests.3openssl target=OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms.3openssl target=SSL_library_init.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_DHparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_DSAparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_PKCS7.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_RSAPublicKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_X509.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_X509_AUX.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_X509_CRL.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_X509_REQ.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_DHparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_DSAparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_PKCS7.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_X509.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_DHparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_DSAparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_PKCS7.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_RSAPublicKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_X509.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_X509_AUX.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_X509_CRL.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_X509_REQ.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_DHparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_DSAparams.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_X509.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW.3openssl target=pem.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_SSLeay.3openssl target=RAND_set_rand_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_event.3openssl target=RAND_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_file_name.3openssl target=RAND_load_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_get_rand_method.3openssl target=RAND_set_rand_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_pseudo_bytes.3openssl target=RAND_bytes.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_screen.3openssl target=RAND_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_seed.3openssl target=RAND_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_status.3openssl target=RAND_add.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RAND_write_file.3openssl target=RAND_load_file.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RC4.3openssl target=rc4.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RC4_set_key.3openssl target=rc4.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RIPEMD160.3openssl target=ripemd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RIPEMD160_Final.3openssl target=ripemd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RIPEMD160_Init.3openssl target=ripemd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RIPEMD160_Update.3openssl target=ripemd.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_blinding_off.3openssl target=RSA_blinding_on.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_flags.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_free.3openssl target=RSA_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_get_default_method.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_get_ex_data.3openssl target=RSA_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_get_method.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_new_method.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_null_method.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_add_SSLv23.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_add_none.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_check_SSLv23.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_padding_check_none.3openssl target=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_print_fp.3openssl target=RSA_print.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_private_decrypt.3openssl target=RSA_public_encrypt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_public_decrypt.3openssl target=RSA_private_encrypt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_set_default_method.3openssl target=RSA_set_method.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_set_ex_data.3openssl target=RSA_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_verify.3openssl target=RSA_sign.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.3openssl target=RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SHA1.3openssl target=sha.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SHA1_Final.3openssl target=sha.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SHA1_Init.3openssl target=sha.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SHA1_Update.3openssl target=sha.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL.3openssl target=ssl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CIPHER_description.3openssl target=SSL_CIPHER_get_name.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_bits.3openssl target=SSL_CIPHER_get_name.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_version.3openssl target=SSL_CIPHER_get_name.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_add_client_CA.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_check_private_key.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_clear_options.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_cert_store.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list.3openssl target=SSL_get_client_CA_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_info_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_mode.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_options.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_timeout.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_timeout.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_remove_session.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_add_session.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_accept.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_connect.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_hits.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_misses.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_sess_number.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_verify.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_SESSION_get_timeout.3openssl target=SSL_SESSION_get_time.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_SESSION_set_time.3openssl target=SSL_SESSION_get_time.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_SESSION_set_timeout.3openssl target=SSL_SESSION_get_time.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_add_client_CA.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_add_session.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_add_session.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_alert_desc_string.3openssl target=SSL_alert_type_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_alert_desc_string_long.3openssl target=SSL_alert_type_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_alert_type_string_long.3openssl target=SSL_alert_type_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_callback_ctrl.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_check_private_key.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_clear_options.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_ctrl.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_flush_sessions.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_accept_state.3openssl target=SSL_set_connect_state.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_cipher.3openssl target=SSL_get_current_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_cipher_bits.3openssl target=SSL_get_current_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_cipher_list.3openssl target=SSL_get_ciphers.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_cipher_name.3openssl target=SSL_get_current_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_cipher_version.3openssl target=SSL_get_current_cipher.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_info_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_max_cert_list.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_mode.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_msg_callback_arg.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_options.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_quiet_shutdown.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_shutdown.3openssl target=SSL_set_shutdown.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_ssl_method.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_verify_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_verify_depth.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_verify_mode.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_has_matching_session_id.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_load_error_strings.3openssl target=ERR_load_crypto_strings.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_need_tmp_rsa.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_remove_session.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_add_session.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_rstate_string_long.3openssl target=SSL_rstate_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_cipher_list.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_client_CA_list.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_ex_data.3openssl target=SSL_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_generate_session_id.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_info_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_max_cert_list.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_mode.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_mode.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_msg_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_options.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_options.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_quiet_shutdown.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_session_id_context.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_ssl_method.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_tmp_dh.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_tmp_rsa.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_verify.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_verify.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_verify_depth.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_verify.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_state_string_long.3openssl target=SSL_state_string.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_PrivateKey.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_PrivateKey_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_certificate.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_certificate_ASN1.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_certificate_file.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_certificate.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_want_nothing.3openssl target=SSL_want.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_want_read.3openssl target=SSL_want.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_want_write.3openssl target=SSL_want.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_want_x509_lookup.3openssl target=SSL_want.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSLeay.3openssl target=OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms.3openssl target=SSL_library_init.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSLeay_version.3openssl target=OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_OpenSSL.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_error_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_info_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_input_boolean.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_input_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_user_data.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_add_verify_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_construct_prompt.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_ctrl.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_dup_error_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_dup_info_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_dup_input_boolean.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_dup_input_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_dup_verify_string.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_free.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_get0_result.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_get0_user_data.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_get_default_method.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_get_method.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_new.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_new_method.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_process.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_set_default_method.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/UI_set_method.3openssl target=ui.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object.3openssl target=X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_add_entry.3openssl target=X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID.3openssl target=X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ.3openssl target=X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_delete_entry.3openssl target=X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_entry_count.3openssl target=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_get_entry.3openssl target=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ.3openssl target=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID.3openssl target=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ.3openssl target=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_oneline.3openssl target=X509_NAME_print_ex.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_print.3openssl target=X509_NAME_print_ex.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_NAME_print_ex_fp.3openssl target=X509_NAME_print_ex.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_free.3openssl target=X509_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_add_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_check_top.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_cmp_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_div_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_dump.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_expand.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_expand2.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_fix_top.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_add_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_comba4.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_comba8.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_high.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_low_normal.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_low_recursive.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_normal.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_part_recursive.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_recursive.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_mul_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_print.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_set_high.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_set_low.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_set_max.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sqr_comba4.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sqr_comba8.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sqr_normal.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sqr_recursive.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sqr_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_sub_words.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/bn_wexpand.3openssl target=bn_internal.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_509_CRL_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509_CRL.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_DSA_SIG.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_Netscape_RSA.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_X509_CRL_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509_CRL.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_X509_REQ_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509_REQ.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_X509_REQ_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509_REQ.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_X509_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/d2i_X509_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/des_read_2passwords.3openssl target=ui_compat.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/des_read_password.3openssl target=ui_compat.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/des_read_pw.3openssl target=ui_compat.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/des_read_pw_string.3openssl target=ui_compat.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_ASN1_OBJECT.3openssl target=d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_DHparams.3openssl target=d2i_DHparams.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_DSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_DSAPublicKey.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_DSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_DSA_SIG.3openssl target=d2i_DSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_Netscape_RSA.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp.3openssl target=d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_RSAPrivateKey.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_RSAPublicKey.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_RSA_PUBKEY.3openssl target=d2i_RSAPublicKey.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_SSL_SESSION.3openssl target=d2i_SSL_SESSION.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509.3openssl target=d2i_X509.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_ALGOR.3openssl target=d2i_X509_ALGOR.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_CRL.3openssl target=d2i_X509_CRL.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_CRL_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509_CRL.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_CRL_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509_CRL.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_NAME.3openssl target=d2i_X509_NAME.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_REQ.3openssl target=d2i_X509_REQ.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_REQ_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509_REQ.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_REQ_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509_REQ.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_SIG.3openssl target=d2i_X509_SIG.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_bio.3openssl target=d2i_X509.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/i2d_X509_fp.3openssl target=d2i_X509.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_delete.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_doall.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_doall_arg.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_error.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_free.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_insert.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_new.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_node_stats.3openssl target=lh_stats.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_node_stats_bio.3openssl target=lh_stats.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_node_usage_stats.3openssl target=lh_stats.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_node_usage_stats_bio.3openssl target=lh_stats.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_retrieve.3openssl target=lhash.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/lh_stats_bio.3openssl target=lh_stats.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_add0_crl.3openssl target=CMS_add0_cert.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_ctrl.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_add1_cert.3openssl target=CMS_add0_cert.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_get1_crls.3openssl target=CMS_add0_cert.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_get1_certs.3openssl target=CMS_add0_cert.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_free.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_paramgen.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_free.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_init.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_ctrl_str.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_hash.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_sign_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_sign.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestSignFinal.3openssl target=EVP_DigestSignInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_SignerInfo_sign.3openssl target=CMS_sign_add1_signer.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_derive_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_derive.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_keygen_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_verify_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_verify.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestSignUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_DigestSignInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_current.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_print_public.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_print_private.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_decrypt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_print_params.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_print_private.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_get0_eContentType.3openssl target=CMS_get0_type.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_encrypt.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_set1_eContentType.3openssl target=CMS_get0_type.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestVerifyFinal.3openssl target=EVP_DigestVerifyInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_set1_signer_certs.3openssl target=CMS_get0_SignerInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set_error.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_add0_recipient_key.3openssl target=CMS_add1_recipient_cert.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate.3openssl target=EVP_DigestVerifyInit.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_type.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb.3openssl target=X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest.3openssl target=CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp.3openssl target=CMS_get0_SignerInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_derive.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_set_default.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_get_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback.3openssl target=threads.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0.3openssl target=CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_new.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_get_psk_identity_hint.3openssl target=SSL_get_psk_identity.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_use_psk_identity_hint.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_cmp.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies.3openssl target=X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_psk_client_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_set_psk_server_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_keygen.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id.3openssl target=CMS_get0_SignerInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/X509_verify_cert_error_string.3openssl target=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values.3openssl target=CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.3openssl target=EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback.3openssl target=SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +link path=usr/share/man/man3openssl/CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id.3openssl target=CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.3openssl +license openssl-1.0.0.license license="OpenSSL, SSLeay" +legacy desc="OpenSSL is a full-featured toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library." name="OpenSSL - a Toolkit for Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer (TLS v1) protocols and general purpose cryptographic library" pkg=SUNWopenssl-commands +legacy desc="OpenSSL C/C++ header files for development of OpenSSL applications (1.0.0)" name="OpenSSL Header Files" pkg=SUNWopenssl-include +legacy desc="OpenSSL Libraries (1.0.0) (Usr)" name="OpenSSL Libraries (Usr)" pkg=SUNWopenssl-libraries +legacy desc="OpenSSL Manual Pages (1.0.0)" name="OpenSSL Manual Pages" pkg=SUNWopenssl-man +legacy desc="OpenSSL Libraries (1.0.0) (Root)" name="OpenSSL Libraries (Root)" pkg=SUNWopensslr
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches-post-config/opensslconf.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- /tmp/opensslconf.h Fri Feb 11 15:36:12 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/opensslconf.h Fri Feb 11 16:58:36 2011 +@@ -181,7 +181,11 @@ + + #if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */ + #if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR) ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#define ENGINESDIR "/lib/openssl/engines/64" ++#else + #define ENGINESDIR "/lib/openssl/engines" ++#endif + #define OPENSSLDIR "/etc/openssl" + #endif + #endif +@@ -228,21 +232,39 @@ + /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a + * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ + #ifndef DES_LONG ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) ++#define DES_LONG unsigned int ++#else + #define DES_LONG unsigned long + #endif + #endif ++#endif + + #if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H) + #define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H ++/* ++ * OpenSSL revision 1.521 from 2005-12-15 in OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable branch changed ++ * 64 bit sparcv9 configuration from SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG to BN_LLONG. ++ */ ++#if defined(__x86_64) ++#undef BN_LLONG ++#else + #define BN_LLONG ++#endif + + /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ + + /* Only one for the following should be defined */ ++#if defined(__x86_64) ++#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG ++#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT ++#else + #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG + #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT + #define THIRTY_TWO_BIT + #endif ++#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT ++#endif + + #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) + #define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/08-6193522.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in +--- openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in 2005-07-04 23:44:22.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/apps/CA.pl.in 2009-04-21 16:08:45.354925289 +0200 +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ + $X509="$openssl x509"; + $PKCS12="$openssl pkcs12"; + +-$CATOP="./demoCA"; ++$CATOP="/etc/openssl"; + $CAKEY="cakey.pem"; + $CAREQ="careq.pem"; + $CACERT="cacert.pem"; +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf +--- openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf 2005-09-16 14:20:24.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/apps/openssl.cnf 2009-04-21 16:07:13.910980196 +0200 +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + #################################################################### + [ CA_default ] + +-dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept ++dir = /etc/openssl # Where everything is kept + certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept + crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept + database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ + + certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate + serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number +-crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number ++#crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number + # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL + crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL + private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key +@@ -122,17 +122,17 @@ + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) +-countryName_default = AU ++#countryName_default = US + countryName_min = 2 + countryName_max = 2 + + stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) +-stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State ++#stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State + + localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) + + 0.organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) +-0.organizationName_default = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd ++#0.organizationName_default = Unconfigured OpenSSL Installation + + # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-) + #1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (eg, company)
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/11-6546806.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod +--- openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod 2002-07-18 20:54:45.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod 2009-04-10 11:09:46.449071541 +0200 +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + + =head1 NAME + +-HMAC, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_cleanup - HMAC message ++HMAC, HMAC_CTX_init, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Init_ex, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_CTX_cleanup, HMAC_cleanup - HMAC message + authentication code + + =head1 SYNOPSIS
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/14-manpage_openssl.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +diff -ruN openssl-0.9.8a/util/extract-section.pl openssl-0.9.8a/util/extract-section.pl +--- openssl-0.9.8a/util/extract-section.pl 2004-11-25 18:47:31.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-0.9.8a/util/extract-section.pl 2009-04-08 12:05:03.128230348 +0200 +@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ + while(<STDIN>) { + if (/=for\s+comment\s+openssl_manual_section:(\S+)/) + { +- print "$1\n"; ++ print "${1}openssl\n"; + exit 0; + } + } + +-print "$ARGV[0]\n"; ++print "${ARGV[0]}openssl\n"; +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/15-pkcs11_engine-0.9.8a.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +--- /tmp/Configure Fri Feb 11 14:40:39 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Configure Fri Feb 11 14:41:36 2011 +@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ + + # see INSTALL for instructions. + +-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; ++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; + + # Options: + # +@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ + # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories + # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory) + # ++# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. ++# (Default: none) ++# + # --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by + # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can + # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". +@@ -622,6 +625,9 @@ + my $idx_arflags = $idx++; + my $idx_multilib = $idx++; + ++# PKCS#11 engine patch ++my $pk11_libname=""; ++ + my $prefix=""; + my $libdir=""; + my $openssldir=""; +@@ -824,6 +830,10 @@ + { + $flags.=$_." "; + } ++ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $pk11_libname=$1; ++ } + elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) + { + $prefix=$1; +@@ -961,6 +971,13 @@ + exit 0; + } + ++if (! $pk11_libname) ++ { ++ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; ++ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; ++ exit 1; ++ } ++ + if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { + $target = "Cygwin".$1; + } +@@ -1123,6 +1140,8 @@ + if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } + else { $no_user_cflags=1; } + ++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; ++ + # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through + # the script "config" or manually. + if (!$no_krb5) +@@ -1492,6 +1511,7 @@ + s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; + s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; + s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; ++ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; + s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; +--- /tmp/Makefile.org Fri Feb 11 14:41:54 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.org Fri Feb 11 14:38:01 2011 +@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ + INSTALL_PREFIX= + INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl + ++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. ++PK11_LIB_LOCATION= ++ + # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! + OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl + +--- /tmp/Makefile Fri Feb 11 14:42:03 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/Makefile Fri Feb 11 14:45:43 2011 +@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ + eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ + tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ + tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ +- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c ++ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ ++ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11_uri.c + LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ + eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ + tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ + tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ +- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o ++ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ ++ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11_uri.o + + SRC= $(LIBSRC) + +--- /tmp/eng_all.c Fri Feb 11 14:46:11 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Fri Feb 11 14:38:01 2011 +@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ + ENGINE_load_cryptodev(); + #endif + ENGINE_load_dynamic(); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 ++ ENGINE_load_pk11(); ++#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA +--- /tmp/engine.h Fri Feb 11 14:46:24 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/engine.h Fri Feb 11 14:47:32 2011 +@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ + #endif + #endif + void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); ++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void); + void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); + + /* Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/18-compiler_opts.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +--- openssl-1.0.0d/Configure Thu Feb 10 20:02:41 2011 ++++ /tmp/Configure Thu Feb 10 20:01:51 2011 +@@ -249,6 +255,15 @@ + #"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::", + "sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::", + ++#### Solaris configs, used for OpenSSL as delivered by S11. ++"solaris-x86-cc-sunw","cc:-m32 -xO3 -xspace -g -Xa::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -lc:BN_LLONG RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m32 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++# ++"solaris64-x86_64-cc-sunw","cc:-xO3 -m64 -g -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -lc:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK BF_PTR DES_PTR DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m64 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++# ++"solaris-sparcv9-cc-sunw","cc:-xtarget=ultra -m32 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -lc:BN_LLONG RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m32 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++# ++"solaris64-sparcv9-cc-sunw","cc:-xtarget=ultra -m64 -xregs=no%appl -xO5 -g -xstrconst -xdepend -xspace -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -lc:BN_LLONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-m64 -G -dy -z text -zdefs -Bdirect -zignore -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):/usr/ccs/bin/ar rs::/64", ++ + #### IRIX 5.x configs + # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate. + "irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/20-remove_rpath.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- /export/openssl/openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.shared Sat Aug 21 13:36:49 2010 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.shared Mon Feb 14 14:25:51 2011 +@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ + @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ + $(DO_GNU_APP); \ + else \ +- LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -R $(LIBRPATH)"; \ ++ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_APP) +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/23-noexstack.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +--- /tmp/Makefile.shared Mon Feb 14 14:33:05 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.shared Mon Feb 14 14:35:56 2011 +@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ + SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_SO_A) ++# Make sure the apps have non-executable stacks and data (x86/x64 only). + link_app.solaris: + @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ + $(DO_GNU_APP); \ +@@ -395,6 +396,10 @@ + else \ + LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)"; \ + fi; \ ++ if expr $(PLATFORM) : '.*x86.*' > /dev/null; then \ ++ LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS} -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexdata"; \ ++ fi; \ ++ LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS} -M/usr/lib/ld/map.noexstk -M/usr/lib/ld/map.pagealign"; \ + $(LINK_APP) + + # OpenServer 5 native compilers used
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/27-6978791.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +--- /tmp/Makefile.shared Mon Feb 14 14:39:29 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.shared Mon Feb 14 14:50:52 2011 +@@ -387,6 +387,9 @@ + ALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSZ}allextract"; \ + NOALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSZ}defaultextract"; \ + SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ ++ if [ $(LIBNAME) = "ssl" ]; then \ ++ SHAREDFLAGS="$$SHAREDFLAGS $${MINUSZ}nodelete"; \ ++ fi; \ + fi; \ + $(LINK_SO_A) + # Make sure the apps have non-executable stacks and data (x86/x64 only).
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/28-enginesdir.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +--- /tmp/18/Configure Fri Feb 11 15:15:50 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Configure Fri Feb 11 15:18:09 2011 +@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ + # --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise) + # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories + # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory) ++# --enginesdir engines shared library location ++# (Default: $prefix/lib/engines) + # + # --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. + # (Default: none) +@@ -640,6 +642,7 @@ + my $prefix=""; + my $libdir=""; + my $openssldir=""; ++my $enginesdir=""; + my $exe_ext=""; + my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}"; + my $cross_compile_prefix=""; +@@ -855,6 +858,10 @@ + { + $openssldir=$1; + } ++ elsif (/^--enginesdir=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $enginesdir=$1; ++ } + elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/) + { + $install_prefix=$1; +@@ -1128,6 +1135,10 @@ + # we're ready to tolerate, so don't... + $multilib="" if !-d "$prefix/lib$multilib"; + ++if ($enginesdir eq "") { ++ $enginesdir = "$prefix/lib/engines"; ++} ++ + $libdir="lib$multilib" if $libdir eq ""; + + $cflags = "$cflags$exp_cflags"; +@@ -1717,7 +1728,7 @@ + } + elsif (/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/) + { +- my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines"; ++ my $foo = "$enginesdir"; + $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g; + print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n"; + }
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-1.0.0/patches/29-devcrypto_engine.patch Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +--- /tmp/Makefile Mon Feb 14 14:59:22 2011 ++++ openssl-1.0.0d/engines/Makefile Mon Feb 14 15:00:35 2011 +@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ + APPS= + + LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a +-LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi ++LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi \ ++ devcrypto + + LIBSRC= e_4758cca.c \ + e_aep.c \ +@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ + e_sureware.c \ + e_ubsec.c \ + e_padlock.c \ +- e_capi.c ++ e_capi.c \ ++ e_devcrypto.c + LIBOBJ= e_4758cca.o \ + e_aep.o \ + e_atalla.o \ +@@ -49,7 +51,8 @@ + e_sureware.o \ + e_ubsec.o \ + e_padlock.o \ +- e_capi.o ++ e_capi.o \ ++ e_devcrypto.o + + SRC= $(LIBSRC) + +@@ -63,7 +66,8 @@ + e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \ + e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \ + e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \ +- e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h ++ e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \ ++ e_devcrypto_err.c e_devcrypto_err.h + + ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) + +@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ + for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \ + $(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \ + LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \ +- LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \ ++ LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \ + link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \ + done; \ + else \
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-fips/32/isalist.sh Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +#!/bin/ksh93 +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# A simple isalist replacement which pretends to be 32bit even when running +# 64bit. + +UNAME_M=$(uname -m) + +case $UNAME_M in + sun4[uv]) + echo "sparcv8" + ;; + i86pc) + echo "i386" + ;; + *) + echo "unknown" + ;; +esac +
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-fips/Makefile Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# +# Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# +# This component is not to be installed. It is used from openssl-0.9.8-fips-140 +# to build FIPS-140 certified OpenSSL libraries. +# + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/shared-macros.mk + +COMPONENT_NAME = openssl-fips +COMPONENT_VERSION = 1.2 +COMPONENT_SRC = $(COMPONENT_NAME)-$(COMPONENT_VERSION) +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE = $(COMPONENT_SRC).tar.gz +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_HASH= sha1:f09c3040da6cdd8bdd8c9cf01af8f14f89ee84d1 +COMPONENT_ARCHIVE_URL = http://www.openssl.org/source/$(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE) + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/prep.mk +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/configure.mk + +# In order to build a 32bit version on a 64bit system the isalist(1) command +# must be substituted for the 32bit build so that amd64|sparcv9 is not part of +# its output. isalist is used internally when configuring the canister before +# building it. In order to allow make install to be run as a no-op we have to +# fake "make install" since we do not want to install the files anywhere. The +# command sets U1 and U2 are defined in the FIPS 1.2 security policy and must be +# run as shown there. Nothing from the tarball can be modified. We use the U2 +# command set, see below. +FAKE_ISALIST = 32/isalist +FAKE_MAKE = gmake +FAKE_CC = cc +FAKE_APPS = $(FAKE_ISALIST) $(FAKE_MAKE) $(FAKE_CC) + +# Do not use $(PWD), it would not work if run from a different directory with +# "gmake -C" as we do from openssl-0.9.8-fips-140. +FIPS_PATH_32 = $(COMPONENT_DIR)/32:$(PATH) +FIPS_PATH_64 = $(PATH) + +OPENSSL_FIPS_HMAC_KEY = etaonrishdlcupfm +OPENSSL_FIPS_HMAC = 79193087e8115df76d3de1f346f7410df79cf6e0 + +# There is a broken link in the tarball which causes cp(1) to fail which would +# fail the whole configure process. It's safer to get rid of the link than +# adding "true" at the end of COMPONENT_PRE_CONFIGURE_ACTION since that could +# hide real issues. +COMPONENT_PRE_CONFIGURE_ACTION = ( cd $(@D); \ + $(RM) $(SOURCE_DIR)/test/fips_aes_data; $(CP) -r $(SOURCE_DIR)/* .; ) + +# There is a specific way that must be followed to build the FIPS-140 canister. +# It is "./config fipscanisterbuild; make; make install" and is called a command +# set "U2" in the OpenSSL FIPS-140 User Guide. +CONFIGURE_SCRIPT = config +CONFIGURE_OPTIONS = fipscanisterbuild +COMPONENT_BUILD_ARGS = +COMPONENT_BUILD_TARGETS = +COMPONENT_INSTALL_ARGS = +COMPONENT_INSTALL_TARGETS = install +CONFIGURE_ENV += FIPS_SITE_LD=$(LD) PATH=$(FIPS_PATH_$(BITS)) +COMPONENT_BUILD_ENV += FIPS_SITE_LD=$(LD) REALCC=$(CC) MYMAKE=$(MAKE) + +$(BUILD_32_and_64): $(FAKE_APPS) + +# You should not use this target with this component unless testing or +# debugging. The OpenSSL FIPS-140 policy is strict and full U2 command set +# should be run. See above for more information. +build: $(BUILD_32_and_64) + +# We must make the "install" target a no-op (but must run it to be compliant). +# See above for more information. +install: GMAKE = $(COMPONENT_DIR)/gmake +install: $(BUILD_DIR_32)/.verified $(BUILD_DIR_64)/.verified + +# This is a recommended set of commands to verify that the FIPS-140 mode can be +# used and that we used the correct tarball. +$(BUILD_DIR)/%/.verified: $(BUILD_DIR)/%/.installed + (printf x; \ + $(ENV) - OPENSSL_FIPS=1 LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$(@D) \ + $(@D)/apps/openssl sha1 -hmac $(OPENSSL_FIPS_HMAC_KEY) \ + $(COMPONENT_ARCHIVE)) | \ + $(NAWK) '{ if ($$2 != "$(OPENSSL_FIPS_HMAC)") exit 1 }' + @echo Basic FIPS-140 mode verification passed. + $(TOUCH) $@ + +test: $(NO_TESTS) + +include $(WS_TOP)/make-rules/depend.mk
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-fips/cc.sh Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# Very simple cc wrapper whose only purpose is to ensure that cc behaves as +# desired when linking the fipscanister.o object. Currently that means adding +# "-W2,-Rfully_unroll to the compiler options. As the fips module is only built +# with Sun Studio on sparc (gcc is used on x86) this workaround will only happen +# on sparc, in fact the compiler bug this is working around is sparc specific +# anyway. + +exec $REALCC -W2,-Rfully_unroll "$@"
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/components/openssl/openssl-fips/gmake.sh Sun Jul 03 23:28:09 2011 -0700 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +#!/bin/ksh93 +# +# CDDL HEADER START +# +# The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). +# You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# +# You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE +# or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions +# and limitations under the License. +# +# When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each +# file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. +# If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the +# fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying +# information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] +# +# CDDL HEADER END +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2009, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. +# + +# Make "make install" a no-op. Everything else gets passed through make. + +if [[ $1 != install ]]; then + $MYMAKE "$@" +fi